Ethereum L1 vs EigenLayer: Security Assumptions

Proven Nakamoto + PoS Security: Secured by ~$100B in staked ETH and a global network of 1M+ validators. This matters for protocols requiring maximized liveness and censorship resistance, like stablecoins (USDC) or core DeFi (Uniswap, Aave).

Economic Finality: Attack cost is the cost of acquiring and slashing ~$34B in staked ETH. This matters for high-value, immutable state where the cost of rewriting history must be astronomically high, such as L1 settlement or canonical asset bridges.

Re-staking for Shared Security: Allows ETH stakers to opt-in to secure additional services (AVSs) like oracles (e.g., EigenDA, Hyperlane) and L2 bridges. This matters for bootstrapping security for new protocols without launching a new token or validator set.

Amplified Staking Yield with Tail Risk: Stakers earn extra yield but face slashing risk from multiple AVSs. This matters for operators seeking yield aggregation but introduces complex, correlated slashing conditions that differ from Ethereum's base layer.

No Third-Party Dependencies: Security is endogenous and self-contained. This matters for foundational infrastructure where introducing external trust assumptions (like a multisig or committee) is unacceptable for the core protocol's integrity.

Modular Security Marketplace: Enables rapid experimentation with new cryptoeconomic models (e.g., actively validated services). This matters for developing novel middleware (like AltLayer rollups) that can tap into Ethereum's economic security without its execution constraints.

Proven Nakamoto + PoS Security: Secured by ~$100B+ in staked ETH and a global, decentralized validator set of ~1M nodes. This provides cryptoeconomic finality that has withstood over 9 years of adversarial scrutiny. This matters for protocols requiring the highest possible security guarantees for state and value, like Lido's stETH or MakerDAO's DAI.

Client & Geographic Diversity: No single entity controls >33% of stake, enforced by client diversity (Prysm, Lighthouse, Teku) and a global node distribution. This creates censorship resistance and liveness guarantees that are critical for base-layer settlement and sovereign applications like USDC or Uniswap governance.

Re-staking for Capital Efficiency: Allows ETH stakers to opt-in to secure new protocols (AVSs) without allocating new capital. This creates a scalable security marketplace where projects like EigenDA or Omni Network can bootstrap security from day one, avoiding the 'cold start' problem of launching a new validator set.

Customizable Security Parameters: AVSs define their own slashing conditions for specific faults (e.g., data unavailability for a rollup). This enables fine-tuned, application-specific security models that are more flexible than Ethereum's base layer, ideal for middleware like oracles (e.g., eoracle) or interoperability layers.

Cost & Throughput Trade-off: Maximum security comes with high costs (~$1-10 per base tx) and limited throughput (~15-30 TPS). This is a prohibitive constraint for high-frequency applications like gaming or micro-transactions, forcing them to layer-2 solutions for scalability.

Slashing Correlation Risk: A bug in one AVS's slashing logic or a coordinated attack could lead to cascading slashing across the restaking pool, creating novel systemic risks. This adds a layer of smart contract and operator dependency risk that does not exist on the base Ethereum L1.

Decentralized Consensus: Security is derived from ~$500B+ in staked ETH and a global network of 1M+ validators. This matters for protocols requiring maximally credible neutrality and resistance to censorship, like MakerDAO or Lido.

Transparent Slashing: Validator penalties are defined in the protocol (e.g., 1 ETH for being offline, up to the full stake for attacks). This matters for risk modeling and capital planning, providing clear, non-negotiable security guarantees for applications like Uniswap or Compound.

Shared Security Pool: Projects like EigenDA or Omni Network can bootstrap security by leveraging Ethereum's existing $50B+ restaked ETH, avoiding the need to bootstrap a new validator set. This matters for new middleware and L2s seeking rapid, cost-effective security without a token launch.

Custom Security Logic: AVSs (Actively Validated Services) can define their own slashing conditions for specific tasks (e.g., data availability proofs, oracle accuracy). This matters for specialized services like Espresso Systems (sequencing) or Lagrange (ZK proofs), enabling tailored cryptoeconomic security.

Concentrated Penalties: A catastrophic bug in a major AVS (e.g., EigenDA) could trigger correlated slashing across the restaking pool, potentially impacting the security of Ethereum's consensus layer. This matters for risk-averse stakers and protocols who prioritize stability over yield.

Trust in Node Operators: Security depends on a subset of Ethereum validators (~200+ operators) opting into AVSs and correctly running complex software. This matters for decentralization purists, as it introduces a new layer of trusted execution beyond base-layer consensus.