Free 30-min Web3 Consultation
Book Consultation
Smart Contract Security Audits
View Audit Services
Custom DeFi Protocol Development
Explore DeFi
Full-Stack Web3 dApp Development
View App Services
Free 30-min Web3 Consultation
Book Consultation
Smart Contract Security Audits
View Audit Services
Custom DeFi Protocol Development
Explore DeFi
Full-Stack Web3 dApp Development
View App Services
Free 30-min Web3 Consultation
Book Consultation
Smart Contract Security Audits
View Audit Services
Custom DeFi Protocol Development
Explore DeFi
Full-Stack Web3 dApp Development
View App Services
Free 30-min Web3 Consultation
Book Consultation
Smart Contract Security Audits
View Audit Services
Custom DeFi Protocol Development
Explore DeFi
Full-Stack Web3 dApp Development
View App Services
LABS
Comparisons

Liquidation Fee Distribution: Liquidators vs Protocol vs Insurers

A technical analysis comparing three core models for distributing liquidation penalties in DeFi lending protocols, focusing on incentive alignment, protocol sustainability, and risk backstopping for engineering leaders.
Chainscore © 2026
introduction
THE ANALYSIS

Introduction: The Liquidation Fee Dilemma

How a protocol allocates liquidation fees fundamentally shapes its risk profile, capital efficiency, and long-term sustainability.

Liquidator-Centric Models, as seen in protocols like Aave and Compound, allocate the majority of the fee to the liquidator. This creates a powerful, decentralized incentive for rapid risk mitigation, often resulting in sub-2 minute liquidation times. The trade-off is that this model can lead to high volatility in protocol revenue and may encourage predatory 'liquidation sniping' during network congestion.

Protocol-Treasury Models, exemplified by MakerDAO's Stability Fees, retain a significant portion of fees to build a treasury buffer. This creates a sustainable war chest for covering bad debt, as seen when Maker's Surplus Buffer grew to over 200 million DAI. The trade-off is potentially slower liquidations due to lower immediate incentives for external actors, requiring robust keeper ecosystems.

Insurer/Staker-First Models, like those used by Synthetix and some newer LST protocols, distribute fees to stakers who backstop the system. This directly compensates capital providers for their risk, improving staking yields. For instance, a protocol might offer a 2-3% APY boost from liquidation fees. The trade-off is reduced immediate treasury growth and reliance on staker liquidity being sufficient during black swan events.

The key trade-off: If your priority is maximizing liquidation speed and decentralization, choose a Liquidator-Centric model. If you prioritize long-term protocol-owned sustainability and a risk buffer, choose a Protocol-Treasury model. For protocols where incentivizing and protecting core stakers is paramount, the Insurer/Staker model is optimal.

tldr-summary
Liquidation Fee Distribution Models

TL;DR: Core Model Differentiators

How a protocol allocates liquidation rewards defines its risk management, capital efficiency, and stakeholder incentives. Choose based on your protocol's priorities.

01

Liquidator Rewards (e.g., Aave, Compound)

Direct Incentive for Speed: Liquidators receive 100% of the fee (e.g., 5-10% bonus). This creates a hyper-competitive, decentralized network for risk closure, minimizing bad debt. Best for: Protocols prioritizing maximum security and liquidation speed over protocol-owned revenue.

~5-10%
Typical Bonus
02

Protocol Treasury (e.g., MakerDAO, early Synthetix)

Revenue Capture for Sustainability: Fees accrue to the protocol treasury, funding development, insurance funds, or token buybacks. This strengthens the protocol's balance sheet but may reduce liquidator participation. Best for: Mature protocols with established stability mechanisms seeking long-term financial sustainability.

Protocol-Owned
Revenue Model
03

Insurer/Stakers (e.g., Solend's Insurance Fund, MarginFi)

Risk-Pooling for Stability: Fees fund a dedicated insurance pool that covers bad debt, protecting general depositors. Stakers who back the pool are compensated for this risk. Best for: Protocols aiming to offer a 'safer' user experience by socializing tail risk among voluntary capital providers.

Capital-Efficient
Risk Coverage
04

Hybrid Models (e.g., Compound's switch, newer Aave proposals)

Balanced Incentives: Splits fees between liquidators (for speed) and a protocol/insurance fund (for sustainability). Requires careful parameter tuning to avoid diluting either incentive. Best for: Protocols seeking a middle ground, optimizing for both network security and treasury growth as they scale.

Flexible
Parameter Tuning
HEAD-TO-HEAD COMPARISON

Liquidation Fee Distribution Models

Direct comparison of fee distribution mechanisms for on-chain liquidations.

Metric / FeatureLiquidator RewardsProtocol TreasuryInsurance Funds

Primary Incentive Target

External Actors

Protocol Treasury

Insurance Pool Participants

Capital Efficiency for Liquidators

High (Direct Reward)

Low (No Direct Reward)

Medium (Via Reimbursement)

Protocol Revenue Capture

0%

100%

0% (Held in Reserve)

User Protection Against Bad Debt

Common Implementation

MakerDAO, Aave

dYdX, GMX

Synthetix, Venus

Typical Fee Range

5-15% of position

5-15% of position

Funded by protocol fees

Systemic Risk Mitigation

Low

Medium

High

pros-cons-a
PROS & CONS

Liquidation Fee Distribution: Model Comparison

Key strengths and trade-offs of the three primary fee distribution models for protocol designers.

01

Liquidator-Centric (e.g., Aave, Compound)

Direct Incentive for Speed: 100% of the liquidation bonus (e.g., 5-10% of position) goes to the liquidator. This creates a hyper-competitive, low-latency market crucial for high-volatility environments like DeFi lending.

100%
Fee to Liquidator
02

Protocol Treasury (e.g., MakerDAO Surplus Buffer)

Capital Efficiency & Protocol-Owned Revenue: Fees accrue to the protocol's treasury, funding development, insurance backstops, or token buybacks. This is optimal for protocols prioritizing long-term sustainability and governance-controlled capital.

Protocol-Owned
Revenue Stream
03

Liquidator-Centric: The Risk

Centralization & MEV: The winner-take-all model favors sophisticated bots with custom infrastructure, leading to centralization. It also creates predictable MEV opportunities that can be extracted via frontrunning, potentially harming regular users.

04

Protocol Treasury: The Trade-off

Reduced Liquidator Participation: Lower or zero direct rewards can disincentivize liquidators during network congestion or low fee periods, increasing systemic risk if positions aren't cleared promptly.

05

Insurance Fund Model (e.g., Synthetix, dYdX)

Explicit Risk Coverage: Fees fund a dedicated insurance pool that covers bad debt from failed liquidations. This is critical for exotic or synthetic assets with unique liquidity or oracle risks, ensuring user funds are protected first.

Capital Buffer
For Bad Debt
06

Insurance Fund: The Cost

Capital Lockup & Opportunity Cost: Capital sits idle instead of being deployed. Requires careful sizing models; if undersized during a black swan event, it fails. Adds complexity in governance for fund management.

pros-cons-b
Liquidation Fee Distribution

Protocol Treasury Model: Pros & Cons

Comparing the economic incentives and trade-offs of directing liquidation fees to Liquidators, the Protocol Treasury, or dedicated Insurance Funds.

01

Liquidator Incentives (MakerDAO, Aave)

Pro: Maximizes System Resilience

  • Directly rewards external actors for risk management, creating a competitive, decentralized liquidation market.
  • Proven to handle extreme volatility, as seen during the March 2020 crash where liquidators cleared over $8M in debt on Aave.
  • Best for: Protocols prioritizing maximum security and capital efficiency over treasury growth.
02

Liquidator Incentives (MakerDAO, Aave)

Con: High and Volatile User Cost

  • Fees (e.g., 5-13% on major lending protocols) are passed directly to users as a liquidation penalty, increasing borrower risk.
  • Creates a zero-sum game between users and liquidators, potentially fostering adversarial relationships.
  • Trade-off: Sacrifices user experience and cost predictability for robust security.
03

Protocol Treasury (Compound, Frax Finance)

Pro: Sustainable Protocol-Owned Revenue

  • Fees accrue to a community-controlled treasury, funding grants, development, and strategic reserves.
  • Creates a long-term, aligned economic flywheel; e.g., Compound Treasury holds significant COMP and USDC from fees.
  • Best for: DAOs seeking financial sustainability and community-directed growth.
04

Protocol Treasury (Compound, Frax Finance)

Con: Weaker Immediate Security Incentives

  • Relies on altruism or secondary token rewards (like COMP distribution) to motivate liquidators, which can lag during black swan events.
  • Risk of treasury mismanagement or political deadlock on fund usage.
  • Trade-off: Prioritizes long-term funding over optimizing for instantaneous liquidation coverage.
05

Dedicated Insurance Fund (dYdX v3, Synthetix)

Pro: Explicit User Protection & Stability

  • Creates a transparent backstop for undercollateralized positions, directly protecting users from bad debt.
  • Smooths out volatility; the dYdX Insurance Fund has covered multiple shortfall events without socialized losses.
  • Best for: Perpetuals exchanges and synthetic asset protocols where user trust in solvency is paramount.
06

Dedicated Insurance Fund (dYdX v3, Synthetix)

Con: Capital Inefficiency & Management Overhead

  • Requires pre-funding and continuous growth of a large, idle capital pool (e.g., millions in USDC).
  • Introduces governance complexity around fund size, drawdown rules, and replenishment mechanisms.
  • Trade-off: Accepts lower capital efficiency to provide a stronger user guarantee and reduce systemic risk.
risk-profile
Liquidation Fee Distribution: Liquidators vs Protocol vs Insurers

Insurance Fund Model: Risk & Reward Profile

How a protocol allocates liquidation fees directly impacts its capital efficiency, risk absorption, and user incentives. The choice defines who bears the tail risk of undercollateralization.

01

Liquidator-First Model (e.g., Aave, Compound)

Direct Incentive for Speed: 5-10% liquidation bonus paid directly to liquidators. This creates a hyper-competitive market for risk, ensuring rapid position unwinding during volatility.

Trade-off: Protocol and users bear full residual risk. If bad debt exceeds collateral, the protocol's treasury or insurance fund must cover it, as seen in Aave's $1.6M shortfall incident (2022).

5-10%
Typical Bonus
~5 sec
Avg. Liquidation Time
02

Protocol Treasury Model (e.g., MakerDAO, Synthetix)

Capital Accumulation for Systemic Risk: Fees flow into a protocol-controlled treasury (e.g., Maker's Surplus Buffer). This builds a war chest to directly cover bad debt, as Maker did using its $500M+ Surplus Buffer during the March 2020 crash.

Trade-off: Lower immediate incentives for liquidators (~3% fee) can lead to slower liquidations during network congestion, increasing risk of cascading insolvencies.

$500M+
Maker Surplus Buffer
1-3%
Typical Fee
03

Dedicated Insurance Fund Model (e.g., dYdX v3, Perpetual Protocol)

Ring-Fenced Risk Capital: A specific vault (e.g., dYdX's Insurance Fund) is capitalized by trading fees and explicitly earmarked for covering liquidation shortfalls. This provides clear, segregated protection for traders.

Trade-off: Requires significant upfront capitalization and continuous fee flow. If depleted, it can trigger automatic protocol safeguards like increased margins or halted markets.

~40%
Fees to Fund (dYdX v3)
Zero
User Losses (to date)
04

Hybrid/Staker-Liability Model (e.g., Synthetix v2, early Maker)

Risk Socialization with Stakers: Stakers (SNX, MKR) act as insurers of last resort, with their staked assets subject to dilution or auction to cover system debt. This creates deep, albeit volatile, backing.

Trade-off: High systemic risk for stakers can deter participation or lead to volatile tokenomics. Synthetix's $1B+ backing per $sUSD is powerful but concentrates risk.

> 500%
SNX Collateral Ratio
Staker Dilution
Last-Resort Mechanism
CHOOSE YOUR PRIORITY

Decision Framework: Which Liquidation Fee Model For Your Use Case?

Liquidator-First Model (e.g., Aave, Compound)

Verdict: Optimal for maximizing capital efficiency and protocol health. This model creates a powerful, decentralized economic incentive for liquidators to monitor and act on underwater positions, leading to faster, more reliable liquidations. This minimizes bad debt and protects the protocol's solvency. The primary trade-off is that fees are extracted from the protocol's user base (the liquidated users) and are not recaptured for protocol revenue or insurance.

Key Metrics & Protocols:

  • Speed: High, due to competitive liquidator bots.
  • Protocol TVL Protection: Excellent; proven at scale with Aave ($12B+ TVL) and Compound.
  • User Cost: Highest for liquidated users (liquidation penalty + gas).
verdict
THE ANALYSIS

Final Verdict & Strategic Recommendation

Choosing a liquidation fee distribution model is a strategic decision that balances protocol security, ecosystem incentives, and user protection.

Liquidator Incentives excel at maximizing network security and speed because they create a powerful, decentralized economic force to keep positions healthy. For example, protocols like Aave and Compound, which allocate 100% of fees to liquidators, consistently achieve sub-minute liquidation times, a critical metric for preventing bad debt during volatility. This model leverages open competition to ensure the protocol's solvency is a top priority for a broad set of actors.

Protocol Treasury Models take a different approach by retaining a portion (e.g., 10-50%) of liquidation fees. This strategy, used by protocols like MakerDAO, results in a direct revenue stream for protocol development and sustainability, but it creates a trade-off by slightly reducing the immediate economic incentive for liquidators. The retained capital can fund risk parameters, insurance funds, or grants, creating long-term value at the potential cost of marginally slower reaction times in extreme conditions.

Insurance/Staker Payouts prioritize user protection and decentralization by distributing fees to backstop providers or stakers, as seen with Synthetix's staking pool. This results in a trade-off where the financial penalty for being liquidated directly strengthens the protocol's collective safety net or rewards its most committed participants, enhancing stability and loyalty, but may not incentivize the same aggressive, rapid-fire liquidation activity as a pure liquidator model.

The key trade-off: If your priority is maximized security and the fastest possible liquidation engine to protect the protocol's balance sheet, choose the Liquidator Incentive model. If you prioritize protocol-owned revenue for sustainable development or user-centric risk mitigation, strongly consider a Protocol Treasury or Insurance/Staker Payout model, respectively. For new protocols, the liquidator model is often the safest bootstrap choice; established protocols with significant TVL can leverage their stability to experiment with treasury or staker distributions.

ENQUIRY

Get In Touch
today.

Our experts will offer a free quote and a 30min call to discuss your project.

NDA Protected
24h Response
Directly to Engineering Team
10+
Protocols Shipped
$20M+
TVL Overall
NDA Protected Directly to Engineering Team
Liquidation Fees: Liquidators vs Protocol vs Insurers | Comparison | ChainScore Comparisons