Why MEV Solution Investing is a Bet on Blockchain Usability

Every public transaction is a free option for extractors, leading to predictable losses for users. This makes DeFi feel rigged.

• Typical DEX Slippage: 1-5%+ on major swaps.
• Sandwich Attack Volume: $1B+ extracted annually.
• Result: Users overpay and under-receive, killing trust in fair execution.

Shift from broadcasting transactions to declaring desired outcomes. Solvers compete to fulfill user intents privately.

• Key Entities: UniswapX, CowSwap, Across.
• User Benefit: Guaranteed execution at quoted price, or better.
• Architecture: Separates expression from execution, moving competition from extraction to service.

During network spikes, users engage in Priority Gas Auctions (PGAs), blindly bidding against bots and burning fees on failed txns.

• Failed Txn Rate: Can exceed 10% during high volatility.
• Wasted Gas: $100M+ annually on failed transactions.
• Result: A terrible UX where paying more doesn't guarantee success.

Auctions order flow to professional searchers who can efficiently bundle and route transactions, guaranteeing inclusion.

• Key Entities: Flashbots Protect, BloXroute.
• User Benefit: ~99.9% success rate, optimal gas pricing.
• Efficiency: Bundling reduces network load and aggregates value for users.

Bridging assets exposes users to prolonged vulnerability and complex, opaque routing that maximizes extractable value.

• Bridge TVL: $10B+ at constant risk.
• Vulnerability Window: Minutes to hours for optimistic bridges.
• Result: Users face uncertainty, delays, and hidden costs on every hop.

A neutral, decentralized sequencer layer that orders transactions across rollups before final settlement, enabling atomic cross-chain intents.

• Key Concept: Shared Sequencers, EigenLayer.
• User Benefit: Atomic composability across L2s, near-instant guarantees.
• Vision: Turns the multi-chain ecosystem into a single, coherent state machine for users.

Every public mempool transaction is a free option for searchers. Users pay for failed front-runs, sandwich attacks, and unpredictable slippage, eroding trust in on-chain interactions.

• Cost: Sandwich attacks extract ~$1B+ annually from users.
• Experience: Failed transactions and unpredictable gas costs create a hostile UX.

Separate transaction ordering from block building. Users submit orders to a private network, shielding intent from public view and auctioning execution to the highest bidder.

• Privacy: No front-running in a private mempool.
• Efficiency: Builders compete on execution quality, not just fee priority.

MEV forces protocols to defensively centralize liquidity (e.g., single-chain DEXs, proprietary bridges) to minimize arbitrage leakage, breaking the cross-chain composability promise.

• Inefficiency: Billions in TVL trapped in suboptimal venues.
• Friction: Users manually bridge and swap across chains, a multi-step MEV feast.

Users declare what they want (e.g., "Swap X for Y on any chain"), not how to do it. Solvers compete to fulfill the intent optimally, abstracting away complexity and capturing cross-chain MEV for the user.

• Abstraction: Single signature for complex, cross-chain actions.
• Optimization: Solvers internalize arbitrage, improving price execution.

Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) without enforceable commitments creates a trust hole. A malicious builder can steal MEV or censor transactions after winning the block auction.

• Trust: Relies on builder honesty in a multi-billion dollar game.
• Censorship: No cryptographic guarantee of transaction inclusion.

Hardcode PBS and commit-reveal schemes (e.g., via EigenLayer) into the protocol layer. Builders must cryptographically commit to block contents before payment, making MEV extraction verifiable and theft impossible.

• Security: Cryptographic guarantees replace social consensus.
• Credible Neutrality: Enforceable rules for transaction inclusion.

Users lose ~$1B+ annually to frontrunning and sandwich attacks. This hidden cost makes DeFi feel predatory and erodes trust.

• Unpredictable Execution: Transaction outcomes are probabilistic, not guaranteed.
• Deteriorates UX: Users must overpay on gas to outbid bots, a terrible onboarding experience.

Shift from specifying transactions (how) to declaring outcomes (what). This abstracts away complexity and MEV from the user.

• Key Entities: UniswapX, CowSwap, Across.
• Guaranteed Results: Users get the promised rate or the transaction fails, eliminating uncertainty.

MEV creates natural economies of scale, leading to >80% of blocks being built by a few entities. This threatens credible neutrality and censorship resistance.

• Protocol Risk: Reliance on centralized sequencers or builders creates a single point of failure.
• Staking Centralization: Large validators can extract more MEV, creating a feedback loop.

Separate block building from proposing. Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) and chains like SUAVE decentralize MEV capture.

• Competitive Markets: Builders compete in open auctions for block space.
• Censorship Resistance: Validators can choose from multiple, neutral block builders.

Developers must design around MEV, avoiding on-chain randomness, time-sensitive logic, and large liquidations. This stifles innovation.

• Limited Primitives: Games, prediction markets, and auctions are inherently vulnerable.
• Fragmented Liquidity: MEV forces liquidity into shielded pools or private mempools.

Encrypt transactions until execution (e.g., Shutter Network) or use consensus-level fair ordering rules. This enables new application classes.

• On-Chain Games: Truly random number generation becomes possible.
• Private Auctions: Sealed-bid mechanisms can be implemented trustlessly.