Pass-through insurance is marketing theater. It promises to make users whole after a stablecoin depeg, but the coverage is illusory. The insurance policy is an off-chain contract between the stablecoin issuer and a traditional underwriter like Lloyd's of London, not an on-chain guarantee.
Why the 'Pass-Through' Insurance Model for Stablecoins is a Mirage
An analysis of why promising FDIC-like insurance for stablecoin reserves is a legal and operational impossibility under current frameworks, creating systemic risk and false security.
The Siren Song of False Security
Stablecoin pass-through insurance models create a false sense of security by obscuring counterparty risk and liquidity constraints.
The claims process is a black box. A user's right to file a claim is not a smart contract right but a legal one, requiring proof of loss adjudicated in a jurisdiction like New York or London. This creates a massive time-to-payout lag that defeats the purpose of real-time DeFi.
The capital structure is misaligned. The insurance premium is a tiny fraction of the stablecoin's market cap. A systemic failure of a major issuer like Circle (USDC) or Tether (USDT) would immediately exhaust the policy's aggregate limit, rendering it useless for the majority of holders.
Evidence: The largest crypto insurance policy ever publicly disclosed, for a custodian, was ~$1B. USDC's market cap exceeds $30B. The coverage ratio is catastrophically insufficient, proving the model is designed for optics, not actual user protection.
Executive Summary: The Core Contradiction
Stablecoin insurance models promising full, pass-through coverage are fundamentally misaligned with the economic reality of on-chain capital.
The Problem: The $100B+ Coverage Gap
The combined market cap of major stablecoins exceeds $150B. No on-chain insurance protocol holds even 1% of that in liquid reserves. This creates a systemic liquidity mirage where advertised coverage is mathematically impossible to honor during a black swan event.
- Capital Inefficiency: Locking $1 to insure $1 defeats the purpose of fractional reserve banking, the core innovation of finance.
- Adverse Selection: Only the riskiest, most volatile assets would seek coverage, guaranteeing pool insolvency.
The Solution: Parameterized Risk Pools (Nexus Mutual)
Successful models like Nexus Mutual avoid the pass-through trap by insuring smart contract failure, not asset price. They use staking-based capital pools and risk assessment to set premiums, creating a sustainable market.
- Capital Efficiency: A $1 capital stake can back $10+ in coverage based on risk parameters.
- Clear Scope: Limits liability to a verifiable, binary event (code bug), not an infinite price oracle failure.
The Reality: DeFi is the Insurance
The true 'insurance' for stablecoins is the liquidity and composability of DeFi itself. Protocols like MakerDAO, Aave, and Compound create resilience through over-collateralization and liquidations.
- Dynamic Safety: $20B+ in excess collateral backs the DAI ecosystem, a buffer no insurance pool can match.
- Market Resolution: Price de-pegs are arbitraged away by Curve/Uniswap LPs, not claim adjusters.
Thesis: A Regulatory & Legal Dead End
The 'pass-through' insurance model for stablecoins is a legal fiction that fails under regulatory scrutiny.
Pass-through insurance is a mirage. It attempts to layer a regulated wrapper over an unregulated asset, creating a legal entity mismatch that no major jurisdiction recognizes. The issuer, not the holder, is the insured party, severing the direct legal claim.
Regulators target the issuer, not the wrapper. The SEC's actions against Ripple and Paxos demonstrate that enforcement focuses on the originator of the asset. An insurance policy on a security is still a security, creating liability for the insurer.
The model inverts legal responsibility. True insurance requires a clear, direct contractual duty between insurer and user. A pass-through structure inserts the issuer as a legal firewall, making consumer recovery a complex, multi-party litigation nightmare.
Evidence: No major stablecoin uses it. Tether (USDT) and Circle (USDC) rely on asset reserves and banking charters, not pass-through insurance. The absence of a credible implementation by a top-10 asset proves the model's impracticality.
The Insurance Gap: Promises vs. Legal Reality
A comparison of the legal and operational reality of 'pass-through' insurance claims made by stablecoin issuers against the requirements for actual depositor protection.
| Critical Feature / Metric | Tether (USDT) | Circle (USDC) | FDIC-Insured Bank Account |
|---|---|---|---|
Legal Entity Covered | Tether Holdings Ltd. | Circle Internet Financial, LLC | The Depositor (You) |
Coverage Trigger | Corporate insolvency / theft | Corporate insolvency / theft | Bank failure |
Maximum Payout per Claim | Uncapped (theoretical) | Uncapped (theoretical) | $250,000 |
Claim Payout Timeline | Not defined; 'best efforts' | Not defined; 'best efforts' | Typically < 2 business days |
Regulatory Backstop | None (private insurers) | None (private insurers) | Full faith & credit of U.S. Government |
Direct Pass-Through to Holder | |||
Public Proof of Reserves Required | |||
Holder Legal Recourse | Unsecured creditor claim | Unsecured creditor claim | Statutory right to payment |
Deconstructing the Mirage: First Principles of Insurance Law
Stablecoin 'pass-through' insurance models fail because they ignore the fundamental legal definition of insurance.
Insurance requires an insurable interest. A user's stablecoin deposit is not a legally recognized 'interest' in the underlying collateral. This is a property law principle, not a DeFi innovation. Protocols like Nexus Mutual or Etherisc require a direct, provable financial loss to trigger a claim.
The 'pass-through' is a legal fiction. Promising to 'pass' a policy's payout to users creates a derivative contract, not an insurance policy. This structure, attempted by some CeFi platforms, introduces a new counterparty risk layer instead of eliminating one. The user's claim is now against the protocol, not the insurer.
Regulatory arbitrage is not a product. Marketing these constructs as 'insurance' invites SEC or state insurance regulator action for selling unregistered securities. The legal precedent from cases against BlockFi and Celsius shows regulators treat promised yield from pooled assets as securities.
Evidence: No licensed insurer underwrites direct pass-through coverage for stablecoin de-peg. The closest analogs are custodial insurance from firms like Coinbase (for hot wallet theft) or FDIC pass-through for bank deposits, both of which rely on strict, regulated custody of the underlying asset—a condition absent in permissionless DeFi.
Precedent of Failure: Custody & Bankruptcy Law
Stablecoin 'pass-through' insurance models rely on legal theories that have consistently failed during actual bankruptcies, leaving user assets trapped.
The Custody Shell Game
Issuers claim assets are held in a bankruptcy-remote Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). In practice, courts often consolidate SPV assets with the bankrupt estate, as seen in Celsius and FTX. The legal distinction is a pleading, not a guarantee.
- Key Risk: SPV status is a legal argument, not a physical firewall.
- Key Precedent: Celsius's 'Earn' accounts were ruled to be unsecured loans, not custodial assets.
The Insurance Mirage
So-called 'pass-through' insurance does not make the holder the policy beneficiary. The policy is an asset of the bankrupt custodian. Payouts go to the estate, not directly to users, defeating the entire purpose.
- Key Risk: Insurance is a corporate asset, not a user asset.
- Key Reality: In bankruptcy, all corporate assets are frozen for equitable distribution to creditors.
The Rehypothecation Loophole
Custody agreements often grant the custodian broad re-lending rights. This transforms 'custodied' assets into the custodian's general unsecured claims, vaporizing any pass-through protection. This was central to the BlockFi and Voyager collapses.
- Key Risk: Your 'custodied' stablecoin is likely a loan on a balance sheet.
- Key Consequence: In default, you become an unsecured creditor in line behind secured lenders.
The Regulatory Arbitrage Trap
Stablecoin issuers operate in a regulatory gray zone, avoiding bank charters to escape stringent capital and custody rules. This creates a systemic fragility where no federal deposit insurance (FDIC) applies, and state money transmitter laws offer minimal asset protection.
- Key Risk: You are trading bank-level security for fintech promises.
- Key Gap: Absence of Regulation EE or SEC 15c3-3 protections standard in traditional finance.
The Operational Risk Black Box
Even with 'qualified custodians', the issuer retains control over movement instructions. A single compromised admin key or fraudulent transaction can drain the omnibus account, as nearly happened with Maple Finance's custodian. Insurance responds to proven theft, not operational failure.
- Key Risk: Custody is only as strong as the issuer's operational controls.
- Key Failure Mode: 'Pass-through' does not mean 'user-controlled'.
The On-Chain Alternative: Verified Reserves
The only credible model is on-chain, verifiable 1:1 backing with assets held in a transparent, permissionless smart contract. This removes the custodian intermediary entirely. MakerDAO's PSM and fully collateralized decentralized stablecoins demonstrate this.
- Key Benefit: Assets are user-controlled or algorithmically locked.
- Key Proof: Real-time attestations and chain-resident proof-of-reserves.
Steelman: The Issuer's Defense & Why It Fails
The argument that stablecoin issuers are mere pass-through entities is a legal fiction that collapses under technical and financial scrutiny.
Issuers claim pass-through status to deflect liability, arguing they are neutral pipes like LayerZero or Axelar. This analogy fails because issuers control the mint/burn function, a centralized point of failure absent in messaging protocols.
The reserve composition matters. A Tether or Circle balance sheet is not a passive custodian; its asset management directly creates the credit and liquidity risk users assume. This is active portfolio management, not pass-through.
On-chain transparency is insufficient. Publishing attestations for USDC or USDT does not eliminate the issuer's role. The legal claim remains against the opaque offshore entity, not the on-chain token, creating a resolution gap during a crisis.
Evidence: During the 2023 banking crisis, USDC depegged because Circle held reserves at Silicon Valley Bank. The 'pass-through' model broke instantly as the issuer's specific operational choices dictated user losses.
The Liability Trap: Risks for Issuers & Holders
Stablecoin issuers touting 'insured' reserves create a dangerous illusion of safety for both themselves and users.
The Custodial Black Box
Insured reserves are held with a single, centralized custodian like a bank. This creates a single point of failure and counterparty risk that is antithetical to crypto's ethos.\n- No On-Chain Proof: Insurance status is an opaque, off-chain promise.\n- Bank Run Vulnerability: In a crisis, the custodian's liquidity and the insurer's capacity become the bottleneck.
The Coverage Mirage
Insurance policies have strict limits, exclusions, and deductibles that render them useless during a systemic collapse—the exact scenario where they're needed.\n- Aggregate Caps: Policies often cap total coverage far below the stablecoin's market cap (e.g., $250M policy for a $10B+ token).\n- Exclusion Clauses: Insurers can deny claims for 'fraud' or 'market disruption', precisely the triggers for a de-peg.
The Regulatory Time Bomb
Marketing a token as 'insured' invites heightened regulatory scrutiny from bodies like the SEC and FDIC. It frames the stablecoin as a securities offering or an unauthorized deposit-taking entity.\n- Misleading Marketing: Promises of insurance can be deemed deceptive under consumer protection laws.\n- Liability Amplification: In a failure, issuers face lawsuits not just for the loss, but for misrepresentation.
The True Solution: On-Chain, Over-Collateralization
The crypto-native answer is verifiable, excessive collateralization on-chain, as pioneered by MakerDAO's DAI and Liquity's LUSD.\n- Transparent Reserves: Collateral ratios and assets are publicly auditable on-chain.\n- No Counterparty: Safety is derived from math and economic incentives, not a fallible third-party promise.
The Holder's False Security
Users lulled into a false sense of security underestimate protocol risk, leading to capital concentration in inherently fragile systems. This creates systemic risk for the entire DeFi ecosystem built atop these stablecoins.\n- Complacency: Holders don't demand on-chain proof of reserves.\n- Contagion Vector: A failure of a 'insured' large-cap stablecoin would cascade through Aave, Compound, and Uniswap pools.
The Path Forward: Algorithmic & Diversified Models
Future stability requires moving beyond the bank-IOU model. This means hybrid algorithmic designs (like Frax Finance) and diversified, verifiable reserve baskets that aren't reliant on a single insurer's balance sheet.\n- Dynamic Response: Algorithms adjust supply/demand in real-time to maintain peg.\n- Resilience Through Diversity: Backing with a mix of on-chain assets, treasuries, and strategic liquidity pools.
The Path Forward: Real Solutions, Not Mirage
Pass-through insurance for stablecoins is a marketing gimmick that fails to address the systemic risk of fractional reserve banking.
Pass-through insurance is a mirage because it only covers the custodian's failure, not the underlying asset's failure. A policy from Lloyd's of London cannot make a USDC redemption claim against a collapsed Silicon Valley Bank. The insurance protects the wrapper, not the asset.
The real risk is fractional reserve banking. Stablecoins like USDC and USDT are claims on a bank's balance sheet, not the cash itself. No insurance policy can instantly liquidate a bank's loan portfolio to meet mass redemption demands during a crisis.
Compare this to on-chain collateralization. Protocols like MakerDAO's DAI or Liquity's LUSD use overcollateralized crypto assets as a first-line defense. The solvency mechanism is transparent, programmable, and does not rely on opaque legal claims against a traditional financial entity.
Evidence: During the March 2023 banking crisis, USDC depegged despite Circle's claims of 'cash and equivalents'. The system's fragility was exposed, proving that off-chain trust is the bottleneck. The solution is verifiable, on-chain reserves, not insurance theater.
TL;DR: For Protocol Architects & VCs
The 'pass-through' insurance model for stablecoins promises to back digital assets with real-world claims, but its economic and legal foundations are fundamentally flawed.
The Legal Mismatch: Off-Chain vs. On-Chain Claims
Pass-through models create a legal chasm between the on-chain token holder and the off-chain insurance policy. The token is not a direct claim; it's a promise from an intermediary.
- Enforceability is murky: Legal recourse requires suing the issuer, not the insurer.
- Jurisdictional nightmare: Which court governs a global, pseudonymous holder's claim?
- Speed kills: Traditional claims processes operate on a ~90-day cycle, incompatible with blockchain's 24/7 finality.
The Capital Efficiency Mirage
Proponents claim 1:1 backing with insurance is capital efficient. This ignores the fundamental risk mismatch and cost structure of traditional insurance.
- Premiums are prohibitive: Insuring against smart contract risk or custody failure costs 5-15% annually, destroying yield.
- Coverage caps apply: A $1B fund might only have $100M in aggregate coverage, making 1:1 backing for all holders impossible.
- Exclusions render it useless: Standard policies exclude 'protocol design flaws' and 'governance attacks'—the primary risks in DeFi.
The Moral Hazard of the Issuer
The model centralizes critical failure points in the issuing entity, creating massive counterparty risk that insurance cannot solve.
- Issuer is the gatekeeper: All claims flow through them. If they are insolvent or malicious, the policy is worthless.
- Incentives misaligned: The issuer's goal is to minimize payouts; the holder's goal is to maximize recovery.
- See: Real-World Assets (RWA): This is not a new problem. Maple Finance and Centrifuge structures show that legal entity risk dominates, not asset risk.
The Better Path: Native Crypto Primitives
The solution isn't gluing broken traditional finance to crypto. It's building native, capital-efficient risk markets.
- Over-collateralization: MakerDAO's DAI and Liquity's LUSD prove this works, with ~150% and 110% minimum collateral ratios, respectively.
- DeFi-native insurance: Nexus Mutual and Uno Re pool risk on-chain, with payouts in days, not months.
- Algorithmic stability: Models like Frax Finance's hybrid or Ethena's delta-neutral synthetics use crypto-native derivatives, not legal promises.
Get In Touch
today.
Our experts will offer a free quote and a 30min call to discuss your project.