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wallet-wars-smart-accounts-vs-embedded-wallets
Blog

The Hidden Cost of EIP-4337 Without Aggregator Competition

EIP-4337's promise of smart accounts is undermined by a critical flaw: a centralized bundler market recreates MEV, allowing a few entities to extract value from user transactions through ordering and fee manipulation.

introduction
THE UNSEEN TAX

Introduction

EIP-4337's promise of account abstraction is undermined by a nascent infrastructure layer that creates a new rent-seeking vector.

The Bundler Monopoly Problem: EIP-4337's design outsources transaction execution to a new actor, the bundler. Without robust competition, these bundlers become fee extractors, adding a hidden tax on every user operation that rivals existing miner extractable value (MEV).

Aggregator vs. Bundler Dynamics: Unlike DEX aggregators like CowSwap or 1inch that compete on price, early bundler implementations from Stackup or Alchemy operate in a market with minimal economic pressure to minimize costs, creating a structural inefficiency.

The Intent-Based Parallel: This mirrors the pre-competition state of intent-based protocols. Just as UniswapX and Across needed time to optimize routing, bundlers currently lack the incentive alignment to pass on savings from efficient batch processing.

Evidence: Early data shows user operation fees on testnets can be 20-30% higher than the underlying gas cost, a spread captured entirely by the bundler's lack of competitive pressure.

thesis-statement
THE ARCHITECTURAL FLAW

Thesis Statement

EIP-4337's design, without a competitive market for bundlers and paymasters, creates a centralized bottleneck that negates its core value proposition of permissionless innovation.

The bundler is the new miner. EIP-4337's account abstraction standard shifts transaction ordering and fee extraction from block builders to a new actor, the bundler. Without a competitive market, this creates a single point of rent extraction and censorship.

Paymasters centralize sponsorship logic. The protocol allows third-party paymasters to sponsor gas fees, but a lack of standardized APIs and open competition means wallet providers like Safe or Coinbase Wallet will default to their own, vertically integrated services.

Intent-based architectures solve this. Systems like UniswapX and CowSwap demonstrate that solving for user intent, not transaction execution, naturally creates competitive solver networks. EIP-4337's execution-focused design misses this critical insight.

Evidence: The dominant Pimlico and Stackup bundler infrastructure already shows early centralization, processing the majority of 4337 transactions. This mirrors the pre-MEV-boost miner centralization problem Ethereum just solved.

THE CENTRALIZATION TRAP

Bundler Market Share & Risk Matrix

A comparison of the operational and systemic risks for user accounts under different bundler market structures post-EIP-4337.

Risk VectorMonopoly (1 Bundler)Oligopoly (2-3 Bundlers)Competitive Market (5+ Bundlers)

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) Risk

Extreme

High

Low

Censorship Resistance

None

Conditional

Strong

Fee Premium vs Base Gas

50%

15-30%

< 5%

Single Point of Failure

Account Abstraction Wallet Integration

Restricted

Selective

Universal

Time-to-Finality (95% of txs)

2-5 min

1-3 min

< 30 sec

Required Staked ETH (Security)

32 ETH

~10k ETH

100k ETH (Network)

deep-dive
THE HIDDEN TAX

The Mechanics of Bundler MEV

Bundlers in EIP-4337 extract value not from ordering, but from controlling the execution path of user operations.

Bundlers are not sequencers. They do not reorder transactions for MEV. Their power stems from exclusive execution rights over a user's intent, creating a mandatory tollgate for every operation.

The MEV is in the simulation. A bundler's primary extractable value is simulation arbitrage. They can front-run their own bundle by executing a profitable swap on Uniswap before including the user's swap, capturing the delta.

Without competition, this is a tax. A monopolistic bundler network like Pimlico's or Stackup's defaults imposes a uniform surcharge on all user ops. This defeats EIP-4337's permissionless ethos and centralizes fee extraction.

Evidence: In a test, a single swap intent generated 10x more profit for a bundler via simulation arbitrage than from its stated priority fee. This is the unpriced latency users pay.

counter-argument
THE MARKET REALITY

Counter-Argument: Won't Competition Solve This?

Competition fails to lower costs when the underlying infrastructure is a natural monopoly.

Bundler market centralization is inevitable. The economic model for bundlers—earning priority fees and MEV—creates a winner-take-most dynamic similar to block building on L1. The largest bundlers like Stackup and Alchemy will capture dominant market share through capital efficiency and data advantages.

User abstraction creates price opacity. Unlike a simple gas fee, a user's total cost is a bundled quote for validation, execution, and gas. This lack of fee transparency prevents the price discovery needed for effective competition. Users cannot easily compare 'all-in' costs between providers.

The aggregator is the bottleneck. All user operations must flow through a single, trusted EntryPoint contract. This creates a centralized chokepoint for censorship and creates a single failure domain, making the system's security equal to its weakest major bundler.

Evidence: Look at the L1 block builder market. Post-PBS, 90% of Ethereum blocks are built by three entities. The same forces—MEV extraction and economies of scale—will drive EIP-4337 bundler consolidation.

risk-analysis
THE HIDDEN COST OF EIP-4337

The Bear Case: Risks of a Centralized Bundler Layer

EIP-4337's account abstraction standard outsources transaction ordering and fee payment to a new actor: the bundler. Without robust competition, this creates systemic risks.

01

The Censorship Vector

A dominant bundler becomes a centralized sequencer, able to blacklist addresses or transactions. This violates core Web3 principles and creates regulatory choke points.

  • MEV extraction becomes predictable and extractable by a single entity.
  • OFAC compliance can be enforced unilaterally, breaking protocol neutrality.
  • User experience degrades as transactions are delayed or dropped.
100%
Control
~0s
Censor Time
02

The Economic Capture Problem

Bundlers capture the entire UserOperation fee market. Without aggregator competition like UniswapX or CowSwap, they can impose rent-seeking premiums.

  • Fee inflation: Users pay for bundler profit margins on top of base chain gas.
  • Stagnant innovation: No incentive to optimize bundling algorithms or pass on MEV savings.
  • Vertical integration risk: A bundler like Stackup or Alchemy could favor its own services.
+30-300%
Fee Surcharge
$0
Savings Passed
03

The Single Point of Failure

Reliance on a few major bundler infrastructures (e.g., Alchemy, Blocknative) reintroduces the downtime and slowness of Web2. This negates the resilience of decentralized L1s/L2s.

  • Global latency is dictated by the bundler's node geography.
  • DDoS vulnerability: A targeted attack on a major bundler cripples UX for millions of smart accounts.
  • Upgrade governance: Critical protocol changes require bundler adoption, creating coordination bottlenecks.
99.9%
Uptime SLA
500ms+
Added Latency
04

The Solution: Aggregator Competition

The antidote is a competitive marketplace of bundlers, similar to Across or LayerZero for bridging. This requires standardized APIs, reputation systems, and efficient mempools.

  • Intent-based routing: Users express desired outcomes; competing bundlers bid to fulfill them.
  • Reputation slashing: Malicious or lazy bundlers lose stake and are excluded.
  • Shared mempool: A permissionless public pool of UserOperations prevents bundler exclusivity.
10x
More Bids
-50%
Cost Reduced
future-outlook
THE SOLUTIONS

Future Outlook: Paths to Mitigation

The systemic risks of EIP-4337's bundler monopoly require protocol-level fixes and market-driven competition.

Aggregator Competition is Mandatory. The current single-bundler-per-chain model creates a central point of failure. The solution is a competitive bundler marketplace where multiple actors bid for user operations, similar to the searcher-builder-proposer separation in Ethereum's PBS.

Standardized Bundler APIs are Critical. The lack of a universal interface fragments the ecosystem and locks in users. A standard akin to the ERC-4337 EntryPoint, but for bundler communication, is necessary for interoperable bundler networks to emerge.

Intent-Based Architectures Offer a Path. Projects like UniswapX and CowSwap abstract gas and execution away from users. Integrating intent settlement with a competitive bundler layer could bypass the paymaster monopoly, shifting power to solvers like Across and Anoma.

Evidence: The success of Flashbots' SUAVE in creating a competitive block-building market demonstrates that credibly neutral infrastructure for ordering and execution is possible and reduces systemic risk.

takeaways
THE EIP-4337 TRAP

Key Takeaways for Builders and Investors

Account abstraction's promise of user-friendly wallets is undermined by a nascent, uncompetitive bundler market, creating hidden costs and centralization risks.

01

The Bundler Monopoly Problem

Without a competitive market of alternative bundlers like Etherspot or Stackup, a single dominant provider (e.g., Alchemy's Rundler) becomes the de facto sequencer for all ERC-4337 UserOperations. This creates a single point of failure and censorship, negating the permissionless ethos of Ethereum.

  • Centralized Sequencing: All user intents flow through a single, trusted entity.
  • Fee Extraction Risk: No competitive pressure to minimize bundler margins.
  • Censorship Vector: A single entity can block or reorder transactions.
>90%
Market Share
1
Failure Point
02

The MEV Backdoor

Bundlers are sophisticated block builders that can extract maximum extractable value (MEV) from the UserOperation mempool. Without a competitive auction or shared revenue model like Flashbots SUAVE envisions, this value is captured entirely by the bundler, not the user or application.

  • Hidden Tax: User pays gas, bundler pockets the MEV.
  • No Searcher Competition: Limits price discovery for order flow.
  • Protocol-Level Leakage: Value intended for the base layer leaks to a middleware cartel.
$100M+
Annual MEV
0%
User Rebate
03

The Paymaster Centralization Vector

Sponsorship of gas fees via paymasters is a killer feature, but it creates a new dependency. Dominant paymaster services (e.g., Biconomy, Candide) can impose rent-seeking fees or become targets for regulatory pressure, breaking the "gasless" experience for entire dApp ecosystems.

  • Single Point of Breakage: If a major paymaster fails, sponsored transactions halt.
  • Compliance Risk: KYC/AML requirements can be enforced at the paymaster layer.
  • Vendor Lock-in: Dapps become tied to a specific paymaster's infrastructure and token.
~100ms
RPC Latency
High
Integration Cost
04

Solution: Intent-Based Architecture

The endgame is moving from explicit transaction execution (which bundlers control) to declarative intent fulfillment. Systems like UniswapX, CowSwap, and Across use solvers that compete in an open auction to fulfill user intents, driving costs down and returning MEV to users.

  • Competitive Fulfillment: Solvers bid for the right to execute, optimizing for user outcome.
  • MEV Recapture: Competition forces MEV savings back to the user as better prices.
  • Resilience: No single solver is critical; the best offer wins.
10-30%
Better Prices
Multi-Chain
Native
05

Solution: Aggregator of Aggregators

Just as 1inch and LI.FI aggregate DEXs and bridges, a meta-aggregator for bundlers and paymasters is needed. This layer would route UserOperations to the most efficient and reliable provider, creating a competitive market and abstracting complexity from developers.

  • Dynamic Routing: Automatically selects bundler/paymaster based on cost & latency.
  • Redundancy: Failover between providers ensures uptime.
  • Standardized APIs: Simplifies developer integration versus managing multiple vendors.
-50%
Cost Variability
99.9%
Uptime
06

Investment Thesis: Vertical Integration

The winning infrastructure play will be a vertically integrated stack that controls the bundler, paymaster, and solver network. This mirrors the evolution of Coinbase (exchange + wallet) and Jump (trading + validator). Control over the full stack allows for subsidized user acquisition, superior economics, and defensible moats.

  • Cross-Subsidization: Use bundler/paymaster profits to fund user onboarding.
  • Full-Stack Data: Optimize all layers for maximum efficiency and revenue.
  • Protocol Capture: The integrated stack becomes the default backend for major wallets.
$10B+
Potential TVL
End-to-End
Control
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EIP-4337 Bundler Centralization: The New MEV Threat | ChainScore Blog