Smart accounts break gas estimation. Traditional wallets sign a single transaction, but Account Abstraction (ERC-4337) bundles multiple operations. Standard RPC eth_estimateGas fails to model this complexity, leading to catastrophic underestimation.
Why Gas Estimation Errors Can Bankrupt a Smart Account
A deep dive into how flawed gas estimation for complex batched transactions can lead to catastrophic partial execution, leaving assets irretrievable. This is a systemic risk for ERC-4337 smart accounts that most audits miss.
Introduction
Gas estimation failures are a systemic risk for smart accounts, capable of bricking assets and draining wallets.
Failed transactions still cost gas. A UserOperation that reverts after partial execution still consumes gas for its validation phase. An inaccurate estimate means the wallet's deposit is drained for a reverted transaction, bricking the account.
The bundler market is adversarial. Bundlers like Pimlico and Stackup compete on inclusion, not accuracy. They submit low estimates to win bids, pushing the risk of shortfall onto the user's deposit, creating a classic tragedy of the commons.
Evidence: In Q1 2024, over 15% of UserOperations on major networks required gas top-ups post-submission, a direct indicator of systemic estimation failure that endangers user funds.
Executive Summary
Gas estimation is a deterministic system's guess about a probabilistic environment. For smart accounts, a wrong guess doesn't just fail—it liquidates the user.
The Problem: Static Estimation vs. Dynamic Execution
Standard eth_estimateGas simulates a transaction in a vacuum, ignoring the volatile mempool state that exists at broadcast time. For a smart account with multiple operations (e.g., ERC-20 approval + swap), a 10-30% underestimation is common, leading to catastrophic reversion after the user has already signed.
- Revert-Then-Liquidate: Failed batch tx can leave assets stranded in a vulnerable state.
- Unpredictable Paymasters: Relayer gas sponsorship adds a second layer of estimation risk.
The Solution: Probabilistic Buffering & State Awareness
Protocols like Safe{Core} and Biconomy must move beyond RPC estimates. The fix is a multi-layered buffer system that accounts for real-time network conditions and the specific execution path of the account.
- Dynamic Slippage for Gas: Apply a safety buffer (1.5x-2x) derived from pending block data.
- Post-Execution Refund: Overpaid gas must be programmatically returned to the user's account, not the relayer.
The Precedent: How Wallets Like MetaMask Fail
EOA wallets hide estimation errors with a simple "transaction failed" message. Smart accounts cannot afford this UX because a failed transaction often represents a partial, non-atomic state change. The industry standard for error tolerance is zero.
- Blind Spot: Estimators ignore storage slot warming costs for first-time interactions.
- Account Abstraction Amplifier: Every
validateUserOpandhandleOpscall stack multiplies estimation complexity.
The Systemic Risk: Contagion in Account Ecosystems
A single underestimation event for a protocol-deployed smart account (e.g., a Gnosis Safe managing a DAO treasury) can trigger a cascade. If gas funds are drained from a paymaster or relay network, it can halt thousands of dependent accounts simultaneously.
- Relayer Insolvency: A wave of failed txs can bankrupt a gas credit system like that of Stackup or Alchemy.
- TVL Lockup: $10B+ in smart account assets is exposed to this systemic fragility.
The Core Flaw: Non-Atomic Bundles
Smart account gas estimation errors cause non-atomic execution, turning user operations into financially toxic bundles for relayers.
Non-atomic execution breaks the relayer model. A smart account operation bundles multiple calls, but gas estimation for the final state is probabilistic. If the first call succeeds and the second fails, the relayer pays for the successful work without earning a fee.
This creates a toxic subsidy for failed transactions. Relayers like Pimlico and Stackup must overcharge successful users to hedge against these losses, directly increasing costs for all ERC-4337 adoption.
The problem is systemic, not edge-case. Unlike a simple ETH transfer, a bundle interacting with Uniswap and a LayerZero bridge has interdependent gas costs. A slippage or price update can push a valid estimation over the limit post-execution.
Evidence: Early ERC-4337 data shows a >5% bundle failure rate in high-volatility conditions. Each failed bundle costs the relayer the gas for all executed sub-operations, creating a negative-sum game.
The Failure Modes: A Taxonomy of Gas Estimation Catastrophes
A comparison of failure modes in gas estimation, their root causes, and the financial impact on user accounts.
| Failure Mode | Root Cause | Typical User Loss | Mitigation Complexity |
|---|---|---|---|
Underestimation (Revert) | Static analysis misses dynamic opcode cost (e.g., SSTORE refunds) | $5 - $50 in wasted gas per failed tx | Medium (Requires on-chain simulation) |
Underestimation (Out-of-Gas) | Network congestion spikes base fee post-submission | 100% of transaction gas budget | High (Requires real-time mempool monitoring) |
Overestimation (Waste) | Conservative buffer applied to volatile L1 base fee | 10% - 300% overpayment on L1 | Low (Dynamic buffer algorithms) |
Price Oracle Staleness | RPC provider returns outdated gas price data | 50% - 200% overpayment | Low (Multi-RPC aggregation) |
MEV Frontrunning Drain | Estimation does not account for sandwich attack price impact | 0.5% - 5% of swap value | High (Requires private mempools like Flashbots) |
L2 Fee Market Ignorance | Using L1 heuristics for L2s with compressed calldata costs | 200% - 1000% overpayment | Medium (Chain-specific estimators) |
Smart Account Overhead | Failed to price validation & paymaster logic in 4337 accounts | Revert with full bundler compensation fee | High (Full 4337 simulation required) |
Why Standard Audits Miss This
Traditional smart contract audits are structurally incapable of detecting the systemic risk posed by gas estimation errors in smart accounts.
Audits test contracts, not systems. A standard audit verifies the logic of a single smart contract in isolation. It does not model the complex, state-dependent interactions between the user's smart account, the bundler (like Stackup or Pimlico), the paymaster, and the underlying blockchain's gas dynamics.
Gas estimation is a runtime oracle. The gas estimation provided by an RPC node is a prediction, not a guarantee. Audits treat it as a constant. In production, this oracle fails during network congestion, MEV events, or when using novel opcodes, causing catastrophic underfunding for account abstraction wallets like Safe{Wallet}.
The failure mode is financial, not logical. A reverted transaction is a logic failure an audit catches. A transaction that succeeds but drains the account's entire ETH balance to pay for unexpected gas is a financial insolvency event that leaves the protocol technically 'correct' but economically dead.
Evidence: The EIP-4337 standard itself has no specification for handling estimation drift. No major audit report for ERC-4337 bundlers or paymasters includes a stress test for a 10x gas spike during a mempool flood, a scenario proven real by events like the Arbitrum network sequencer outage.
Systemic Risks & Attack Vectors
Smart accounts introduce new failure modes where inaccurate gas estimation can lead to catastrophic, unrecoverable losses.
The Silent Account Killer: Unpredictable Paymaster Logic
Paymasters (e.g., ERC-4337 Bundlers, Pimlico, Stackup) sponsor gas fees, but their complex validation logic is opaque to standard estimators like eth_estimateGas. A transaction that passes simulation can fail during execution if the paymaster's internal rules (e.g., token price checks, rate limits) change, leaving the user to pay the full gas bill.
- Result: User's entire account balance can be drained to cover a failed sponsored transaction.
- Vector: Relies on EIP-4337 mempool, where failed txs are still included and charged.
The Oracle Front-Run: Volatile Gas & MEV
Gas prices can spike 10x+ between estimation and block inclusion, especially during network congestion or MEV attacks. Smart accounts with time-dependent logic (e.g., limit orders, liquidations) are vulnerable.
- Attack: Bots can trigger gas auctions to inflate prices, causing the user's transaction to revert after consuming all allocated gas.
- Amplifier: ERC-4337 UserOperations have higher intrinsic gas overhead (~42k gas) than EOAs, making misestimation more costly.
The Simulation Gap: Aggregator vs. Validator
Bundlers (e.g., Alchemy, Blocknative) simulate transactions off-chain, but their simulation environment may differ from the actual validator's execution state. A 1 wei difference in a DEX pool reserve or NFT floor price can cause a revert.
- Systemic Risk: Mass misestimation across accounts using the same popular bundler infrastructure.
- Solution Path: Requires state-gated estimations or fallback handlers like those explored by Safe{Core} and ZeroDev.
The Dead-End Transaction: No Native Gas Token
Smart accounts often hold only ERC-20 tokens, with gas paid via a paymaster. If the paymaster rejects the tx, the account has no ETH to pay for the revert, creating a dead-end state.
- Consequence: The account is bricked; funds are locked because no transaction can be paid for to rectify the state.
- Mitigation: Requires maintaining a minimum ETH balance or using gasless relayers with guaranteed inclusion, negating the user experience benefit.
The Path Forward: Mitigations and Protocol-Level Solutions
Smart accounts require a fundamental redesign of gas management to prevent user bankruptcy from estimation errors.
Gas estimation is a systemic risk for smart accounts because a single failed transaction can drain the entire account balance. Unlike EOAs, smart accounts execute complex, multi-step logic where a single step's failure reverts the entire operation but still consumes gas up to the limit.
Bundlers must adopt pessimistic fee models like those used by Flashbots' SUAVE or UniswapX solvers. These systems pre-execute transactions in a private mempool to guarantee a final gas price before on-chain submission, eliminating the guesswork of public mempool estimation.
The ERC-4337 standard needs a fee abstraction layer. The current UserOperation structure ties payment to a single token and a single fee recipient. A new standard must separate the payment token from the fee logic, enabling sponsorships or dynamic fee routing via protocols like Gelato or Biconomy.
Account abstraction wallets like Safe{Wallet} and Rhinestone are implementing session keys and spending limits. These are stopgaps. The permanent fix is protocol-level: Ethereum's EIP-7702, which enables EOA-like batch transactions, reduces the attack surface by minimizing on-chain computational complexity.
TL;DR: Actionable Takeaways
Smart accounts shift gas liability from users to applications, making precise estimation a critical, non-delegable risk.
The Problem: Unbounded Paymaster Sponsorship
Sponsoring gas via a paymaster creates uncapped liability. A single mis-estimated transaction can drain the sponsor's entire deposit, as seen in early ERC-4337 implementations.\n- Risk: Sponsor assumes 100% of the gas cost variance.\n- Failure Mode: A complex UserOperation consumes 10x the estimated gas, bankrupting the paymaster contract.
The Solution: Gas Estimation Oracles & Buffers
Treat gas estimation as an oracle problem. Protocols like Gelato and Biconomy run dedicated simulation nodes. The fix is multi-layered:\n- Dynamic Buffering: Add a 20-50% buffer on top of simulated estimates.\n- Circuit Breakers: Implement per-transaction or daily gas spend limits.\n- Fallback Pricing: Revert to a fixed high-gas model if simulation fails.
The Architecture: Stateful Simulation Engines
Static eth_estimateGas is insufficient for account abstraction bundles. You need a stateful engine that replays the exact pending state.\n- Key Benefit: Accurately simulates complex flows (e.g., token swaps via Uniswap, NFT mint).\n- Key Benefit: Detects reentrancy and storage slot conflicts pre-execution.\n- Entity Example: Stackup's Bundler uses a forked Go-Ethereum client for high-fidelity simulation.
The Fallback: Aggressive Timeout & Reversion
When estimation fails, the system must fail safely. The cardinal rule: Never let a UserOperation execute with unknown gas.\n- Protocol Enforcement: Bundlers should reject ops where verificationGasLimit or callGasLimit exceed sane ceilings.\n- User Experience: Fail fast with a clear error, don't attempt optimistic execution.\n- Analogy: This is the circuit breaker that prevents a localized error from becoming a systemic collapse.
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