Token Curated Registry (TCR)

The core mechanism where participants must stake or bond the registry's native token to propose an entry (application stake) or challenge an existing one (challenge stake). This stake is slashed if the proposal or challenge fails, aligning economic incentives with the goal of maintaining a high-quality list. This creates a skin-in-the-game requirement for all participants.

A defined time window during which any token holder can challenge a new application or existing entry by matching the application stake. The challenge triggers a commit-reveal voting period where token holders vote to decide the outcome. The winning side (applicant or challenger) receives a portion of the loser's slashed stake as a reward, creating a self-regulating dispute resolution system.

Voting power is directly proportional to the amount of the registry's native token held or staked by the voter. This ensures that those with the greatest economic stake in the network's success have the most influence over its curation. This model is a form of plutocratic governance and is fundamental to aligning the registry's contents with the collective interest of its token holders.

A well-curated TCR becomes a valuable, trusted data source. The demand for inclusion can drive demand for the underlying curation token, as entities must acquire it to apply. Successful challengers and voters earn rewards from slashed stakes, creating a work token model where token utility is derived from active participation in curation work. This can create a positive feedback loop for token value.

The economic cost of staking and the risk of stake slashing make it prohibitively expensive for a malicious actor to spam the registry with low-quality entries or to mount coordinated attacks (Sybil attacks). To manipulate the list, an attacker would need to acquire and risk a significant portion of the token supply, making attack vectors economically irrational compared to honest participation.

The security and behavior of a TCR are governed by key parameters set by its creators or governance, including:

• Application/Challenge Stake Amount: The cost to propose or dispute.
• Commit & Reveal Period Lengths: Time for private voting and resolution.
• Dispensation Percentage: The reward share given to voters.
• Challenge Period Duration: Time window to dispute an entry. Poor parameter choices can lead to stagnation or vulnerability.

Platforms like Civil used TCRs to curate a list of vetted journalism organizations. Publications staked tokens to be listed, signaling credibility and commitment to ethical standards. Readers and other journalists could challenge listings they deemed unreliable, triggering a dispute resolution process. This aimed to combat misinformation by aligning economic incentives with journalistic integrity.

In decentralized ecosystems, TCRs can maintain a registry of verified developers or auditors. To be listed, a developer stakes tokens, which are at risk if their work is found to be fraudulent or negligent. This provides a trustless signal of reputation, useful for DAOs hiring contractors or protocols selecting security auditors. The registry's quality is maintained by the wisdom of the (staked) crowd.

TCRs can authenticate high-value collections or verify the provenance of digital assets. For example, a registry could list officially licensed sports NFT collections. Unauthorized or counterfeit collections would be excluded through the challenge period mechanism. This helps collectors identify legitimate assets in a crowded market, with curators earning fees for correct listings.

DAOs use TCRs to maintain a canonical list of active, contributing members eligible for rewards or voting power. Membership requires a stake, which can be slashed for malicious or non-participatory behavior. This prevents sybil attacks and ensures the registry reflects genuine contributors. It automates the process of reputation-based access within decentralized organizations.

The core utility of a TCR is its cryptoeconomic challenge mechanism.

• Listing & Stake: An applicant stakes tokens to add an entry.
• Challenge Period: During a set time, any token holder can challenge the entry by matching the stake.
• Voting & Resolution: Token holders vote to accept or reject the entry. The losing side forfeits their stake to the winners. This process ensures list quality is continuously and decentrally enforced.

The core security mechanism requires participants to stake tokens as a bond when proposing or challenging a list entry. This deposit is slashed if the community votes against the action, creating a financial disincentive for malicious or low-quality submissions. The size of the required bond is a critical parameter, balancing accessibility with the cost of attack.

A major vulnerability where a malicious actor offers to share the rewards from a successful challenge (or proposal) with token holders to sway their vote. This breaks the cryptoeconomic link between a voter's financial stake and their honest judgment. Mitigations include:

• Commit-Reveal voting schemes to hide votes during the voting period.
• Using a conviction voting model where voting power increases over time.

The TCR's economic security is defined by its parameters, which are often set by governance. Key parameters include:

• Challenge period duration
• Deposit size
• Vote quorum requirements Poorly chosen values can make the system vulnerable to griefing attacks (spamming with cheap challenges) or render it economically inaccessible. These parameters themselves become a target for governance attacks.

Token holders may choose not to participate in curation (voting) because it requires effort and gas fees, while still benefiting from an accurate list maintained by others. This can lead to voter apathy and low participation, making the registry easier to manipulate. Some designs incorporate participation rewards or curation rewards to align incentives.

The economic dynamics differ significantly based on the registry's purpose:

• A Whitelist TCR (e.g., a list of reputable DAOs) is inclusionary. Stakes are lost for proposing bad entries. It favors quality over comprehensiveness.
• A Blacklist TCR (e.g., a list of malicious smart contracts) is exclusionary. Stakes are lost for failing to challenge a bad entry. It favors vigilance and rapid response. The choice impacts the attacker's profit motive and the community's required vigilance.