Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a blockchain architecture that formally separates the role of the block proposer (or validator) from the block builder. In this model, the proposer is responsible for selecting and publishing the next block in the chain, but does not construct its contents. Instead, specialized actors known as builders compete in an open market to create the most valuable blocks by including transactions and MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) opportunities. The proposer's role is reduced to selecting the most profitable block header from builders via a commit-reveal scheme or a direct auction, such as a sealed-bid auction.
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS)
What is Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS)?
A design paradigm that decouples the roles of block proposal and block construction in proof-of-stake consensus mechanisms.
The primary motivations for PBS are to democratize access to MEV and reduce the centralization risks associated with validator operations. Without PBS, validators who can run sophisticated MEV extraction software gain a significant economic advantage, creating a centralizing force. PBS externalizes the complex and resource-intensive task of block building to a competitive marketplace. This allows validators with modest resources to earn revenue from MEV by simply selecting the highest-bidding builder's block, while builders compete on efficiency and access to transaction flow. This separation is a core component of Ethereum's post-merge roadmap, implemented via proposer-builder separation (ePBS).
PBS is typically implemented through a two-phase protocol. In the first phase, builders create full blocks and submit bids (cryptographic commitments) to the proposer. The proposer then selects the bid with the highest attached payment. In the second phase, the winning builder reveals the full block body, and the proposer publishes it to the network. Critical to this design is crlist-censorship resistance, which ensures builders cannot censor transactions by forcing them to include all transactions from a publicly known list. PBS also introduces new entities like relays, which act as trusted intermediaries to prevent frontrunning and ensure bid privacy during the auction process.
The ecosystem around PBS has given rise to a builder market dominated by specialized firms and MEV-boost software, which is the interim, off-protocol implementation of PBS used by most Ethereum validators today. Builders aggregate transactions from users, searchers (who identify MEV opportunities), and blockchain APIs to construct optimized blocks. The economic dynamics of this market are complex, involving priority fees, inclusion lists, and competition for order flow. The long-term goal is to formalize these mechanisms directly into the consensus layer protocol, enhancing security and decentralization while mitigating risks like builder cartel formation or relay centralization.
How Proposer-Builder Separation Works
An architectural design that decouples the roles of block proposal and block construction in proof-of-stake consensus, primarily to address centralization risks in maximal extractable value (MEV).
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a protocol design that formally splits the block production process into two distinct roles: the block builder and the block proposer (or validator). The builder is responsible for constructing a block's contents—ordering transactions and extracting MEV—while the proposer is solely responsible for selecting and attesting to the most profitable or desirable block from a competitive marketplace. This separation prevents a single entity from controlling both transaction ordering and consensus, mitigating the centralization pressure caused by sophisticated MEV extraction.
The mechanism typically operates through a commit-reveal scheme or a direct marketplace. Builders create full blocks, compute a bid (often the tip to the proposer), and submit a commitment (like a hash) to the network. Proposers, often chosen via the underlying consensus algorithm, then select the block with the highest bid from a public mempool or a private relay. The winning builder's full block is revealed only after the proposer has committed to it, ensuring the proposer cannot steal the builder's transaction ordering strategy.
A primary implementation is Ethereum's PBS via MEV-Boost, an out-of-protocol (or "enshrined") solution used post-Merge. Here, validators (proposers) run MEV-Boost software to connect to a network of builders and relays. Builders construct blocks, relays validate them and forward the header with a bid, and the proposer signs the most profitable header. This allows validators with modest resources to capture MEV revenue without operating complex, centralized MEV infrastructure themselves.
The long-term goal for many protocols is enshrined PBS, where the separation is baked directly into the consensus layer. This provides stronger cryptographic guarantees, reduces reliance on trusted relays, and further decentralizes the building process. Enshrined PBS designs, such as those proposed for Ethereum's future upgrades, aim to create a more permissionless and competitive building market through mechanisms like builder auctions conducted in-protocol.
Key benefits of PBS include decentralization (reducing validator centralization from MEV), efficiency (specialization leads to optimized block construction), and fairer revenue distribution. However, it introduces new trust assumptions, particularly in the relay layer in interim solutions, and can create a centralized builder market if not carefully designed. The evolution of PBS is central to managing the economic and security implications of MEV in modern blockchain ecosystems.
Key Features and Design Goals
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a blockchain design paradigm that decouples the roles of block proposal and block construction to enhance network efficiency, censorship resistance, and decentralization.
Role Specialization
PBS creates two distinct, specialized roles: Block Builders compete to create the most valuable block by including transactions and MEV, while Block Proposers (validators) simply select and attest to the most profitable block header. This separation allows each role to optimize for different goals—builders for economic efficiency, proposers for network security.
MEV Democratization
A core goal is to democratize access to Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). In a PBS model, the value from transaction ordering (like arbitrage and liquidations) is transparently auctioned in a public marketplace. This aims to distribute profits more broadly to validators/stakers rather than allowing a few sophisticated actors to capture it covertly.
Censorship Resistance
PBS enhances censorship resistance by introducing economic disincentives for builders who exclude valid transactions. Proposers are incentivized to choose the block with the highest bid, which typically includes all profitable transactions. This makes it costly for a builder to systematically censor transactions, as they would have to outbid builders who include them.
Protocol vs. Enshrined PBS
PBS can be implemented in two primary ways:
- Enshrined PBS: The separation is a core, mandatory rule of the blockchain protocol (e.g., Ethereum's proposed design).
- Protocol (Out-of-Protocol) PBS: The separation is implemented through a free market of off-chain relayers and builder software, as seen with MEV-Boost on Ethereum today. The long-term goal for Ethereum is to enshrine PBS to reduce reliance on trusted third parties.
Relayers as Trusted Intermediaries
In current implementations like MEV-Boost, Relayers act as a critical, trusted intermediary between builders and proposers. They receive full blocks from builders, verify their validity, and pass only the header and bid to the proposer. This ensures the proposer cannot steal the block content. Reducing or eliminating this trust assumption is a key challenge for enshrined PBS.
Builder Market Efficiency
PBS fosters a competitive builder market. Builders invest in sophisticated infrastructure (like high-performance mempools and arbitrage bots) to construct optimal blocks. This competition drives innovation in block construction, increases the revenue returned to validators/stakers, and theoretically leads to more efficient transaction inclusion for end-users.
Etymology and Historical Context
This section traces the conceptual and practical evolution of Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS), a fundamental architectural shift in blockchain design.
The term Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) emerged from the Ethereum research community around 2019-2020 as a proposed solution to the centralizing forces of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). It describes a market-based design that formally splits the role of a block producer into two distinct, specialized parties: the block proposer (who selects the block) and the block builder (who constructs it). This separation was conceived to mitigate the risks of validator centralization and to create a more transparent and competitive market for block space.
Historically, the need for PBS became acute with the rise of sophisticated MEV extraction techniques like arbitrage and liquidations. In a naive system, the entity proposing the next block (the validator) also has the sole power to order transactions, creating a massive profit incentive to run complex, centralized infrastructure. This led to the growth of MEV relays and builder networks, which were informal, off-protocol precursors to PBS. The Flashbots research collective played a pivotal role in popularizing these concepts and building initial implementations like MEV-Boost for Ethereum's post-merge Proof-of-Stake chain.
The etymology reflects its functional decomposition: 'Proposer' refers to the validator's canonical role of signing and proposing a block header, while 'Builder' denotes the new, competitive role of assembling the most valuable block body. 'Separation' is the key innovation, enforcing a clear market boundary. This design is philosophically aligned with modular blockchain architecture, promoting specialization—builders compete on execution efficiency and MEV capture, while proposers focus on consensus and security.
PBS represents a formalization of a market dynamic that was already occurring off-chain. Its implementation, particularly through enshrined PBS in future Ethereum upgrades, aims to bring this activity on-chain with cryptoeconomic guarantees. The historical context is thus a transition from opaque, centralized MEV extraction toward a transparent, permissionless auction for block-building rights, fundamentally altering the validator's economic role and the landscape of blockchain infrastructure.
Ecosystem Usage and Implementation
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a design paradigm that decouples the roles of block proposing and block building to address centralization risks in proof-of-stake networks. Its implementation involves a market-driven ecosystem of specialized actors and specific protocol mechanisms.
The Core Auction Mechanism
At the heart of PBS is a sealed-bid, first-price auction. Builders compete by constructing the most valuable block possible and submitting a bid (a portion of their profits) to the proposer. The proposer selects the highest bid without seeing the block's contents, ensuring they cannot censor transactions based on the builder's identity or the transactions included. This creates a competitive market for block space.
Builder Specialization & MEV
Builders are specialized nodes that aggregate transactions from the mempool and private orderflows (like MEV-Boost relays) to construct execution payloads. Their goal is to maximize Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) through:
- Arbitrage between decentralized exchanges
- Liquidations in lending protocols
- Optimizing transaction ordering The profits from this extraction fund their bids to proposers, creating the economic engine for PBS.
The Proposer's Role
The proposer (a validator) has a simplified role: they receive bids from builders via a relay, select the highest one, and commit to it by signing a block header commitment. Critically, the proposer only learns the block's contents after they have committed, which enforces the separation of duties. Their primary incentives are to maximize their rewards by choosing the highest bid and to ensure the relay is trustworthy to avoid proposing an invalid block.
Relays: The Trusted Intermediaries
Relays are neutral intermediaries that facilitate the PBS market. They perform essential functions:
- Receive execution payloads and bids from builders
- Validate payloads for correctness (e.g., gas limit, signature checks)
- Forward only the header and bid to proposers
- Reveal the full block to the proposer after commitment Relays prevent proposers from stealing block content and builders from withholding blocks, but they introduce a point of centralization that protocol-native PBS aims to eliminate.
In-Protocol PBS (ePBS)
Enshrined Proposer-Builder Separation (ePBS) is the goal of integrating PBS directly into the Ethereum consensus layer, removing the need for trusted relays. Proposed designs like ePBS via the Builder API or two-slot PBS use cryptoeconomic penalties (slashing) and protocol guarantees to enforce the proposer-builder covenant. This moves the trust assumptions from off-chain intermediaries to the blockchain's own security model.
Security Considerations and Critiques
While PBS aims to decentralize block production, its implementation introduces new security models and potential attack vectors that must be critically examined.
Builder Centralization Risk
The primary critique of PBS is the potential for builder centralization. Specialized builders with advanced hardware and private orderflow access can outcompete smaller players, leading to a few dominant entities. This creates a new point of centralization and potential censorship, where a small group of builders could exclude certain transactions. The relay becomes a critical trust point to mitigate this.
MEV Extraction & Censorship
PBS formalizes Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) extraction by builders, which can have negative externalities. Security concerns include:
- Censorship: A builder could be pressured to exclude transactions from specific addresses.
- Time-bandit attacks: A builder could attempt to reorg a block if a more profitable MEV opportunity emerges.
- Sandwich attacks: Builders can front-run user transactions within their blocks, harming end-users.
Relay as a Trusted Third Party
In current PBS implementations, the relay is a critical and trusted intermediary. It receives blocks from builders and forwards the most valuable one to the proposer. This creates security dependencies:
- The relay must be honest and not censor builders.
- It becomes a high-value target for denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
- Proposers must trust the relay's attestations about block validity and contents, creating a new trust assumption.
Proposer Collusion & Bribes
PBS introduces new collusion vectors. A malicious builder could bribe a proposer to select their block, even if it's not the most valuable, undermining the auction's integrity. This is related to MEV-boost-style out-of-protocol PBS. Mitigations like commit-reveal schemes and in-protocol PBS (e.g., Ethereum's proposed ePBS) aim to make such collusion detectable or impossible.
Complexity & Protocol Security
Adding PBS increases the protocol complexity of the consensus layer. More complex code and interactions increase the attack surface for bugs. The separation of roles also changes the economic incentives and slashing conditions for validators, requiring careful security analysis to ensure the network's liveness and safety are not compromised by the new builder-proposer dynamic.
Data Availability Challenges
Builders may create large blocks to capture more MEV. This pressures the network's data availability layer. If a builder withholds data after a block is proposed, it can lead to challenges and force the chain to fork. Robust Data Availability Sampling (DAS) and layers like EigenDA or Celestia are critical complements to PBS for maintaining security under high load.
PBS vs. Traditional Block Production
A side-by-side comparison of the core architectural and economic differences between Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) and the traditional integrated block production model.
| Feature | Traditional Model | PBS Model |
|---|---|---|
Primary Actor | Proposer (Validator) | Builder (Specialized Node) |
Role Separation | ||
Block Construction | Local, by validator | Off-chain, by competitive builders |
MEV Capture | By the validator | Auctioned to builders; proceeds can be shared |
Validator Hardware Requirements | Moderate (must run execution client) | Minimal (can run consensus-only client) |
Censorship Resistance | Relies on individual validator | Enhanced via inclusion lists (crLists) |
Protocol Complexity | Lower (integrated) | Higher (requires relay network, auction mechanism) |
Dominant Implementation | Pre-Ethereum Merge | Post-EIP-1559, enshrined PBS target |
Common Misconceptions About Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS)
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a critical Ethereum protocol design, but its mechanics are often misunderstood. This section clarifies frequent points of confusion regarding its implementation, purpose, and impact on network participants.
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a protocol design that decouples the roles of block building and block proposing to mitigate centralization risks from Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). In this model, specialized actors called block builders compete in an auction to create the most valuable block by including and ordering transactions. The winning builder's block is then cryptographically committed to the block proposer (e.g., a validator), who simply signs and publishes it to the network. This separation prevents proposers from being forced to run complex, centralized MEV extraction infrastructure.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a design paradigm for blockchain networks that decouples the roles of block proposal and block construction. These questions address its core mechanics, rationale, and implementation status.
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is a blockchain architecture that splits the traditional validator role into two specialized parties: block builders and block proposers. It works through a two-stage, auction-based process. First, builders compete in a sealed-bid auction to construct the most valuable block, which includes ordering transactions and extracting Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). They submit their block header and a bid to the proposer. The proposer (often a validator) then simply selects the header with the highest bid, attests to it, and receives the payment, without seeing the block's contents. This separation allows proposers to remain simple and neutral while builders specialize in complex, competitive block construction.
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