Voting Power

The most common model where voting power is directly proportional to the quantity of governance tokens held. This creates a one-token, one-vote system, aligning influence with economic stake. Key characteristics include:

• Linear Scaling: Doubling your token holdings doubles your voting power.
• Delegation: Token holders can delegate their voting power to other addresses (e.g., experts or representatives) without transferring asset custody.
• Example: In Compound Governance, COMP token holders vote on proposals proportional to their delegated COMP balance.

Systems that increase a participant's voting power based on the duration tokens are locked or committed. This rewards long-term alignment and reduces short-term speculation. Common implementations are:

• Vote Escrow (veToken): Tokens are locked for a user-chosen period, granting voting power that decays linearly to zero at unlock. Longer locks grant more initial power (e.g., Curve Finance's veCRV).
• Staking Duration: Some DAOs grant bonus voting power for tokens staked in longer-term contracts.
• Purpose: Mitigates vote selling and flash loan attacks by requiring time commitment.

A mechanism designed to reduce the dominance of large token holders by making the cost of voting power increase quadratically. A voter with N tokens receives sqrt(N) voting power. This aims to:

• Dilute Whales: A holder with 100 tokens gets 10 votes, while a holder with 10,000 tokens gets 100 votes (10x the tokens, 10x the votes, not 100x).
• Favor Broad Consensus: Makes it expensive for a single entity to overwhelmingly sway decisions.
• Practical Challenge: Vulnerable to Sybil attacks (splitting holdings into many addresses), requiring robust identity or proof-of-personhood systems to implement effectively.

Governance models that decouple voting rights from financial capital, using alternative metrics for contribution and legitimacy. Examples include:

• Proof-of-Personhood / Soulbound Tokens (SBTs): One vote per verified unique human (e.g., Gitcoin Passport).
• Reputation-Based Systems: Voting power earned through verifiable contributions to the protocol (e.g., code commits, community moderation).
• Multisig / Council Models: Voting power is held by a pre-selected, often elected, group of key stakeholders or experts.
• Goal: To achieve plurality and prevent governance capture by pure capital.

A flexible system where token holders can either vote directly on proposals or delegate their voting power to a representative who votes on their behalf. This creates a delegation graph. Key features:

• Transitive Delegation: Delegates can further delegate, forming a chain of trust.
• Liquid Choice: Delegation is not permanent; voters can reclaim and re-delegate their power at any time.
• Efficiency: Allows for specialized voters (e.g., subject matter experts) to make informed decisions without requiring every token holder to be constantly engaged.
• Example: Prominently used in the Compound and Uniswap governance systems.

The design of voting power directly impacts a protocol's resilience to manipulation. Critical considerations include:

• Vote Buying/Selling: The open market for voting power can lead to governance capture.
• Flash Loan Attacks: Borrowing a massive amount of tokens temporarily to pass a malicious proposal. Mitigated by time-locks or time-weighted voting.
• Tyranny of the Majority: Large token holders (whales) can consistently override minority interests.
• Voter Apathy: Low participation rates can allow a small, motivated group to control outcomes.
• 51% Attack: In token-weighted systems, acquiring a majority of tokens grants full control.

The most prevalent model where voting power is directly proportional to the quantity of a specific governance token held. This creates a plutocratic system where capital equals influence.

• Mechanism: 1 token = 1 vote. Power is often calculated via a snapshot of token balances at a specific block.
• Examples: Uniswap (UNI), Compound (COMP), Aave (AAVE).
• Pros: Simple, Sybil-resistant, easy to audit.
• Cons: Can lead to voter apathy among small holders and centralization of power among whales.

Voting power is boosted by locking tokens for a specified duration. Longer lock-ups grant exponentially greater voting weight, aligning long-term incentives.

• Mechanism: Power = Tokens Locked × Lock Time (e.g., in years). A 4-year lock may grant 4x the voting power of a 1-year lock for the same token amount.
• Examples: Curve Finance (veCRV), Balancer (veBAL).
• Key Feature: Often includes the right to direct protocol emissions ("vote-escrow"), making governance economically consequential.

Token holders delegate their voting power to representatives or experts who vote on their behalf. This reduces voter fatigue while maintaining token-based sovereignty.

• Mechanism: A holder assigns their voting power to a delegate address. The delegate's voting weight is the sum of all tokens delegated to them.
• Examples: Optimism Collective (Citizen & Token House), many DAOs using Snapshot delegation.
• Outcome: Creates a political layer of known delegates who build platforms and are accountable to their delegators.

Voting power is granted based on non-transferable participation metrics or contributions, decoupling influence from mere capital. This aims for a meritocratic or community-centric system.

• Mechanism: Power is earned through actions like submitting proposals, code contributions, or consistent participation. It is often soulbound (non-transferable).
• Examples: SourceCred, early Moloch DAO shares, Gitcoin DAO's Steward reputation.
• Goal: Align influence with proven engagement and expertise, mitigating plutocracy.

A mechanism designed to reflect the intensity of preference while limiting the power of large holders. The cost of votes increases quadratically with the number of votes cast on a single proposal.

• Mechanism: To cast n votes for an option, a voter spends n² credits or tokens. This makes it prohibitively expensive for one entity to dominate.
• Application: Used in Gitcoin Grants for matching fund allocation to measure community sentiment strength.
• Challenge: Vulnerable to Sybil attacks without robust identity verification (e.g., Proof-of-Personhood).

A continuous voting model where voting power accrues over time as tokens are staked on a proposal, signaling sustained conviction. It is used for continuous funding allocation.

• Mechanism: Users stake tokens on a proposal. Voting power increases with the size and duration of the stake according to a time-decay formula. Funds are automatically allocated when a proposal reaches a predefined threshold.
• Example: Commons Stack / 1Hive gardens for community treasuries.
• Benefit: Allows emergent prioritization without fixed proposal cycles and reduces governance overhead.

The most common mechanism where voting power is directly proportional to the quantity of governance tokens held. This creates a plutocratic system, aligning influence with economic stake. Key implementations include:

• Snapshot: Off-chain signaling using token balances.
• On-chain voting: Direct execution via smart contracts (e.g., Compound, Uniswap).
• Vote delegation: Allows token holders to delegate their voting power to representatives.

A mechanism designed to reduce plutocratic dominance by making the cost of votes increase quadratically. A voter with N tokens can cast sqrt(N) votes. This dilutes the power of large holders and better reflects the intensity of preference among a broader community. It was pioneered in Gitcoin Grants for public goods funding and explored in governance systems to mitigate whale dominance.

A time-based voting model where voting power accrues over time a voter's tokens are committed to a proposal. Power grows according to a conviction curve, rewarding long-term, committed stakers over transient voters. This system:

• Reduces governance fatigue by not requiring constant re-voting.
• Filters for high-confidence proposals that sustain support.
• Is used by protocols like 1Hive's Gardens for continuous funding decisions.

A system that locks governance tokens for a fixed period to mint non-transferable veTokens (e.g., veCRV, veBAL). Voting power is weighted by both the amount locked and the lock duration. This model:

• Aligns long-term incentives between voters and protocol health.
• Creates a time-weighted plutocracy.
• Is central to Curve Finance's gauge system for directing liquidity mining rewards.

A system where token holders can delegate their voting power to a representative without transferring asset custody. This enables:

• Voter apathy mitigation by empowering informed delegates.
• Expert-driven governance from dedicated community members.
• Vote aggregation into cohesive blocs. Protocols like Compound and Uniswap use delegation to create a representative structure, forming a governance layer of active participants.

Mechanisms to prevent a single entity from accumulating disproportionate power by creating many fake identities (Sybil attacks). These are critical for one-person-one-vote systems. Approaches include:

• Proof-of-Personhood: Verification of unique human identity (e.g., Worldcoin, BrightID).
• Proof-of-Participation: Basing power on verified contributions or attestations.
• Soulbound Tokens (SBTs): Non-transferable tokens representing credentials or membership.