Kleros Curated Registry

Registry entries are subject to crowdsourced verification. If a submission is challenged, a decentralized panel of jurors from the Kleros protocol reviews the evidence and votes on its correctness. This replaces a centralized admin with a cryptoeconomic game where jurors are financially incentivized to vote honestly.

The registry operates on the Token-Curated Registry design pattern. Participants must stake the registry's native token (e.g., PNK for Kleros) to submit or challenge entries. This stake-and-slash mechanism aligns incentives, as bad actors risk losing their deposit.

The community actively maintains list quality. Any token holder can:

• Challenge a submission they believe is invalid.
• Vouch for a submission by adding their own stake to support it.
• Curate by reviewing and voting in dispute resolution cases. This creates a continuous, adversarial curation process.

Curated Registries are used to create trusted lists in environments without a central trust anchor. Real-world examples include:

• Token Lists: Curating legitimate ERC-20 tokens for DEXs (e.g., Uniswap).
• DApp Stores: Listing vetted decentralized applications.
• Oracle Registries: Maintaining a list of reliable data providers.
• Marketplace Badges: Verifying seller reputations.

The registry acts as a subjective oracle for questions that lack a single on-chain truth. It answers "Is this item a legitimate member of this list?" by aggregating the wisdom and incentives of a decentralized crowd, producing a cryptoeconomically secure answer.

The system is resistant to Sybil attacks through costly signaling. Actions require staking tokens, making large-scale manipulation expensive. Jurors are paid from the losing side's stake, creating a self-sustaining incentive model for honest participation and accurate curation.

Used by insurance protocols like UnoRe to maintain a whitelist of approved cover policy terms. This ensures that all policies offered on the platform are legitimate and non-malicious. The registry crowdsources the verification of policy smart contract code and terms, with Kleros providing a final, binding judgment on any disputes about an entry's suitability.

Creating a trusted database of labeled blockchain addresses (e.g., 'Binance: Hot Wallet 6', 'Compound: Comptroller'). This fights phishing and improves transparency. The community can propose labels with supporting evidence, and challenges are resolved by Kleros jurors who assess the proof. This builds a decentralized alternative to centralized labeling services.

A registry for verifying and listing decentralized applications. This helps users find audited and legitimate dApps while filtering out malicious forks or scams. Developers submit their dApp, and the community can challenge submissions based on criteria like open-source code, security audits, or functional integrity. Kleros arbitrates these challenges.

Maintaining a list of reliable oracle data providers. For DeFi protocols that rely on external price feeds, a TCR ensures only oracles with proven uptime, accuracy, and decentralization are listed. Challenges can be made based on provable downtime, manipulation, or centralization faults, with Kleros jurors evaluating the evidence.

The core mechanism relies on a Schelling point—a focal solution people choose in the absence of communication. Jurors are incentivized to vote for the answer they believe others will select, converging on the objectively correct outcome. This creates a focal point equilibrium where honest voting is the dominant strategy.

Security is enforced through cryptoeconomic slashing. Jurors must stake PNK tokens to participate. Dishonest or incoherent jurors who vote against the majority consensus have a portion of their stake slashed and redistributed. This makes Sybil attacks and bribery economically irrational, as the cost of corrupting the court exceeds the potential reward.

To prevent random errors and ensure robust finality, rulings can be challenged through a multi-round appeal system. Each appeal round doubles the required jury size and the associated arbitration fee, making frivolous appeals prohibitively expensive. This creates a gradual consensus mechanism where disputes settle at the appropriate level of security and cost.

Jurors are selected randomly from the staked pool using cryptographic sortition, weighted by their staked PNK. This random, stake-weighted selection mitigates collusion and preferential voting. The system is designed to be permissionless and Sybil-resistant, as acquiring enough stake and identity to reliably influence outcomes is cost-prohibitive.

The registry is optimized for objectively verifiable criteria (e.g., "Does this contract address match the listed ABI?") rather than subjective quality. For clear, binary questions, the Schelling game converges efficiently. This design limits the attack surface and reduces juror ambiguity, strengthening the system's consensus on the curated list's contents.

The system is funded by arbitration fees paid by parties who challenge a listing. These fees pay jurors for their work and fund the appeal bond mechanism. This creates a self-sustaining economic loop where the cost of attacks funds the defense, aligning economic incentives with the registry's security and maintenance.

The native utility and governance token of the Kleros protocol. It serves three primary functions:

• Juror Staking: Users must stake PNK to be eligible for jury selection.
• Decision Incentive: Jurors earn fees in ETH for ruling on cases.
• Governance: PNK holders vote on protocol upgrades and parameter changes.

Kleros courts can act as a decentralized oracle for subjective data. Instead of providing numeric data (like price feeds), it resolves questions with multiple possible outcomes.

• Example: "Does this social media post violate platform guidelines?"
• Application: Can be integrated by other protocols to adjudicate real-world events or content moderation.