Surround Vote

In a surround vote, a voter with a large token balance exploits the snapshot mechanism of a governance system. The attacker first votes on a proposal with a small amount of tokens. Then, they deposit a much larger amount of tokens into the staking contract (e.g., a veToken model) after the snapshot for that proposal is taken but before voting ends. This large deposit gives them significant voting power on subsequent proposals, allowing them to "surround" and outvote the original, smaller vote. The strategy hinges on the fact that voting power is often calculated from a snapshot taken at the proposal's creation, not at the time of the vote.

The primary goal of a surround vote is to dilute the voting power of other participants on a target proposal without directly changing one's own vote on it. By dramatically increasing their overall voting power in the system, the attacker makes the voting power of the initial, opposed vote proportionally insignificant. This can be used to ensure a rival proposal fails or to protect a proposal the attacker favors from being overturned. It is considered a form of governance attack or vote manipulation that undermines the principle of one-token-one-vote fairness at a specific point in time.

A classic example involves the Curve Finance DAO and its veCRV (vote-escrowed CRV) system. An attacker could vote against a gauge weight proposal with a small stake. They then lock a massive amount of CRV to obtain veCRV, which grants them enormous voting power for all future gauge weight votes. This new power allows them to outvote the initial decision on the next voting cycle, effectively nullifying the community's earlier outcome. The surround vote exploits the time delay between snapshot and execution inherent in many DeFi governance systems.

To mitigate surround voting, protocols implement defensive mechanisms. These include a vote-locking period that prevents newly deposited tokens from being used for voting immediately, and adaptive quorum calculations that consider changing token supplies. Some systems move towards continuous voting or time-weighted voting power models, where influence is based on a historical average of holdings rather than a single snapshot. Understanding this attack vector is crucial for designing robust, sybil-resistant decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) governance.

A surround vote is a governance tactic where a voter, typically a large token holder or "whale," places a portion of their voting power in support of an existing proposal and a larger portion in support of a new, competing proposal they create. The goal is to "surround" the original proposal, making it impossible to pass without also passing the voter's preferred alternative. This is achieved by exploiting the vote-quorum and majority-threshold mechanics of platforms like Snapshot, where only the winning option's votes are counted toward the quorum.

The mechanism works because most governance systems tally votes per option, not per voter. A voter can split their voting power (e.g., their token balance) across multiple choices. By creating a new proposal with similar goals but different parameters (like a modified treasury allocation or a different smart contract address), the actor votes a small amount for the original and a large amount for their new version. If the original proposal reaches a quorum and a simple majority, the surrounding voter's small for vote helps it pass. However, their larger vote for the competing proposal often ensures it receives more total support, making it the winning choice.

This strategy is controversial as it can subvert the intent of decentralized governance. It allows a well-resourced actor to hijack the proposal process, creating a vote-splitting scenario where the community's will is distorted. Defenders argue it is a legitimate expression of preference within the rules. In response, many DAOs have implemented defenses such as vote locking (preventing tokens from being used on multiple proposals), timing restrictions between proposals, or more nuanced voting systems like quadratic voting or conviction voting to reduce the impact of concentrated capital.

A surround vote is a governance attack vector in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) where a malicious actor, or cartel, manipulates an on-chain vote by strategically distributing their token holdings. The attacker places a large vote against a proposal they wish to defeat, then uses separate wallets to place smaller votes for the proposal both before and after their large opposing vote. This "surrounds" the honest votes in favor, diluting their voting power within the chosen snapshot mechanism. The attack exploits the specific vote-counting logic of certain snapshot-based governance systems, particularly those using a relative majority or quorum system, rather than a simple token-weighted tally.

The mechanics rely on the time-dependent nature of the vote. In systems like Compound's and Uniswap's early governance, a voter's voting power is determined by their token balance at the exact block number of the proposal's creation. The attacker first casts a large, honest-looking vote against a proposal. Then, using tokens acquired or delegated after that snapshot block, they create new wallet addresses to cast smaller votes in favor. Because these new votes are cast with tokens not locked at the snapshot, they are often weighted less or counted separately, but their strategic placement manipulates the apparent margin and can invalidate honest votes sandwiched between them. This creates a false narrative of support while ensuring the attacker's original, heavily-weighted opposing vote dictates the outcome.

Visualizing this attack reveals its deceptive nature. On a voting timeline, honest "For" votes appear as a cluster. The attacker's large "Against" vote is a dominant negative block. The fraudulent "For" votes from the attacker are then placed on both sides of the honest cluster, appearing to "surround" it. This visualization highlights how the protocol's vote aggregation logic is tricked into reading the sequence as a coherent shift in sentiment, rather than a single entity gaming the system. The result is that the genuine voter support is effectively nullified or diluted within the calculated margins, leading to the proposal's failure despite potentially having legitimate majority support.

Mitigating surround votes requires protocol upgrades. The most common solution is the implementation of a vote checkpoint or token delegation snapshot. This mechanism freezes token balances and delegations at a specific block before the voting period begins, preventing attackers from using newly acquired tokens to create surrounding votes. Compound famously patched this vulnerability by introducing Governor Bravo, which records voting power at the proposal submission block. Other defenses include moving to simpler, non-time-weighted vote counting or implementing sybil-resistance mechanisms to detect and cluster votes from likely related addresses, though the snapshot fix remains the most direct and widely adopted technical solution.