A shared security model is a blockchain design pattern where a primary, high-security chain (often called a hub or main chain) provides finality and validator security for one or more secondary chains (often called spokes, rollups, or parachains). This architecture addresses the security trilemma by allowing new chains to inherit the established security of a larger network, rather than bootstrapping their own validator set. The primary chain's validators are responsible for validating the state transitions of the secondary chains, either directly or through a system of cryptographic proofs. This model is foundational to ecosystems like Cosmos with Interchain Security, Polkadot with its Relay Chain and parachains, and various Ethereum Layer 2 rollups secured by the Ethereum mainnet.
How to Architect a Shared Security Model Across Chains
How to Architect a Shared Security Model Across Chains
This guide explains the core architectural patterns for implementing a shared security model, where a primary blockchain provides economic security for one or more secondary chains.
Architecting this system requires defining the core communication and validation interfaces. The primary chain must expose a validation interface that secondary chains can call to submit state updates or fraud proofs. For example, in an optimistic rollup model on Ethereum, the secondary chain's sequencer posts transaction batches and state roots to a smart contract on the main chain (like OptimismPortal or ArbitrumOne). A challenge period follows, where any watcher can submit a fraud proof to dispute an invalid state transition. In a zk-rollup model, the secondary chain submits a validity proof (a ZK-SNARK or ZK-STARK) with each batch, which the main chain verifies instantly. The smart contract on the primary chain acts as the ultimate arbiter of canonical state.
The economic and slashing model is critical. Validators or sequencers on the secondary chain must bond collateral (stake) on the primary chain. This stake can be slashed if they are proven to have acted maliciously, such as by finalizing an invalid block. The architecture must define clear, automatically executable slashing conditions within the primary chain's logic. In Cosmos' Interchain Security v1, the provider chain's validators run nodes for the consumer chain and a portion of their staked ATOM can be slashed for misbehavior on that consumer chain. This tightly couples the economic security. The design must also account for reward distribution to validators for their extra work and for resolving disputes or proof verification.
Cross-chain messaging is the final core component. The shared security model must include a secure message-passing protocol that allows the primary and secondary chains to communicate about state, slashing events, and rewards. This is often implemented via IBC (Inter-Blockchain Communication) in Cosmos, XCMP (Cross-Chain Message Passing) in Polkadot, or smart contract function calls in Ethereum's rollup ecosystems. The security of this messaging layer is paramount, as it is the conduit for commands that trigger slashing or finalize state. Architects must ensure the message channel is permissionless for fraud proofs but permissioned for state finalization, and that it is resistant to censorship and replay attacks across chains.
When implementing, start by defining the state commitment scheme. Will you post Merkle roots, zk-proofs, or entire block headers to the primary chain? Then, implement the verification contract or module. For a zk-rollup, you would deploy a verifier contract like the PlonkVerifier on Ethereum. For an optimistic model, you need a fraud proof verification system. Next, establish the staking and slashing logic, connecting it to your validator set management. Finally, integrate the cross-chain messaging. Use existing, audited libraries where possible, such as the OP Stack for optimistic rollups or the Cosmos SDK Provider and Consumer modules. Thoroughly test the slashing conditions and failure modes in a testnet environment before launch.
Prerequisites and Core Assumptions
Before designing a cross-chain shared security model, you must establish a clear understanding of the core components, trust assumptions, and technical requirements. This section outlines the foundational knowledge needed to evaluate and implement shared security architectures.
A shared security model is a system where a primary blockchain (the security provider) validates and secures transactions or state transitions for one or more secondary chains (the consumers). This is distinct from isolated security, where each chain maintains its own validator set. The primary architectural goal is to decouple security provisioning from state execution, enabling smaller chains to inherit the robust economic security of a larger, more established network. Key examples include Polkadot's parachains secured by the Relay Chain, EigenLayer's restaking for Actively Validated Services (AVS), and Cosmos' Interchain Security v2.
The core assumption underpinning any shared security model is the cryptoeconomic security of the provider chain. You must assess the provider's total value staked (TVS), validator decentralization, slashing conditions, and governance processes. For instance, a model relying on Ethereum's consensus assumes the integrity of its ~$90B staked ETH and its >1 million validators. Architectures must define the fault and slashing mechanism: what constitutes a malicious action by a consumer chain, how it is detected, and how the provider chain's validators are penalized. This requires precise, verifiable fault proofs.
From a technical prerequisite, the consumer chain must be capable of producing verifiable state transitions. This typically means implementing a light client of the provider chain to verify consensus proofs and headers, or designing a bridging protocol that relays attested state roots. Your chain's state machine must expose interfaces for the security provider's validators to participate, often through a consensus pallet (Substrate), a consumer module (Cosmos SDK), or a set of smart contracts on a rollup. The communication layer between chains must be trust-minimized, leveraging protocols like IBC or arbitrary message bridges.
Finally, you must define the economic and governance alignment. This includes the fee model (how consumer chains pay for security, e.g., via native token transfers or a share of transaction fees), the governance process for onboarding/offboarding consumer chains, and the incentive mechanisms for provider validators. A poorly aligned model can lead to validator apathy or centralization. The architecture must ensure that the cost of attacking the consumer chain remains a significant fraction of the cost of attacking the provider chain itself, preserving the security guarantee.
Core Architectural Components
Shared security models enable blockchains to inherit economic security from a larger, established network. These are the key components for designing such a system.
Technical Architecture: A Step-by-Step Design
A practical guide to designing a shared security model that allows a single validator set to secure multiple, independent blockchains.
A shared security model enables a primary blockchain (the provider chain) to lease its economic security and validator set to one or more consumer chains. This architecture is central to projects like Cosmos Interchain Security and Polkadot's Parachains. The core design principle is delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS): validators on the provider chain run nodes for the consumer chains in parallel, using the same staked tokens as collateral. This creates a powerful security guarantee where an attack on a consumer chain would require attacking the significantly larger, more valuable provider chain, making it economically prohibitive.
The architectural design follows a clear, step-by-step process. Step 1: Define the Security Provider. This is typically a mature, high-value Layer 1 like the Cosmos Hub or Polkadot Relay Chain. Its role is to provide a trusted, decentralized validator set. Step 2: Establish the Consumer Chain. This is a sovereign blockchain with its own application logic, governance, and token, but it opts out of bootstrapping its own validator community. It must implement the necessary interfaces (like the Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC) protocol) to communicate with the provider.
Step 3: Implement the Validation Logic. This is the core technical integration. The provider chain's consensus engine must be able to produce and validate blocks for the consumer chain. In Cosmos, this is done via a Consumer Chain Module that runs on the provider, handling tasks like validator set updates and slashing evidence. Validators run a full node for each consumer chain they secure. A simplified proof-of-concept in pseudocode might look like:
codefunction validateConsumerBlock(providerValidators, consumerBlock) { // 1. Verify consumer block signature against current provider validator set if (!verifySignatures(providerValidators, consumerBlock.header)) { slashValidator(providerValidators.misbehaving); } // 2. Forward slashing evidence to provider chain for enforcement submitSlashingPacket(providerChain, evidence); }
Step 4: Design the Economic and Governance Link. The model must define how rewards and penalties flow. Consumer chain fees and inflation rewards are typically distributed to the provider chain's validators and delegators. Crucially, slashing conditions (e.g., double-signing, downtime) on the consumer chain must trigger proportional slashing of the validator's stake on the provider chain. This is enforced via cross-chain evidence submission, making misbehavior on any secured chain financially costly on the main chain.
Step 5: Enable Sovereign Features. A well-architected model balances security with sovereignty. The consumer chain must retain control over its own upgrades, governance (e.g., parameter changes), and fee markets. The provider chain only enforces validator set membership and slashing. This is often managed through a governance proposal on the provider chain to add a new consumer chain, which includes the consumer's genesis state and the agreed-upon security parameters.
Successful implementation requires careful consideration of latency between chains, validator infrastructure scaling, and fee distribution mechanics. The end result is a scalable security primitive that allows new blockchains to launch with enterprise-grade security from day one, fostering a more secure and interconnected multi-chain ecosystem without fragmenting validator resources.
Real-World Implementation Comparison
Comparison of dominant shared security models by their architectural approach and operational characteristics.
| Architectural Feature | Cosmos Interchain Security (v1) | EigenLayer Restaking | Polygon Avail (Data Availability) |
|---|---|---|---|
Security Source | Consumer chain inherits from Cosmos Hub validator set | Restaked ETH from Ethereum mainnet | Dedicated validator set with economic security |
Settlement Layer | Consumer chain (sovereign) | Ethereum L1 | Polygon Avail chain |
Validator Coordination | Provider chain (Hub) governs validator set | Operator nodes with slashing on Ethereum | Proof-of-Stake with nominated validators |
Slashing Enforcement | Native via provider chain ATOM | Enforced via smart contracts on Ethereum | Native via MATIC stake on Avail |
Time to Finality | ~6 seconds | Ethereum L1 finality (~12-15 minutes) | ~20 seconds |
Consumer Chain Sovereignty | High (custom execution, governance) | Low (execution logic is an AVS on Ethereum) | N/A (Provides data, not execution) |
Economic Security (TVL) | $1.8B (ATOM staked) | Over $15B (ETH restaked) | $0.9B (MATIC staked for Avail) |
Primary Use Case | Sovereign Cosmos SDK chains | Actively Validated Services (AVSs) on Ethereum | Modular chains needing scalable data availability |
Designing Slashing Condition Propagation
A guide to architecting the secure and reliable propagation of slashing conditions across interconnected blockchain networks.
Shared security models, like those in restaking or interchain security, rely on a core principle: a validator's misbehavior on one network must have consequences across all networks they secure. This requires a robust system for slashing condition propagation. The architectural challenge is to create a protocol that is cryptographically verifiable, resistant to censorship, and timely in its execution. A failure in propagation undermines the entire security model, as malicious actors could isolate their slashing to a single chain.
The foundation of propagation is a standardized slashing proof. This is a digitally signed data packet containing immutable evidence of a fault, such as a double-sign or an equivocation. The proof must be self-contained and cryptographically verifiable by any receiving chain without requiring external state queries. Projects like EigenLayer define specific Interchain Security Modules (ISMs) that standardize the format and verification logic for these proofs, ensuring interoperability between the provider chain (where the fault occurred) and consumer chains.
Propagation typically follows a publish-and-attest model. First, a slashing event is finalized on the provider chain. Then, a relayer (which can be permissionless) submits the slashing proof to a target consumer chain. The critical component is the verification contract on the consumer chain. This smart contract, pre-configured with the provider chain's light client state or validator set, cryptographically verifies the submitted proof. Only after successful on-chain verification is the slashing condition executed on the consumer chain's native staking contract.
Key design considerations include latency tolerance and data availability. Consumer chains must define a dispute period during which honest actors can challenge an invalid slashing proof. Furthermore, the slashing proof data must be available for this challenge. Solutions often leverage the provider chain itself or a decentralized data availability layer as the source of truth. The architecture must also guard against griefing attacks, where spamming invalid proofs could burden the consumer chain.
Implementation requires careful smart contract development. On the consumer chain, the verification contract's verifySlashingProof(bytes calldata _proof) function must efficiently decode and validate signatures against a known merkle root of the validator set. The contract then calls the staking contract's slash(address _validator, uint256 _amount) function. An example flow using a mock light client might check: require(lightClient.verifyMerkleProof(proofRoot, validatorLeaf, proof), "Invalid proof"); followed by stakingContract.slash(validatorAddress, slashAmount);.
Ultimately, a well-architected propagation system transforms isolated chains into a cohesive security collective. It ensures the cryptoeconomic security pledged by validators is enforceable everywhere, creating a stronger security base for applications. This design is fundamental to the viability of shared security protocols, making slashing a credible, cross-chain threat.
How to Architect a Shared Security Model Across Chains
A guide to designing economic and technical systems for securing multiple blockchains with a single validator set, covering models from Cosmos to EigenLayer.
A shared security model allows a primary blockchain's validator set to provide economic security for multiple, independent chains. This architecture addresses the security trilemma where new chains often trade off decentralization and security for scalability. The core principle is that validators stake their native tokens (e.g., ATOM on Cosmos Hub) and face slashing penalties on that stake for malicious actions on any of the secured chains, known as consumer chains. This creates a powerful economic disincentive that is inherited by all participants in the ecosystem, preventing the fragmentation of security capital.
The technical foundation for this is an Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC) protocol or a custom light client bridge. The provider chain's validators run full nodes for each consumer chain. They participate in its consensus by signing blocks or validating state transitions, with proofs of misbehavior relayed back to the provider chain for slashing. Key design choices include the validation model—opt-in vs. mandatory for all providers—and the data availability solution, which can be handled by the provider chain (like Celestia) or managed separately by each consumer.
Fee distribution is critical for validator incentives. In the Cosmos Interchain Security v3 model, consumer chains pay fees and inflationary rewards to the provider chain's Community Pool and validators. A portion of transaction fees is typically paid in the consumer chain's native token, which validators must then liquidate. More advanced models use cross-chain swaps via IBC to automatically convert fees into the staking token. Alternatively, EigenLayer's restaking model on Ethereum allows ETH stakers to opt-in to secure Actively Validated Services (AVSs), earning additional rewards from those services on top of Ethereum consensus rewards.
When architecting the system, you must define the reward function. This algorithm determines how consumer chain fees are split between the provider chain treasury (for public goods), validators, and delegators. It often involves a dynamic take-rate. You also need a secure oracle or relay system to report consumer chain states and slashing proofs. A major challenge is validator apathy; if rewards are insufficient, validators may not run the consumer chain's node software reliably, leading to liveness failures. Penalties for liveness faults must be carefully calibrated.
Implementation requires smart contracts or custom modules. On Cosmos, the Provider Chain Module and Consumer Chain Module coordinate via IBC. A simplified fee distribution contract in Solidity for an Ethereum-based model might track rewards and allow validators to claim them. The architecture must also plan for governance, allowing the provider chain's stakeholders to vote on adding new consumer chains, adjusting parameters, or handling emergency upgrades without compromising security.
Successful examples include the Cosmos Hub securing Neutron and Stride, and EigenLayer securing EigenDA and Omni Network. The end goal is to create a positive security flywheel: more value secured attracts more stakers, which increases the cost of attack, making the ecosystem more attractive for new chains to join. When designing your model, prioritize clear economic incentives, robust slashing conditions, and seamless cross-chain communication to ensure the shared security is both attractive and enforceable.
Key Design Trade-offs and Considerations
Designing a shared security model involves balancing decentralization, cost, and performance. These cards outline the core trade-offs and implementation choices.
Economic Security vs. Capital Efficiency
The core trade-off is between the economic stake securing the network and the capital efficiency of validators. A model like EigenLayer allows ETH stakers to re-stake for additional protocols, increasing economic security but introducing slashing risks. Conversely, a dedicated validator set requires new capital, which is less efficient but offers isolated risk. The key metric is the cost-of-corruption versus the cost-of-defense.
Validator Set Centralization Risks
Shared security often relies on a subset of validators from a large chain (e.g., Ethereum). This creates centralization vectors:
- Geopolitical risk: Validators concentrated in specific jurisdictions.
- Client diversity: Over-reliance on a single execution or consensus client.
- Pool dominance: A few large staking pools controlling significant stake. Mitigations include decentralized validator technology (DVT) and enforcing client diversity quotas.
Sovereignty vs. Security Guarantees
Chains must choose between full sovereignty and stronger security. A sovereign rollup (e.g., Celestia-based) controls its execution and governance but provides its own security. An optimistic or ZK-rollup inherits Ethereum's security but cedes some control over sequencing and upgrades. App-chains using a shared security provider (like Cosmos Interchain Security) sit in the middle, trading customizability for proven validator sets.
Interoperability and Message Passing
Security isn't just about consensus; it's about secure cross-chain communication. Architectures must define:
- Trust assumptions for bridging: light clients, multi-sigs, or zero-knowledge proofs.
- Data availability: Ensuring transaction data is available for fraud proofs or validity proofs.
- Settlement layer: Where disputes are ultimately resolved (e.g., Ethereum L1). Poor design here is a major source of exploits, as seen in bridge hacks.
Slashing Design and Enforcement
An effective slashing mechanism is critical for deterring malicious behavior. Key considerations include:
- Slashing conditions: Defining provable offenses (double-signing, downtime, invalid state transitions).
- Enforcement jurisdiction: Can the host chain slash for offenses on a connected chain? This requires complex interchain security contracts.
- Graduated penalties: Different penalties for different faults, versus full stake loss. Poorly calibrated slashing can deter participation or fail to prevent attacks.
Upgradeability and Governance
How are upgrades to the security model managed? Immutable models are more secure but inflexible. Governance-controlled upgrades (via token votes) introduce attack vectors if the token is concentrated. Common patterns include:
- Timelocks for all security-critical changes.
- Multisig emergency councils with clearly limited powers.
- Gradual decentralization of the upgrade keys over time. The governance model must be as secure as the underlying consensus.
Implementation Resources and Documentation
These resources document how production networks implement shared security across multiple chains. Each card links to primary documentation or specifications used by teams building or integrating shared security models.
Security Tradeoffs and Design Patterns
Shared security systems introduce non-obvious failure modes that architects must model explicitly. Most production designs converge on a small set of patterns.
Common design considerations:
- Correlated slashing risk across multiple chains or services
- Validator concentration when security is reused
- Governance attack surfaces spanning multiple domains
- Exit and unbonding delays under cascading failures
Studying existing implementations reveals why many teams combine shared security with rate limits, circuit breakers, and gradual stake caps. This knowledge is critical before extending security across heterogeneous execution environments.
Frequently Asked Questions on Shared Security
Technical questions and answers for developers designing and implementing cross-chain shared security models.
A bridge is a specific application that facilitates the transfer of assets or data between two chains, often relying on its own set of validators or a multi-signature wallet for security. A shared security model is a broader architectural paradigm where one blockchain (the provider) actively validates the state or consensus of another blockchain (the consumer).
Key differences:
- Scope: Bridges secure asset transfers; shared security secures the entire state of a consumer chain.
- Security Source: Bridge security is typically isolated; shared security is "borrowed" from a larger, established validator set (e.g., Ethereum validators via EigenLayer, Cosmos Hub validators via Interchain Security).
- Economic Alignment: Shared security models often involve the provider chain's native token (like ETH or ATOM) being staked to slashable conditions on the consumer chain, creating deeper economic ties than most bridge models.
Conclusion and Next Steps
This guide has outlined the core components for building a shared security model that spans multiple blockchains, moving from theory to practical implementation.
Architecting a shared security model is not about finding a single universal solution, but about selecting and integrating the right primitives for your specific use case. The choice between economic security (like restaking), cryptographic security (like light clients), and social/validator security (like multi-sigs) depends heavily on your trust assumptions, desired finality, and the chains involved. For high-value, general-purpose messaging, a combination—such as EigenLayer AVSs for validation and zk-proofs for state verification—often provides the most robust defense-in-depth.
The next step is to implement a proof-of-concept. Start by defining the security budget and slashing conditions for your model. For a restaking-based validator set, you would write and deploy slashing contracts on the provider chain (e.g., Ethereum) that can be triggered by fraud proofs from a watcher network. Simultaneously, develop the light client or zk-verifier contracts that will run on destination chains to validate incoming cross-chain messages. Tools like the IBC protocol specification or the Solidity IBC Core implementation offer a concrete starting point for light client logic.
Finally, rigorous testing is non-negotiable. Move beyond unit tests to simulate adversarial conditions in a multi-chain testnet environment. Use frameworks like Foundry or Hardhat to create fork tests that simulate chain reorganizations or validator downtime. Stress-test the economic incentives: ensure slashing is severe enough to deter malice but not so severe it discourages participation. The goal is to create a system where the cost of attacking the bridge objectively exceeds the potential profit, making it economically irrational.
As you build, stay engaged with the evolving landscape. Follow the development of shared security providers like EigenLayer, Babylon, and Cosmos Interchain Security v2. Research new cryptographic techniques such as succinct proofs and proof aggregation which can drastically reduce verification costs. The architecture you design today should be modular enough to incorporate these advancements tomorrow, ensuring your cross-chain application remains secure and cost-effective as the underlying technology matures.