Quadratic Voting vs Token-Weighted Voting

Prevents whale dominance: Voting power scales with the square root of tokens committed, diluting large holders' influence. This matters for community-driven DAOs like Gitcoin Grants, where preventing Sybil attacks and ensuring broad participation is critical.

High complexity & cost: Requires identity verification (e.g., BrightID, Proof of Humanity) to prevent Sybil attacks, adding friction. Voting calculations are more gas-intensive. This matters for high-frequency governance on L1 Ethereum, where gas fees can prohibit participation.

Capital-efficient & simple: Aligns voting power directly with economic stake, as seen in Compound and Uniswap governance. Enables fast, clear decision-making. This matters for DeFi protocols where tokenholders' financial skin-in-the-game should dictate treasury and parameter decisions.

Leads to plutocracy: Large tokenholders (VCs, whales) can single-handedly pass proposals, marginalizing small holders. This matters for social DAOs and public goods funding, where decision quality suffers without diverse input, potentially reducing long-term ecosystem health.

Mitigates whale dominance: Voting power = √(tokens committed). A voter with 100 tokens gets 10x the power of a 1-token voter, not 100x. This matters for community-driven protocols like Gitcoin Grants, where preventing a single entity from controlling outcomes is critical.

Higher gas and UX friction: Each vote requires calculating and verifying square roots on-chain (e.g., via zk-SNARKs), increasing transaction costs. This matters for high-frequency governance on L1s, where gas fees can disenfranchise smaller holders despite the theoretical model.

Direct capital alignment: 1 token = 1 vote. This creates clear, predictable governance for DeFi protocols like Uniswap or Compound, where large stakeholders (e.g., VC funds, whales) have the most skin in the game and their decisions directly impact treasury value and protocol security.

Leads to centralized control: A few large holders (e.g., early investors, foundations) can dictate all proposals. This matters for decentralization-focused DAOs where community sentiment should outweigh pure capital, as seen in early struggles of protocols like MakerDAO before introducing delegate systems.

Specific advantage: Cost of influence scales quadratically. Buying 10x the voting power costs 100x more. This matters for preventing whale dominance and protecting against Sybil attacks, as seen in Gitcoin Grants and Optimism's Citizen House. It's ideal for public goods funding and community sentiment gauging.

Specific advantage: Empowers small holders; a user with 1 token has 1 vote, while a user with 100 tokens has only 10 votes. This matters for protocols seeking legitimacy and broad-based consensus, like Nouns DAO's aesthetic decisions, reducing the "tyranny of the capital" problem.

Specific disadvantage: Requires identity verification (e.g., BrightID, Worldcoin) or complex capital locking to prevent Sybil attacks, adding friction. Voting costs (gas) can become prohibitive for large-scale decisions. This matters for high-frequency governance on L1s or protocols with limited resources for identity infrastructure.

Specific advantage: One token, one vote. Simple to implement and understand, leading to faster decision-making. This matters for DeFi protocols like Uniswap and MakerDAO where large, aligned stakeholders (veCRV holders on Curve) need to make rapid parameter adjustments and capital allocation decisions.

Specific advantage: Voter influence is directly proportional to their economic stake. This matters for protocols where financial skin-in-the-game is critical, such as Aave's risk parameter updates or Arbitrum's DAO treasury management. Accountability is transparent and aligned with token value.

Specific disadvantage: Prone to whale dominance and vote buying, centralizing power. A single entity (e.g., a16z in Uniswap governance) can sway outcomes regardless of broader community sentiment. This matters for protocols aiming for decentralized, credibly neutral governance and can lead to voter apathy among smaller holders.