Prover markets are the new mining pools. The computational cost of generating ZK proofs for L2s like zkSync and StarkNet creates a natural oligopoly, where specialized hardware operators aggregate to win block rewards and transaction ordering rights.
zk-rollups-the-endgame-for-scaling
Blog
The Future of Prover Markets and MEV Extraction
ZK-rollups shift consensus to validity proofs, creating a new competitive layer: the prover market. This analysis explores how proving incentives will inevitably birth Prover MEV, where actors race to prove profitable state transitions, mirroring and evolving today's block builder dynamics.
introduction
THE PROVER WAR
Introduction
The race for zero-knowledge proof supremacy is creating a new, winner-take-most market for MEV extraction.
MEV extraction will shift upstream. The entity controlling the prover determines transaction order, moving the MEV supply chain from today's searcher/validator model to a prover/sequencer cartel, as seen in early Arbitrum and Optimism sequencer auctions.
Proof aggregation is the moat. Protocols like EigenLayer and Espresso Systems are building generalized proof markets, but the winning design will be the one that minimizes latency and cost for rollups, not the most decentralized.
Evidence: The cost to prove an Ethereum block on a zkEVM is ~$0.20-$1.00 today; a 10x reduction via specialized ASICs creates a ~$100M annual market for provers by 2025, concentrated among 3-5 major pools.
thesis-statement
THE PROVER MARKET
The Core Thesis: Validity Creates a New Arena for Extraction
The shift to validity proofs transforms block production from a probabilistic consensus game into a deterministic computational market, creating a new, more efficient vector for value extraction.
Validity proofs decouple execution from consensus. Finality is no longer a function of social consensus or economic security; it is a mathematical guarantee. This separates the role of the sequencer from the role of the prover, creating two distinct markets for value capture.
The prover market is a pure compute auction. Sequencers will outsource proof generation to the cheapest, fastest prover network, whether that's a centralized service like RiscZero, a decentralized network like Gevulot, or a specialized ASIC farm. This is a commodity market driven by hardware efficiency and latency.
MEV extraction becomes formalized and verifiable. In a rollup, the sequencer's transaction ordering is the only MEV source. The validity proof cryptographically attests to the correctness of this ordering, making front-running and other adversarial strategies detectable and punishable. This moves MEV from a dark forest to a lit auction.
Evidence: The economic design of networks like Espresso and Astria focuses entirely on sequencing markets, acknowledging that proof generation is a separate, commoditized layer. Their value accrual models depend on capturing ordering rights, not compute cycles.
key-trends
FROM ZK-RACE TO MARKET DYNAMICS
Key Trends: The Building Blocks of Prover MEV
The commoditization of ZK proving is creating a new competitive landscape where latency, cost, and reliability become the primary vectors for extracting value.
01
The Problem: The ZK Proving Commodity Trap
General-purpose provers like Risc Zero and SP1 are becoming fast, cheap commodities. This erodes margins for simple proof generation, forcing a shift upstream.
- Race to the Bottom: Proving costs for standard EVM blocks could drop to <$0.01.
- Value Migration: MEV shifts from making proofs to orchestrating and optimizing the proving pipeline.
<$0.01
Cost Per Proof
~500ms
Latency Floor
02
The Solution: Specialized Prover ASICs & FPGA Pools
Entities like Ingonyama and Cysic are building hardware for specific proof systems (e.g., Plonky2, Halo2). This creates a two-tier market.
- Performance Moats: 10-100x speedup for targeted ZK-VMs, creating latency arbitrage.
- Capital-Intensive Advantage: High Capex barriers prevent commoditization, enabling sustainable prover MEV for pool operators.
100x
Speedup
$10M+
Capex Barrier
03
The Problem: Fragmented Prover Liquidity
ZK-rollups (e.g., zkSync, Starknet, Polygon zkEVM) use different proof systems. This fragments proving power and creates inefficiencies.
- Idle Capacity: A prover optimized for Stark proofs cannot work on a Plonk job.
- Inefficient Markets: No unified venue to match proof jobs with the cheapest, fastest specialized hardware.
5+
Major ZK-VMs
~30%
Idle Capacity
04
The Solution: Proof Auctions & Intent-Based Settlement
A prover marketplace (like Espresso Sequencer for proving) allows rollups to auction proof jobs. Solvers (prover pools) compete on latency and cost.
- MEV for Provers: Solvers can extract value by frontrunning slow provers or bundling jobs.
- Intent Architecture: Rollups submit proving intents ("prove this block in <2s for <$0.1"), mirroring UniswapX and Across.
<2s
SLA Target
$100M+
Market Size
05
The Problem: Centralized Prover Trust Assumptions
Even with decentralized sequencers, a single prover (or cartel) creates a liveness bottleneck and censorship risk. This is the single failure point for any ZK-rollup.
- Censorship Vector: A malicious prover can refuse to prove certain blocks.
- Liveness Risk: Prover downtime halts finality, breaking the L2.
1
Single Point
100%
Liveness Dependency
06
The Solution: Decentralized Prover Networks with Slashing
Networks like =nil; Foundation's Proof Market and Herodotus's coprocessor model decentralize proving. Multiple provers attest to a proof's validity, with slashing for malfeasance.
- Byzantine Fault Tolerance: Requires 2/3+ of provers to be honest.
- Economic Security: Slashing stakes (e.g., $1B+ TVL) disincentivize attacks, creating a new staking derivative market.
2/3+
Honest Majority
$1B+
Staked Security
THE FUTURE OF PROVER MARKETS
MEV vs. Prover MEV: A Comparative Framework
Compares traditional transaction-based MEV with the emerging prover-based MEV, analyzing their mechanics, economic models, and market structures.
| Feature / Metric | Traditional MEV (e.g., Ethereum) | Prover MEV (e.g., zkRollups, OP Stack) | Intent-Based Systems (e.g., UniswapX, CowSwap) |
|---|---|---|---|
Core Extraction Target | Pending transaction mempool | Proof generation & sequencing rights | User intent fulfillment path |
Primary Actors | Searchers, Builders, Validators | Provers, Sequencers, Aggregators | Solvers, Fillers, Aggregators |
Extraction Latency | < 1 second (block time) | Minutes to hours (proof generation window) | Seconds to minutes (auction duration) |
Revenue Concentration | Top 5 builders control > 80% | Governed by prover market structure (TBD) | Top solver wins 100% of per-batch auction |
Value Leakage to Users | ~0% (via frontrunning/backrunning) |
| ~100% (via auction to user) |
Infrastructure Dependence | Flashbots SUAVE, Builder APIs | Proof aggregation networks (e.g., Gevulot) | Solver networks, Intents DSL |
Key Risk Vector | Centralization of block building | Prover cartel formation & Liveness attacks | Solver collusion & censorship |
Market Maturity | Established ($1B+ annualized) | Nascent (theoretical, <$10M annualized) | Growing (~$100M annualized volume) |
deep-dive
THE MARKET STRUCTURE
Deep Dive: Mechanics of the Prover Race
The proving market is evolving from a simple cost center into a complex, extractive financial layer defined by competition, specialization, and MEV.
Proving is now a market. The initial model of a single, subsidized prover is obsolete. Networks like zkSync and Polygon zkEVM now operate with multiple competing provers, creating a commoditized execution layer where cost and speed determine success.
Specialization creates moats. General-purpose provers lose to specialists. Firms like RiscZero and Succinct focus on specific proof systems (e.g., RISC-V, Plonky2), achieving hardware-level optimization that generic teams cannot match. This mirrors ASIC vs. GPU mining.
MEV is the endgame. The highest-value proving work is not batch processing but proving MEV extraction. A prover that can prove an Arbitrum-DEX arbitrage bundle faster than rivals captures the arbitrage profit, transforming proving from a cost into a revenue source.
Evidence: The Espresso Sequencer integration with rollups like Frax Ferrum demonstrates this convergence, where the sequencer/prover stack coordinates to capture and prove cross-domain MEV, internalizing value that once leaked to searchers.
protocol-spotlight
THE FUTURE OF PROVER MARKETS & MEV
Protocol Spotlight: Architectures Defining the Battlefield
The race for modular supremacy is shifting from block production to block proving and settlement, creating new markets for computation and new vectors for value extraction.
01
The Problem: Centralized Provers Create a New Bottleneck
Rollups rely on a single, trusted prover, creating a centralized point of failure and rent extraction. This undermines the decentralization guarantees of the underlying L1.
- Single point of censorship and high fees.
- No competitive market for proof generation costs.
- Stifles innovation in proof systems (e.g., Nova, Boojum).
1
Default Prover
>90%
Margin
02
The Solution: Permissionless Prover Networks (e.g., EigenLayer, Espresso)
Decentralized networks of provers compete on cost and latency, turning proof generation into a commodity. Staked operators are slashed for malfeasance.
- Creates a liquid market for proving power, driving down L2 fees.
- Enables shared sequencing layers to also provide proving, streamlining the stack.
- Unlocks specialized hardware (GPUs, ASICs) for optimal proving.
-80%
Proving Cost
100+
Active Provers
03
The Problem: MEV is Now a Cross-Chain Game
Atomic arbitrage and liquidation opportunities exist across rollups and L1s. Traditional searchers are trapped in siloed mempools, leaving value on the table.
- Inefficient capital allocation across fragmented liquidity.
- Users get worse prices due to isolated settlement.
- Builders cannot coordinate cross-domain block building.
$100M+
Annual Opportunity
5+
Chains Involved
04
The Solution: Shared Orderflow Auctions & Intents (e.g., UniswapX, Across)
Protocols aggregate user intents and auction orderflow to a cross-chain network of solvers. MEV is captured and partially returned to users.
- Users submit signed intents, not transactions, improving UX.
- Solvers (like CowSwap, 1inch Fusion) compete to fulfill orders optimally across chains.
- MEV is democratized via rebates or protocol treasury.
+20%
User Savings
~2s
Settlement
05
The Problem: Prover Centralization Enables MEV Censorship
A centralized prover can front-run, censor, or reorder transactions within a rollup's batch. This creates a trusted, opaque layer for value extraction.
- Prover can insert its own arbitrage trades before proving the batch.
- No cryptographic guarantee of execution integrity.
- Undermines credibly neutral base layer.
100%
Control
0
Slashing
06
The Solution: Based Sequencing & Encrypted Mempools (e.g., Espresso, SUAVE)
Push sequencing and transaction privacy to a decentralized network. Combine with commit-reveal schemes to neutralize prover-level MEV.
- Based sequencing uses the L1 (e.g., Ethereum) for ordering, making it canonical and censorship-resistant.
- Encrypted mempools (via FHE) prevent front-running until execution.
- Separates the roles of ordering, execution, and proving.
L1
Security
~0ms
Front-Run Window
counter-argument
THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC FRONTIER
Counter-Argument: Can Cryptography Save Us?
Advanced cryptography offers a direct technical challenge to centralized prover markets, but introduces new economic and operational constraints.
Cryptography enforces decentralization by design. Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) and multi-party computation (MPC) create verifiable trust without relying on a single prover's honesty. This mathematically eliminates the need for a centralized sequencer or prover cartel, directly attacking the root of extractive MEV.
ZK-Rollups like zkSync and StarkNet demonstrate this principle in execution. Their validity proofs ensure state transitions are correct, preventing malicious proposers from stealing funds. However, this only secures execution, not transaction ordering, which remains a separate vulnerability.
The real bottleneck is economic centralization. Generating ZKPs requires specialized hardware and expertise, creating high fixed costs. This favors large, capital-rich operators like Espresso Systems or dedicated proving marketplaces, potentially recreating the oligopoly cryptography aimed to destroy.
Threshold cryptography and shared sequencers like Astria or Fairblock propose a hybrid model. They distribute trust across a decentralized set of signers, making collusion for MEV extraction statistically improbable. This shifts the attack vector from technical to social, which is harder but not impossible to exploit.
risk-analysis
PROVER MARKETS & MEV
Risk Analysis: The Slippery Slope to Re-Centralization
As proof markets mature, the economic incentives for MEV extraction threaten to undermine decentralization by concentrating power in a few dominant players.
01
The Prover Oligopoly Problem
High hardware and operational costs create massive barriers to entry, leading to a winner-take-most market. This centralizes the critical proving layer, creating a single point of failure and censorship.
- Capital Requirement: Specialized hardware (e.g., GPUs, ASICs) costs $10M+ for competitive setups.
- Market Share: Top 3 provers could control >60% of sequencing and proving volume.
- Consequence: A cartel of provers can dictate fees and censor transactions.
>60%
Market Control
$10M+
Barrier to Entry
02
MEV as a Centralizing Force
Maximal Extractable Value transforms provers from neutral infrastructure into profit-maximizing entities with privileged access to the transaction stream. This creates an insurmountable advantage for incumbents.
- Information Asymmetry: Provers see the mempool first, enabling front-running and sandwich attacks.
- Reinvestment Loop: Extracted MEV funds are reinvested into more hardware, creating a self-reinforcing monopoly.
- Example: A dominant prover like Espresso Systems or a shared sequencer could become the de facto MEV auctioneer.
Self-Reinforcing
Monopoly Loop
Privileged
Mempool Access
03
Solution: Enshrined Prover Auctions & PBS
Mitigation requires protocol-level design to separate block building from proving and enforce fair access. Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) must be adapted for the proving layer.
- Enshrined Auction: A decentralized auction for proving rights, enforced by the base layer protocol.
- Neutrality Enforcement: Provers are cryptographically blinded to transaction content until committed.
- Adoption Path: EigenLayer restaking could secure such a marketplace, while SUAVE aims to decentralize block building.
Protocol-Level
Enforcement
Blinded
Execution
04
Solution: Intent-Based Architectures
Shifting from transaction-based to intent-based systems (like UniswapX or CowSwap) moves competition away from raw speed and towards solving optimization problems. This reduces the prover's advantage.
- User Sovereignty: Users submit desired outcomes, not specific transactions.
- Leveled Field: Solvers compete on efficiency, not latency, reducing the value of front-running.
- Ecosystem Impact: Reduces MEV leakage to a few centralized sequencers, benefiting protocols like Across and layerzero.
Outcome-Based
Paradigm
Reduces
Latency Arms Race
05
The Regulatory Capture Vector
Centralized proving entities present a clear target for regulators, risking enforced transaction blacklists (e.g., OFAC compliance). This is the ultimate form of re-centralization: state-mandated.
- Single Point of Control: A <5 entity prover market is trivial to regulate.
- Censorship Risk: Compliance would require filtering >40% of Ethereum blocks today.
- Existential Threat: Turns decentralized infrastructure into a permissioned, surveilled system.
<5 Entities
Regulation Target
>40%
Blocks Censored
06
Solution: Decentralized Prover Networks
The endgame is a robust network of geographically and politically distributed provers, coordinated via cryptographic protocols. This requires economic designs that reward verifiable decentralization.
- Proof-of-Distributed-Work: Incentivize provers across diverse jurisdictions and hardware types.
- Fault Tolerance: Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus among provers for finality.
- Key Projects: Espresso Systems' shared sequencer and Astria aim for this, but their tokenomics are untested at scale.
BFT Consensus
For Provers
Jurisdictional
Diversity
future-outlook
THE INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER
Future Outlook: The Prover Market Stack (2025-2026)
Proving will evolve from a monolithic feature into a competitive, specialized market, fundamentally altering validator economics and MEV extraction.
Specialized prover networks will unbundle the monolithic sequencer. Dedicated proving layers like RiscZero and Succinct will compete on cost and latency, forcing L2s like Arbitrum and Optimism to become protocol-agnostic clients.
Prover MEV becomes the dominant extractable value. The entity controlling proof ordering and batching captures a new rent, mirroring PBS for block builders. This creates a prover-builder separation (PBS) market for zero-knowledge proofs.
Proof aggregation services will emerge as the critical middleware. Protocols like Herodotus and Lagrange will aggregate proofs across rollups, enabling native cross-chain liquidity without bridging assets, directly competing with LayerZero and Axelar.
Evidence: Espresso Systems' integration with Arbitrum demonstrates the market demand for shared, auction-based sequencing, a precursor to a liquid prover market. The economic model shifts from sequencer profits to proof subsidy auctions.
takeaways
THE PROVER ECONOMY
Key Takeaways for Builders and Investors
The MEV supply chain is being unbundled, creating a new market for specialized, commoditized proving hardware.
01
The Problem: Prover Monopolies Create Centralization
High-performance provers (e.g., for zkEVMs) are capital-intensive, risking a return to centralized sequencer-like control. This creates a single point of failure and rent extraction.
- Vendor lock-in for L2s reliant on a single prover network.
- Proposer-Builder-Separation (PBS) logic applies: we must separate block building (sequencing) from block proving (validity).
- Market solution is a competitive auction for proving time, similar to EigenLayer for decentralized sequencing.
1-3
Dominant Provers
>70%
Cost is Hardware
02
The Solution: Specialized Prover Networks (RiscZero, Succinct)
General-purpose provers will lose to vertically-integrated, application-specific proving stacks optimized for a single VM.
- RiscZero's zkVM and Succinct's SP1 enable custom provers for any chain or app.
- Proof aggregation (like Espresso Systems for sequencing) will emerge, batching proofs from multiple rollups for a ~30-50% cost reduction.
- Investment thesis: back infrastructure that commoditizes the prover, not the one trying to own it.
30-50%
Cost Save via Aggregation
10-100x
Specialization Speedup
03
The New MEV Stack: Provers as Extractors
The prover is the new MEV extractor. By controlling proof ordering and latency, they can influence transaction inclusion, creating a prover-extractable value (PEV) market.
- Fast provers can auction priority proving slots, similar to Flashbots' MEV-Boost.
- This necessitates zk-PBS (Proposer-Builder-Separation for ZK Rollups) to keep sequencing decentralized.
- Builders must design circuits that are MEV-resistant at the proof layer, learning from CowSwap and UniswapX's intent-based architectures.
~500ms
Priority Proof Latency
$1B+
Potential PEV Market
04
The Endgame: Physical Infrastructure is King
The winning proving hardware isn't just GPU farms—it's custom ASICs (like Cysic, Ingonyama) and zero-knowledge coprocessors. This is a physical moat.
- Expect a proof-of-useful-work model where hardware mines proofs, not tokens.
- Decentralized physical infrastructure networks (DePIN) like Render will pivot to sell proving cycles.
- Investment implication: The largest capital allocation will be to silicon, not software. The hardware roadmap is the roadmap.
1000x
ASIC over GPU
DePIN
Business Model
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