How to Communicate Post-Quantum Risks to Executives

The security of blockchain, banking, and government systems relies on public-key cryptography, specifically algorithms like RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). These systems are secure because factoring large numbers or solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is computationally infeasible for classical computers. However, a sufficiently powerful quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could solve these problems in hours or days, rendering current encryption and digital signatures obsolete. This is not a distant threat; encrypted data harvested today can be stored for future decryption, a strategy known as "harvest now, decrypt later."

Communicating this risk to executives requires translating technical vulnerabilities into business impacts. Frame the discussion around digital asset protection, regulatory compliance, and long-term operational continuity. For a blockchain project, a quantum attack could lead to the theft of treasury funds, the compromise of validator keys, or the irreversible alteration of a supposedly immutable ledger. In traditional finance, it could invalidate the trust underpinning digital transactions. The goal is to shift the perception from a theoretical computer science problem to a concrete enterprise risk requiring proactive investment and planning.

The transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a multi-year endeavor, similar to the Y2K remediation or the migration from SHA-1 to SHA-256. It involves auditing systems for cryptographic dependencies, testing new quantum-resistant algorithms like those standardized by NIST (e.g., CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium), and planning for phased upgrades. Executives must understand that this is not a simple software patch but a foundational change to core security infrastructure. Early adoption can become a competitive advantage, signaling to users and partners a commitment to long-term security and resilience.

Your communication should conclude with a clear call to action. Recommend initiating a cryptographic inventory to identify all systems using vulnerable algorithms. Propose forming a cross-functional team with legal, compliance, and engineering leads to develop a PQ migration roadmap. Finally, emphasize that starting the conversation and planning phase now is critical, as the cryptographic transition for a large organization can take 5-10 years to complete, and the quantum threat clock is already ticking.

The first prerequisite is technical fluency. You must be able to explain the core threat without jargon. A quantum computer capable of breaking current public-key cryptography (like RSA and ECC) does not yet exist, but the risk is not hypothetical. The threat model is store-now, decrypt-later, where an adversary harvests encrypted data today to decrypt it once a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) is available. You should be prepared to cite authoritative sources like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and their ongoing standardization process to ground the discussion in established fact, not speculation.

The second prerequisite is business impact translation. Executives think in terms of risk, cost, and strategic advantage. Map the technical risk to tangible business outcomes: the compromise of long-lived secrets (e.g., root CA certificates, blockchain private keys), the invalidation of data privacy guarantees for sensitive information with decades-long shelf life, and potential regulatory and compliance failures as standards evolve. Quantify what is at stake by identifying your organization's crown jewel assets—the data and systems whose exposure would cause existential harm.

Finally, you need a structured narrative. Avoid leading with complex mathematics. Instead, frame the conversation around risk management and preparedness. A recommended structure is: 1) Define the Threat (store-now, decrypt-later), 2) Assess Your Exposure (inventory critical data and systems), 3) Understand the Timeline (migration is a multi-year project, starting now), and 4) Propose a Path Forward (establish a governance body, begin crypto-agility initiatives). This positions the issue as a manageable strategic program, not an imminent technical crisis.

Begin by framing the threat in business, not technical, terms. Avoid leading with Shor's algorithm or lattice-based cryptography. Instead, state the core risk: quantum computers will eventually break the public-key cryptography that secures nearly all digital trust. This includes TLS/SSL for websites, digital signatures for software updates, and blockchain transaction authorization. The 'cryptographic apocalypse' is not about encrypting today's emails; it's about the future inability to verify the authenticity of any digital asset or communication, undermining the foundation of digital finance, supply chains, and data integrity.

Quantify the risk using a two-axis model: probability and impact. The probability of a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) emerging is uncertain but increasing, with estimates from entities like the NSA and NIST suggesting a 10-20 year horizon. The impact, however, is near-certain and catastrophic for unprotected systems. Use the 'Harvest Now, Decrypt Later' (HNDL) attack to make this tangible: adversaries are likely collecting encrypted data today (financial transactions, state secrets, intellectual property) to decrypt it once a quantum computer is available. This creates an immediate need for action, not when the quantum computer arrives.

Translate technical timelines into business planning cycles. Executive thinking operates on fiscal years and strategic roadmaps. Map the quantum migration to familiar concepts: regulatory deadlines (like NIST's post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standardization), technology refresh cycles (hardware security modules, code-signing certificates), and product lifespans (a 15-year infrastructure project deployed today must be PQC-ready). Present the migration as a multi-year program akin to Y2K or the SHA-1 deprecation, requiring phased investment in crypto-agility—the ability to swap out cryptographic algorithms without redesigning entire systems.

Present a clear, phased action plan. Avoid vague recommendations to 'start planning.' Propose concrete, budgetable steps:

1. Inventory: Catalog all critical systems using public-key crypto (TLS certificates, digital signatures, blockchain keys).
2. Prioritize: Identify 'crown jewel' assets most vulnerable to HNDL or needing long-term security.
3. Experiment: Test NIST-standardized PQC algorithms (like CRYSTALS-Kyber for encryption) in lab environments.
4. Partner: Engage vendors on their PQC roadmaps for hardware, cloud services, and software libraries.
5. Govern: Establish a crypto-agility working group to oversee the multi-year transition. Frame early investment as risk mitigation and future-proofing, not an immediate overhaul.

Finally, address common executive concerns directly. Cost: Position spending as an insurance premium against existential risk, noting that retrofitting later will be far more expensive. Competition: Highlight that early movers will gain a trust advantage. Standards: Confirm that NIST has selected the first algorithms, moving the problem from research to engineering. Conclude by shifting the narrative: the goal isn't to build a quantum computer, but to build a business resilient to one. Your recommendation is not to panic, but to initiate a deliberate, managed program that aligns technical necessity with strategic business continuity.

Communicating post-quantum cryptography (PQC) risks requires shifting from technical jargon to business impact. Executives need to understand the existential threat to current cryptographic systems, which secure everything from blockchain transactions to enterprise data. The core risk is cryptographic relevance: a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break the public-key algorithms (like RSA and ECC) that underpin digital signatures and key exchange. Frame this not as a distant science project, but as a predictable event with a long lead time for mitigation, similar to the Y2K problem. The goal is to establish PQC as a strategic enterprise risk management priority, not just an IT upgrade.

Structure your communication around three executive-friendly pillars: Asset Inventory, Impact Assessment, and Strategic Timeline. First, quantify what's at stake: map all systems using vulnerable cryptography, including TLS certificates, software signing keys, hardware security modules (HSMs), and blockchain wallets holding long-term assets. Use concrete numbers: "Our current infrastructure relies on 15,000 TLS certificates and 500 signing keys vulnerable to a quantum attack." This transforms an abstract threat into a tangible inventory of risk.

Next, translate technical failure into business consequences. Avoid saying "SHA-256 is quantum-resistant but ECDSA is not." Instead, say: "A quantum breach could compromise customer data integrity, invalidate digital contracts, and lead to the theft of crypto assets held in legacy wallets. For a blockchain project, this risks the irreversible loss of funds and total erosion of network trust." Use analogies they know: explain that today's encryption is a vault, and a quantum computer is a master key being developed. The cryptographic shelf-life of sensitive data and assets must be a key metric.

Present a phased mitigation timeline tied to industry standards and concrete milestones. Reference the NIST PQC Standardization Process, with final standards expected (e.g., ML-KEM, ML-DSA) and deployment already beginning in protocols like OpenSSH and Cloudflare's Geo Key Manager. Propose a three-phase plan: 1) Discovery & Prioritization (6 months): inventory systems and test with tools like the Open Quantum Safe library. 2) Hybrid Implementation (12-18 months): deploy algorithms that combine classical and post-quantum crypto. 3) Full Migration (3-5 years): complete system overhaul. This demonstrates proactive, manageable action.

Finally, build the investment case by quantifying the cost of inaction versus the cost of migration. Highlight that competitors and regulators (like NIST SP 800-208) are already moving, creating a potential compliance and competitive disadvantage. Propose starting with a focused crypto-agility pilot project, such as implementing hybrid signatures for internal code signing. This shows prudent, incremental investment. Your executive summary should conclude with a clear ask: budget and mandate for the discovery phase, positioning the organization to respond swiftly as the quantum threat and solutions mature.

Begin the briefing by establishing a shared risk framework. Avoid diving into quantum mechanics. Instead, anchor the discussion in familiar business concepts: data sovereignty, regulatory compliance, and intellectual property protection. Frame the quantum threat as a cryptographic expiration date on all current asymmetric encryption, including the algorithms securing blockchain signatures (ECDSA, EdDSA), TLS for web traffic, and software signing. This makes the abstract threat concrete and ties it directly to assets the board already values.

Quantify the exposure with a focused asset inventory. Create a simple, high-impact slide mapping critical digital assets to their quantum vulnerability timeline. For a Web3 organization, this must highlight: - Hot wallet private keys (immediate risk upon quantum break) - Cold storage seed phrases (risk if ever exposed for signing) - On-chain transaction history (future deciphering risk) - Smart contract upgrade authorization keys. Use a simple timeline graphic showing the "cryptographic shelf-life" of these assets against projected quantum advancement milestones, such as the NIST PQC standardization timeline.

Translate technical solutions into business decisions. Present post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribution (QKD) not as technologies, but as strategic investment pathways with different risk/return profiles. For example, PQC migration is a software upgrade with budget and timeline implications, while QKD represents infrastructure investment for physical layer security. Clearly outline the cost of inaction: the inability to comply with emerging regulations like NIST SP 800-207A, the risk of frozen assets in a post-quantum world, and the catastrophic loss of trust following a "harvest now, decrypt later" attack where encrypted data is collected today for future decryption.

Conclude with a clear, phased recommendation and call to action. Propose a three-stage plan: 1. Inventory & Audit (6 months): Catalog all cryptographic dependencies using tools like Crypto-Agility scanners. 2. Pilot & Test (12-18 months): Implement PQC standards like CRYSTALS-Kyber or Falcon in a non-critical system, such as internal signing mechanisms. 3. Roadmap Integration (24+ months): Mandate PQC-readiness in all new vendor contracts and product developments. Assign clear ownership (e.g., CISO office) and tie next steps to existing risk management frameworks, requesting a follow-up decision on the pilot phase budget and timeline.

Your goal is to frame the quantum threat not as a distant, abstract problem for cryptographers, but as a tangible business continuity risk with a defined timeline. Avoid technical jargon like "Shor's algorithm" and instead focus on the core business impact: the potential for a sudden, irreversible loss of data confidentiality. For a Web3 organization, this translates to the compromise of private keys securing digital assets, the decryption of sensitive on-chain data, or the forgery of digital signatures underpinning governance votes. The executive summary should clearly state that the cryptographic foundation of blockchain—and by extension, your company's products and user funds—has a known expiration date.

Structure your communication around three key executive priorities: financial risk, operational risk, and regulatory/compliance risk. Quantify the potential financial exposure from a theoretical "quantum break" of your wallet infrastructure or custodial services. Outline the operational disruption of having to urgently migrate systems under duress versus a planned, phased transition. Finally, highlight the emerging regulatory landscape; standards bodies like NIST are already selecting post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms, and sectors like finance are likely to see compliance mandates. Proactive adaptation is a competitive advantage and a demonstration of governance maturity.

Present a clear, phased action plan. Start with a cryptographic inventory to identify all systems using vulnerable algorithms (primarily RSA and ECC). Propose a prioritization framework based on asset value, system criticality, and implementation complexity. Advocate for initial, low-risk pilots, such as implementing PQC in internal signing processes or for new product features, to build organizational competency. Emphasize that migration is a multi-year journey requiring sustained investment, similar to the Y2K remediation. Conclude by recommending the formation of a cross-functional team (security, engineering, product, legal) to own the roadmap, ensuring the transition aligns with broader business objectives.