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How to Architect a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) System for DeFi

A step-by-step technical guide for developers on designing and implementing MPC systems for DeFi applications like private price oracles and secure collaborative calculations.
Chainscore © 2026
introduction
TECHNICAL GUIDE

How to Architect a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) System for DeFi

A practical guide to designing and implementing a secure, non-custodial MPC wallet system for decentralized finance applications.

Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic technique that allows a group of parties to jointly compute a function over their private inputs without revealing those inputs to each other. In the context of DeFi, MPC is primarily used to create non-custodial wallets where the signing key is never stored in one place. Instead, it is split into multiple secret shares, distributed among different parties or devices. This architecture eliminates the single point of failure inherent in traditional private key management, providing a more resilient foundation for managing digital assets across protocols like Uniswap, Aave, and Compound.

The core architectural decision involves selecting an MPC protocol. The two predominant threshold signature schemes (TSS) for blockchain are GG18/GG20 (based on ECDSA for Ethereum-compatible chains) and FROST (often used with EdDSA, like Ed25519). GG20, an improvement on GG18, includes robustness against malicious participants. Your choice dictates the underlying elliptic curve and the specific cryptographic operations. For a DeFi system, you must also decide on the threshold (t-of-n), such as 2-of-3, where any two of three share holders can collaboratively sign a transaction, balancing security with availability.

A production MPC system for DeFi requires several backend components. You need a Key Generation Service to orchestrate the secure, distributed generation of key shares. A Signing Orchestrator manages the protocol flow when a transaction needs to be signed, communicating with the parties holding the shares. These parties are often implemented as Hardware Security Modules (HSMs), secure enclaves (like AWS Nitro or Intel SGX), or mobile devices. Crucially, the architecture must include a state synchronization layer to ensure all participants agree on the current nonce for the blockchain account, preventing replay or double-spend attacks.

From the user's perspective, the front-end application must abstract away the MPC complexity. When a user initiates a swap on a DEX, the app sends the transaction data to the Signing Orchestrator. The orchestrator contacts the required threshold of share-holding parties (e.g., the user's phone and a cloud HSM). Each party runs the MPC signing protocol locally, producing a partial signature. The orchestrator aggregates these partial signatures into a single, valid ECDSA signature that can be broadcast to the Ethereum network. The private key never reconstitutes at any point, maintaining the security model.

Security considerations are paramount. The architecture must guard against rushing attacks during signing rounds and ensure deterministic nonce generation to avoid vulnerabilities like the one exploited in the PlayStation 3 breach. All network communication between nodes must be authenticated and encrypted. Furthermore, you must plan for proactive secret sharing refresh, where key shares are periodically updated without changing the public address, to defend against attackers slowly compromising shares over time. Auditing the implementation by firms like Trail of Bits or OpenZeppelin is non-negotiable for DeFi applications handling significant value.

Integrating this MPC wallet with DeFi requires careful handling of gas fees and smart contract interactions. The MPC wallet's public address is a standard Ethereum address, so it interacts seamlessly with contracts. However, you must implement gas estimation and EIP-1559 fee market logic within the signing orchestrator. For advanced operations like batched transactions or smart contract wallet upgrades (EIP-4337), the MPC protocol must be able to sign more complex UserOperation objects. Testing on testnets like Goerli and deploying gradually with limits is essential before mainnet launch.

prerequisites
PREREQUISITES AND CORE KNOWLEDGE

How to Architect a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) System for DeFi

Building a secure and efficient MPC system requires a foundational understanding of cryptographic primitives, distributed systems, and the specific threat models of decentralized finance.

Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic technique that allows a group of parties to jointly compute a function over their private inputs without revealing those inputs to each other. In DeFi, this is most commonly applied to threshold signature schemes (TSS), where a private key is split into secret shares distributed among multiple parties. No single party ever has access to the full key; instead, a predefined threshold (e.g., 2-of-3) of parties must collaborate to produce a valid signature. This architecture fundamentally shifts the security model from a single point of failure (a hot wallet) to a distributed, fault-tolerant system, making it ideal for managing protocol treasuries, cross-chain bridges, and institutional custody.

Before designing your system, you must define its trust assumptions and threat model. Key questions include: Is the adversary model passive (honest-but-curious) or active (malicious)? What is the required threshold (t-of-n)? How many parties can be corrupted before security fails? For most DeFi applications, an active adversary model with a robust threshold like 2-of-3 or 3-of-5 is standard. You must also plan for key lifecycle management: how shares are securely generated (using a Distributed Key Generation or DKG protocol), rotated, and eventually deleted. Libraries like ZenGo's tss-lib provide implementations for these core cryptographic operations.

The system architecture consists of several critical components. Signing nodes are the participants that hold secret shares and run the MPC protocols. A coordinator (which can be decentralized or a simple relay) manages the protocol flow and message passing between nodes. A key storage module securely persists encrypted secret shares, often using hardware security modules (HSMs) or trusted execution environments (TEEs). Finally, an audit and monitoring layer logs all protocol executions to detect anomalies. These components must communicate over authenticated and encrypted channels, typically using a messaging layer like libp2p or a custom WebSocket server.

Performance and network considerations are paramount. MPC signing rounds involve multiple communication rounds between nodes, introducing latency. For a 2-of-3 ECDSA signing, expect 6-8 rounds of communication. Your architecture must handle node failures and network partitions gracefully, potentially implementing retry logic and session timeouts. Furthermore, you must decide between synchronous protocols (all parties must be online) and asynchronous variants. For high-availability DeFi applications, an asynchronous or hybrid model is often necessary, though it adds complexity. Load testing with tools like k6 on a testnet is essential to establish baseline performance metrics.

Integrating the MPC system with blockchain networks requires a transaction relayer. The MPC cluster produces a signature, but the signed transaction must be broadcast to the network. This relayer can be a simple service that receives the signature payload and submits it via a standard RPC provider. Crucially, the relayer should never have access to the private key shares. For advanced use cases like account abstraction, the MPC system can function as the signer for a smart contract wallet, enabling social recovery and batched transactions. Always deploy and test the entire stack on a testnet (like Sepolia or Goerli) before considering a mainnet launch.

Security auditing is non-negotiable. Beyond the core cryptographic library audit, you must review the entire system's implementation: the network layer for potential denial-of-service attacks, the storage layer for side-channel vulnerabilities, and the coordination logic for race conditions. Engage specialized firms to conduct penetration testing. Finally, establish clear operational procedures for incidents, including proactive share refresh (to limit exposure from a slowly compromised share) and a disaster recovery plan to re-instantiate the system from secure backups if the threshold of nodes is lost.

architectural-overview
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW

How to Architect a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) System for DeFi

A practical guide to designing a secure, scalable MPC system for decentralized finance applications, focusing on key components and trade-offs.

A Multi-Party Computation (MPC) system for DeFi enables multiple parties to jointly compute a function—like signing a transaction—without any single party learning the complete private key. This architecture is foundational for institutional-grade custody, cross-chain bridges, and decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) treasuries. The core principle is threshold cryptography, where a secret (e.g., a signing key) is split into shares distributed among participants. A transaction is only authorized when a pre-defined threshold (e.g., 2-of-3) of parties collaborate. This eliminates single points of failure inherent in traditional private key management.

The system architecture comprises several critical layers. The client layer includes user wallets and institutional dashboards that initiate signing requests. The MPC node layer is the core, where independent servers or parties run the MPC protocol (like GG18, GG20, or CMP) to generate key shares and perform distributed signing. A coordination layer, often a relayer, manages the communication flow between nodes, batching and routing messages without accessing secret data. Finally, the blockchain layer is where the signed transactions are broadcast. Each layer must be designed for resilience and minimal trust.

Selecting the right MPC protocol is the first technical decision. Protocols like GG20 (used by Fireblocks and others) support threshold ECDSA, which is compatible with Ethereum and Bitcoin. Newer proactive secret sharing protocols periodically refresh key shares to defend against attackers who compromise nodes slowly over time. The architecture must also define the signing ceremony flow: whether it uses a central coordinator (faster, less complex) or a peer-to-peer mesh (more decentralized, higher latency). For most DeFi applications, a coordinator-hub model with attested, permissioned nodes offers a practical balance.

Security design extends beyond the cryptography. The trusted execution environment (TEE) like Intel SGX or AWS Nitro Enclaves can be used to isolate each node's key share in hardware, providing an extra defense layer if a server is compromised. Network security requires all peer-to-peer communication to be over authenticated, encrypted channels (TLS). Furthermore, the system needs robust audit logging and fraud detection mechanisms to identify anomalous signing requests, which is critical for compliance and insurance in institutional DeFi.

In practice, architecting for DeFi means optimizing for low latency and high availability. DeFi transactions are time-sensitive; a 10-second signing delay can result in a failed arbitrage or liquidation. This demands geographically distributed MPC nodes with high-quality network interconnects. The architecture should also be chain-agnostic, capable of generating signatures for EVM chains, Solana, Cosmos, and others. A well-architected system, such as those underlying safe{Wallet} or Coinbase's dApp wallet, demonstrates that MPC can provide both the security of self-custody and the usability required for mainstream adoption.

mpc-protocol-choices
ARCHITECTURE GUIDE

MPC Protocol Selection

Choosing the right MPC protocol is foundational for building secure, scalable, and efficient DeFi custody and signing solutions. This guide covers the core technical trade-offs.

06

Performance & Scalability Considerations

MPC signing involves multiple rounds of communication between parties, impacting latency and throughput.

  • Round Complexity: GG18 requires 7 rounds for signing, while newer protocols aim for fewer. This directly affects user experience for high-frequency trading.
  • Parallelization: Design your system to handle multiple signing requests in parallel across different key shards.
  • Hardware: Consider Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) or Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX for storing shares, adding another layer of defense.
ARCHITECTURE DECISION

MPC Protocol Comparison for DeFi Use Cases

A comparison of popular MPC protocol families for implementing secure key management in DeFi applications.

Feature / MetricThreshold ECDSA (GG20)Multi-Party SchnorrBLS Signatures

Signature Type

ECDSA

Schnorr

BLS

Signature Aggregation

Signature Size

64-72 bytes

64 bytes

48 bytes

Signing Latency (3/5)

~2-5 sec

~1-3 sec

~3-7 sec

Key Refresh Support

Proactive Secret Sharing

On-Chain Gas Cost (ETH)

High

Medium

Low

Library Maturity

High (TSS Lib, ZenGo)

Medium (Multi-Party-ECDSA)

High (Herumi, Blst)

threshold-signatures-deep-dive
ARCHITECTURE GUIDE

Implementing Threshold Signature Schemes (TSS)

A practical guide to designing a secure, production-ready Multi-Party Computation (MPC) system for DeFi applications, covering key architecture decisions, protocol choices, and implementation patterns.

Threshold Signature Schemes (TSS) enable a group of participants to collaboratively generate and use a cryptographic signature without any single party ever holding the complete private key. This is a core primitive of Multi-Party Computation (MPC). In a (t, n)-threshold scheme, n parties hold secret shares, and any subset of t or more can produce a valid signature, while fewer than t cannot. This architecture fundamentally eliminates single points of failure for private keys, making it ideal for securing DeFi protocol treasuries, institutional wallets, and cross-chain bridge operators where key compromise is catastrophic.

Architecting an MPC system requires selecting a foundational protocol. The GG20 protocol (by Gennaro and Goldfeder) is the current standard for ECDSA threshold signatures, supported by libraries like ZenGo's tss-lib. For EdDSA (used by Solana, StarkNet), FROST is a popular choice. Your architecture must manage the key generation, signing, and resharing phases. Each phase involves multiple rounds of peer-to-peer communication where parties exchange nonces and other cryptographic material. A robust system must handle network failures, malicious participants, and ensure deterministic output so all honest parties agree on the final signature.

A production MPC client for DeFi must integrate several critical components. First, a secure enclave (like Intel SGX or a Hardware Security Module) to protect secret shares at rest and during computation. Second, a state machine to meticulously manage the multi-round protocol, persisting state between rounds to survive restarts. Third, a transport layer for P2P communication, often using authenticated channels like TLS or libp2p. Finally, a coordination server (which does not see secrets) may be used to orchestrate the session initiation and message routing between parties, especially if they are behind firewalls.

Security considerations are paramount. The architecture must guard against adaptive adversaries who may corrupt parties during the protocol. Use zero-knowledge proofs within the protocol to verify each party's contributions are correct (e.g., verifying the validity of secret shares). Key refresh protocols allow you to update secret shares without changing the public key, limiting the exposure from a slowly compromised share. For DeFi, consider on-chain verification costs; an ECDSA TSS signature is a standard (r, s) tuple and verifies like a normal signature, ensuring compatibility with smart contracts on Ethereum and EVM chains.

Implementing a signing ceremony for a DeFi transaction involves specific steps. Participants agree on the transaction hash to sign. Each party i generates a secret nonce share and commits to it. Parties then exchange and verify commitments. Through several rounds, they collaboratively compute the signature components r and s. A sample code snippet for initiation using a tss-lib variant might look like:

go
parties := tss.CreateParties(...)
ctx := tss.NewPeerContext(parties)
params := tss.NewParameters(ctx, partyID, len(parties), threshold)
keyGenParty := tss.NewECDSAKeyGenParty(params, outCh, endCh)

The output is a public key and a secret share for each party.

Integrate your MPC system with DeFi applications by using it as the signer backend for a wallet abstraction layer. The MPC client's API should expose generateKey(), signTransaction(hash), and reshare() methods. For governance, the signing group could be a multisig of DAO members. For a cross-chain bridge, validators run MPC clients to sign attestations on the source chain. Always audit the entire stack, from cryptographic implementations to network communication. By decentralizing signing authority, TSS MPC provides a more resilient and secure foundation for the next generation of DeFi infrastructure than traditional multisig wallets.

secure-function-evaluation
ARCHITECTURE GUIDE

Secure Function Evaluation for Private Oracles

This guide explains how to design a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) system to power a private oracle, enabling secure, trust-minimized data feeds for DeFi applications without exposing raw inputs.

A Multi-Party Computation (MPC) oracle enables a group of independent nodes to compute a function—like calculating a price average—over private data without any single party seeing the others' inputs. This architecture is critical for DeFi, where data sources must be kept confidential to prevent front-running and manipulation. Unlike a traditional oracle that aggregates and broadcasts raw data, an MPC oracle broadcasts only the result of a computation, such as a signed price attestation. The core cryptographic primitive enabling this is Secure Function Evaluation (SFE), which allows the computation of a public function on private, distributed inputs.

Architecting this system begins with defining the computation circuit. For a price oracle, this is often a robust statistical function like a trimmed mean. Each node i holds a private input x_i (e.g., a price from an exclusive API). Using an MPC protocol like SPDZ or Shamir's Secret Sharing, each node splits x_i into secret shares [x_i]_1, [x_i]_2, ..., [x_i]_n and distributes them among the participant set. No single share reveals any information about the original value. The nodes then collaboratively perform addition and multiplication gates on these shares within the circuit to compute the final result, which is then revealed.

The practical deployment involves a network of oracle nodes running MPC client software. A typical workflow has four phases: 1) Data Fetching, where each node independently retrieves its datum; 2) Share Generation & Distribution using cryptographic libraries like MP-SPDZ; 3) Secure Computation, where nodes communicate over authenticated channels to evaluate the circuit; and 4) Result Publication, where the final output is reconstructed and signed by a threshold of nodes (e.g., 7-of-10) before being posted on-chain. This threshold signature ensures liveness and Byzantine fault tolerance.

Key design considerations include latency vs. security trade-offs. Protocols like GMW offer lower computational overhead but require more communication rounds, while Homomorphic Secret Sharing can reduce rounds at a computational cost. For a production DeFi oracle, you must also implement a key refresh protocol to maintain security over time and defend against proactive adversaries. The on-chain contract must verify the threshold signature (e.g., using ECDSA or BLS) and only accept results with a valid quorum. This architecture, used by projects like Chainlink DECO, provides a stronger privacy and security guarantee than naive aggregation models.

node-selection-security
MPC SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Node Selection and Anti-Collusion Mechanisms

Secure MPC for DeFi requires robust node selection and mechanisms to prevent collusion. This guide covers key architectural components.

05

Network Topology & Geographic Dispersion

Design node communication to resist network-level attacks like BGP hijacking or regional outages. Geographic and network provider diversity is critical.

  • Strategy: Enforce a minimum distance between nodes (e.g., different AWS regions, cloud providers, or autonomous systems).
  • P2P Layer: Use libp2p or a custom gossip protocol with peer scoring to isolate faulty nodes.
  • Case Study: After the AWS us-east-1 outage, protocols like dYdX highlighted the need for infrastructure-agnostic node distribution.
99.99%
Target Uptime
06

Continuous Auditing & Key Refresh

Proactive security requires continuous auditing of node behavior and periodic key refresh ceremonies to limit key exposure over time.

  • Audit Logs: All signing requests and participant actions are logged to a secure, immutable ledger for post-hoc analysis.
  • Proactive Security: Use zero-knowledge proofs to allow nodes to prove correct computation without revealing shares.
  • Key Refresh: Periodically execute a DKG ceremony to generate new secret shares, rendering any previously leaked shares useless. This is a best practice in long-running MPC setups.
implementation-steps
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE

How to Architect a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) System for DeFi

A technical walkthrough for building a secure, production-ready MPC system to manage private keys for DeFi applications.

Multi-Party Computation (MPC) is a cryptographic protocol that distributes a private key among multiple parties, enabling secure signing without any single entity holding the complete key. In DeFi, this architecture is critical for institutional custody, cross-chain bridges, and decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) treasuries. The core principle is threshold signature schemes (TSS), where a subset of participants (e.g., 2-of-3) can collaboratively generate a signature, while the full key never exists in one place. This eliminates single points of failure and provides a robust security model superior to traditional multi-sig wallets.

The first architectural decision is selecting a TSS protocol. GG18 and GG20 are common ECDSA-based schemes, while FROST is gaining traction for Schnorr signatures. For Ethereum and EVM chains, ECDSA is necessary. You must choose a secure multi-party computation library like ZenGo's KZen, Multi-Party ECDSA, or TSS-Lib. These libraries handle the complex cryptographic operations for key generation, signing, and resharing. Your system's nodes will run these protocols, communicating over secure channels.

A production MPC system requires a robust network layer. Nodes communicate during key generation and signing rounds, exchanging cryptographic messages. You must implement a secure peer-to-peer transport layer, often using libp2p or gRPC with TLS. Critical messages must be signed and verified to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. The architecture should include a coordinator or message relay service to manage the protocol flow, but this coordinator must be non-custodial—it should only route messages, not participate in the computation or see private share data.

For DeFi integration, your MPC system needs a smart contract interface. The typical pattern is a wallet factory contract that deploys a smart contract wallet (like a Gnosis Safe) whose ownership is controlled by the MPC-generated public address. The signing flow is off-chain: users request a transaction, the MPC nodes perform distributed signing, and the resulting single signature is submitted on-chain. You must also architect for key refresh protocols to proactively update key shares and implement backup and recovery mechanisms, such as using hardware security modules (HSMs) to store participant shares.

Security auditing is non-negotiable. Engage a specialized firm to audit your cryptographic implementation, network protocol, and smart contracts. Monitor for liveness failures where nodes go offline and design slashing mechanisms or automated share redistribution. In practice, systems like Fireblocks and Qredo use similar architectures. Your final stack might consist of Go services for the MPC nodes, a Rust-based threshold cryptography library, Kubernetes for orchestration, and Ethereum smart contracts for on-chain settlement, creating a resilient foundation for DeFi operations.

MPC ARCHITECTURE

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Common technical questions and solutions for developers implementing Multi-Party Computation (MPC) systems in decentralized finance applications.

Threshold Signature Schemes (TSS) and multi-signature (multisig) wallets solve the same problem—distributing signing authority—but with fundamentally different architectures.

Multi-signature wallets are smart contracts on-chain. They require M out of N participants to submit individual, on-chain signatures for a transaction to be valid. This exposes participant addresses, requires multiple transactions, and incurs higher gas costs.

Threshold Signature Schemes (TSS) perform the signing process off-chain using cryptographic protocols like GG20 or FROST. N parties collaborate to generate a single, standard cryptographic signature (e.g., an ECDSA signature for Ethereum) that is indistinguishable from one created by a single private key. Only this one signature is broadcast to the chain, reducing gas costs and preserving participant privacy. The key material is never assembled in one place, offering stronger security against single-point attacks compared to multisig setups.

conclusion-next-steps
ARCHITECTURE REVIEW

Conclusion and Next Steps

This guide has outlined the core components for building a secure and scalable Multi-Party Computation (MPC) system for DeFi applications. The next steps involve implementing, testing, and evolving your architecture.

Architecting an MPC system for DeFi requires balancing security, performance, and user experience. The key decisions involve selecting a threshold signature scheme (like GG20 or FROST), designing a robust key generation ceremony, and integrating with a secure signing server or trusted execution environment (TEE). Your architecture must be resilient against both external attacks and internal collusion, often using a 2-of-3 or 3-of-5 threshold to ensure no single party can compromise the private key. The system's state, including key shares and protocol metadata, should be managed by a secure enclave or a distributed key management database.

For implementation, start by integrating a proven MPC library such as ZenGo's Multi-Party Schnorr or Coinbase's Kryptology. Your backend service must handle session management, participant coordination, and message routing between parties. A critical component is the signing orchestrator, which initiates signing requests, collects partial signatures, and combines them into a final, valid transaction. This service should expose a well-defined API (e.g., REST or gRPC) for your DeFi frontend to interact with, abstracting the complexity of the MPC protocol from the end-user.

Thorough testing is non-negotiable. Begin with unit tests for cryptographic primitives and integration tests for the signing flow. You must then conduct extensive simulation testing on a testnet (like Sepolia or Arbitrum Goerli) to sign real transactions. Security audits are essential; engage specialized firms to review your implementation of the MPC protocol, key storage, and network communication. Consider implementing continuous monitoring for anomalous signing attempts and regular key rotation policies to limit the blast radius of a potential key share compromise.

Looking ahead, the MPC landscape is rapidly evolving. Account abstraction (ERC-4337) presents a significant opportunity, allowing MPC-managed smart contract wallets to sponsor gas fees and implement complex transaction logic. Research into proactive secret sharing, where key shares are periodically refreshed without changing the public key, can enhance long-term security. Furthermore, interoperability with cross-chain messaging protocols (like LayerZero or CCIP) will be crucial as DeFi becomes increasingly multi-chain, enabling your MPC wallet to manage assets across different networks seamlessly.

To continue your learning, explore the documentation for MPC libraries (e.g., TSS-Lib, Multi-Party-ECDSA), study academic papers on threshold cryptography, and examine open-source implementations from projects like Safe (formerly Gnosis Safe) and Fireblocks. Building a production-grade MPC system is a complex but rewarding endeavor that directly addresses the custody challenges at the heart of decentralized finance.

How to Architect a Multi-Party Computation (MPC) System for DeFi | ChainScore Guides