MEV is modularizing. The monolithic sequencer model is obsolete. In a modular stack, execution, settlement, and data availability are separate layers, each with its own profit extraction surface.
The Future of MEV Capture in Modular Systems
The modular blockchain thesis is redefining the MEV supply chain. As execution and settlement separate, the primary value capture point migrates from block builders to the sequencing layer, creating a new infrastructure war.
Introduction
Modular blockchain architecture is fragmenting the MEV supply chain, forcing a fundamental redesign of value capture.
Value capture moves upstream. The execution layer sequencer (e.g., Arbitrum, Optimism) is no longer the sole beneficiary. Settlement layers like Celestia and EigenDA and shared sequencer networks like Espresso and Astria create new, competitive markets for block space.
Cross-domain MEV dominates. The most profitable opportunities are inter-blockchain arbitrage, executed via intents routed through systems like UniswapX, Across, and LayerZero. This requires new coordination primitives.
Evidence: Over 30% of Ethereum's PBS blocks now contain cross-domain bundles, a figure that will exceed 80% as modular adoption grows.
Executive Summary: The Modular MEV Thesis
Monolithic blockchains concentrate MEV value and risk. Modular architectures disaggregate the stack, creating new vectors for extraction and defense.
The Problem: The Shared Sequencer Bottleneck
Rollups outsourcing to a single shared sequencer (e.g., Espresso, Astria) recreate the L1 validator cartel problem. They become a centralized MEV auction house, extracting rent from all connected chains.
- Single Point of Failure for censorship and value capture
- Creates cross-rollup MEV opportunities for the sequencer alone
- Rollups trade sovereignty for convenience, losing native MEV revenue
The Solution: Sovereign Sequencing & Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS)
Rollups must enforce PBS at the sequencing layer. A competitive builder market for rollup block space separates block production from inclusion, democratizing access.
- Enables permissionless builder networks like Flashbots SUAVE
- Rollups capture MEV revenue via auction fees instead of leaking it
- Specialized searchers emerge for app-chain specific opportunities (e.g., dYdX, Lyra)
The New Arena: Interchain MEV & Intents
Modularity turns cross-domain arbitrage into the dominant MEV category. Systems like Across, Socket, and LI.FI already capture this via fillers. The endgame is generalized intent-based architectures.
- UniswapX and CowSwap abstract execution, batching cross-chain intents
- Solvers compete on fulfillment, extracting interdomain price discrepancies
- Creates a meta-layer for MEV capture above individual execution layers
The Infrastructure: Specialized MEV Co-Processors
MEV extraction requires low-latency access to state. Co-processors like Axiom, Risc Zero, and Brevis provide verifiable off-chain computation, enabling complex strategies without bloating the rollup.
- Prove arbitrage logic or liquidations off-chain, settle on-chain
- Reduces on-chain footprint and gas costs for searchers
- Enables privacy-preserving MEV via ZK proofs for strategy confidentiality
The Risk: MEV Fragmentation & Liquidity Dilution
Thousands of app-chains fragment liquidity and MEV opportunities. Searcher capital becomes spread thin, reducing competition and efficiency for smaller chains, leading to worse execution for users.
- Thin order books increase slippage and extractable value
- Cross-chain arbitrage becomes complex, requiring sophisticated infrastructure
- Creates a winner-take-most market for aggregators like LayerZero and Axelar
The Endgame: Encrypted Mempools & Threshold Cryptography
The final defense is removing the visible mempool. Projects like Shutter Network use threshold encryption to encrypt transactions until block inclusion, neutralizing frontrunning.
- Blinds the sequencer, preventing transaction-based MEV
- Preserves fair ordering and user privacy
- Compatible with PBS; builders receive encrypted bundles, decrypt after winning bid
The Core Argument: MEV Migrates Up the Stack
Modular blockchain design shifts MEV capture from execution layers to the interoperability and settlement layers above them.
MEV migrates to interop layers. In a monolithic chain, block producers capture all MEV. In a modular stack, execution layers like Arbitrum or Optimism outsource block building. The value accrual shifts upward to the sequencers and bridges that coordinate cross-domain transactions, creating new capture points.
Settlement layers become MEV hubs. A shared settlement layer like Celestia or EigenDA does not process transactions but finalizes state. This makes it the canonical source of truth for cross-chain arbitrage. Protocols that settle there, like rollups using Celestia for data availability, create MEV that the settlement layer's validators can extract.
Intent-based architectures formalize this. Protocols like UniswapX and Across abstract transaction routing into declarative intents. Solvers compete to fulfill these intents across chains, centralizing MEV capture in the routing layer rather than at individual block producers. This turns cross-chain MEV into a structured market.
Evidence: The proliferation of shared sequencers like Astria and Espresso proves the thesis. These systems propose to order transactions for multiple rollups, explicitly positioning themselves as the new, centralized point for cross-rollup MEV extraction, disintermediating individual L2 sequencers.
Current Battlefield: The Race for Sequencing Sovereignty
The modular stack is shifting the core value capture from block production to transaction ordering, creating a new competitive layer.
Sequencers are the new validators. In a modular world, execution layers like Arbitrum and Optimism outsource security and data availability, making their sequencer the primary profit center. This entity controls transaction order, enabling maximal extractable value (MEV) capture through frontrunning and arbitrage.
The sovereign rollup model changes the game. Chains like Celestia and Eclipse enable sovereign rollups with native sequencing, bypassing the need for a centralized sequencer from a shared L2. This creates a direct market for sequencing services, where protocols like Astria and Espresso Systems compete to provide decentralized sequencing networks.
MEV capture fragments across the stack. Instead of a single Ethereum validator capturing all value, MEV is now stratified: L1 validators get cross-domain MEV, rollup sequencers get intra-rollup MEV, and shared sequencers like Espresso compete for order flow. This stratification increases complexity but democratizes access.
Evidence: Arbitrum's sequencer generates millions in annual profit from MEV, while Espresso's testnet processes orders for multiple rollups, demonstrating the viability of shared sequencing as a market.
Sequencer Landscape: Value Propositions & Trade-offs
A comparison of sequencer models based on their approach to MEV extraction, decentralization, and economic alignment.
| Feature / Metric | Centralized Rollup (e.g., Arbitrum, Optimism) | Shared Sequencer Network (e.g., Espresso, Astria) | Decentralized Sequencing Set (e.g., SUAVE, Shutter) |
|---|---|---|---|
Primary MEV Capture Entity | Protocol Treasury / Foundation | Sequencer Node Operators | Proposer-Builder-Separation (PBS) Auction |
MEV Redistribution Mechanism | Sequencer fee profit β Protocol revenue | MEV auction revenue β Sequencer stakers | Cross-domain auction β Searcher/Builder |
Time to Finality (L2 -> L1) | ~1 week (challenge period) | < 1 hour (with fast bridges) | ~12 seconds (with enshrined PBS) |
Censorship Resistance | Partial (permissioned set) | ||
Cross-Domain MEV Arbitrage | |||
Sequencer Bond / Slashing | None (centralized op) | ~$10k-$50k (staked) |
|
Integration Complexity for Rollups | Low (native client) | Medium (shared network API) | High (requires fork/consensus change) |
Key Dependency / Risk | Single operator failure | Cartel formation among sequencers | Builder collusion in auction |
Deep Dive: The Mechanics of Modular MEV Capture
Modularity fragments the MEV supply chain, creating new extraction points and shifting power from monolithic sequencers to specialized actors.
Sequencer MEV is a first-mover advantage. The entity ordering transactions on a rollup or sovereign chain captures the right to extract value from block space. This centralizes MEV capture at the execution layer sequencer, a model seen in Arbitrum and Optimism.
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) migrates to settlement. In a modular stack, the settlement layer (e.g., Celestia, EigenDA) becomes the new auction house. Builders on Ethereum compete to order rollup blocks, not just Ethereum blocks, creating cross-domain MEV bundles.
Interoperability protocols are the new MEV hubs. Cross-chain messaging layers like LayerZero and Axelar observe state disparities across chains. Their relayers capture arbitrage by front-running the attestation of cross-chain messages, a form of interchain MEV.
Shared sequencers like Espresso and Astria change the game. They decouple sequencing from execution, creating a neutral marketplace for block space across multiple rollups. This commoditizes sequencing and forces MEV profits into a public auction.
Evidence: The Ethereum PBS model extracts over $1B annually. Modular systems will replicate this at scale; a shared sequencer auction for ten major rollups will concentrate more value than any single L2 today.
Critical Risks: What Could Derail This Future?
The modular MEV supply chain introduces new systemic risks that could stall or capture value flows.
The Interoperability MEV Trap
Cross-domain MEV creates a new attack surface where value is most vulnerable. The bridging and sequencing layer becomes the new choke point, not the execution layer.\n- Vulnerability: Adversarial sequencing can front-run cross-chain arbitrage or sandwich bridge settlements.\n- Consequence: MEV revenue leaks to malicious actors, disincentivizing honest participation and fragmenting liquidity.
Centralization of the Sequencing Layer
Economic gravity pulls sequencing towards a handful of dominant providers, recreating L1 validator centralization. Whoever sequences, controls the chain of blocks and its MEV.\n- Vulnerability: A centralized sequencer (e.g., a dominant rollup's sequencer set) can extract maximal value via opaque ordering, killing competitive markets.\n- Consequence: MEV capture becomes rent-seeking, stifling innovation in PBS (Proposer-Builder Separation) and pushing users to centralized alternatives.
Sovereign Rollup Exit Scam
A sovereign rollup's ability to force a transaction through its settlement layer is a double-edged sword. A malicious sequencer can execute a timed 'rug pull' by censoring or reordering blocks during the dispute window.\n- Vulnerability: The security model relies on honest watchers to fraud-proof in time; a well-funded attacker can overwhelm this.\n- Consequence: Total loss of funds for users who don't self-verify, destroying trust in modular systems not backed by robust economic slashing.
Data Availability Blackmail
Modular chains outsource data availability (DA) to cost-optimized layers. This creates a fee market hostage situation where DA providers can extract economic rent by threatening to withhold data.\n- Vulnerability: If a rollup is locked into a specific DA layer, the provider can gradually increase prices, capturing a significant portion of the chain's MEV and fee revenue.\n- Consequence: Rollups face a trade-off between security (staking-heavy DA) and cost, potentially leading to fragile, under-secured chains that are MEV honeypots.
Intent-Based System Collapse
The shift from transaction-based to intent-based systems (UniswapX, CowSwap) abstracts complexity to solvers. This creates a solver cartel risk where a few entities collude to offer non-competitive quotes.\n- Vulnerability: Solvers have perfect visibility into user intent flows and can partition the market, extracting surplus value that should go to users.\n- Consequence: The promised efficiency gains of intents are captured by intermediaries, reverting to a broker-dealer model and killing the decentralized MEV supply chain.
Regulatory Capture of the MEV Supply Chain
As MEV extraction becomes formalized through protocols like MEV-Share or MEV-Boost, it enters regulatory sightlines. Authorities could classify searchers, builders, or relay operators as unregistered broker-dealers or market manipulators.\n- Vulnerability: Compliance requirements would force centralization, pushing activity to opaque, offshore entities and creating a regulatory arbitrage layer.\n- Consequence: The transparent, competitive MEV market fractures, with compliant layers being low-value and high-risk layers capturing the real profit, increasing systemic opacity.
Future Outlook: The Endgame is Intent-Based
The modular stack's fragmentation will shift MEV capture from block builders to intent-centric networks.
MEV extraction shifts upstream. In a modular world, the execution layer is a commodity. The real value accrual moves to the intent layer where user preferences are expressed and matched. Protocols like UniswapX and CowSwap already demonstrate this by outsourcing execution to a network of solvers.
Solver networks become the new validators. The competitive landscape for filling user intents will replace the competition for block space. This creates a new MEV supply chain where specialized solvers (e.g., PropellerHeads, Barter) compete on execution quality, not just gas price.
Cross-domain intents are the ultimate prize. The endgame is a unified intent layer across rollups and appchains. Standards like ERC-4337 and SUAVE are precursors, but the winner will be the network that best aggregates and routes intents across Arbitrum, Optimism, and Base.
Evidence: UniswapX processed over $7B in volume in its first six months by abstracting execution complexity into an intent-based flow, proving user and developer demand.
Key Takeaways for Builders and Investors
Modularity fragments the MEV supply chain, creating new attack surfaces and forcing a strategic rethink of value capture.
The Problem: Cross-Domain MEV is a Fragmented Nightmare
Searchers must now coordinate across execution, settlement, and data availability layers, each with its own latency and finality profile. This creates atomicity risk and coordination overhead, making complex cross-chain arbitrage and liquidations unreliable.
- Key Benefit 1: Protocols that solve atomic composability (e.g., LayerZero, Across) become critical infrastructure.
- Key Benefit 2: Builders who own the sequencing layer (e.g., Espresso, Astria) capture the right to order cross-domain bundles.
The Solution: Intents and Auction-Based Systems Win
Pushing complexity off-chain via intent-based architectures (like UniswapX or CowSwap) flips the MEV game. Users express desired outcomes, and solvers compete in a sealed-bid auction to fulfill them, internalizing MEV as solver profit or user savings.
- Key Benefit 1: Better UX (gasless, failed tx protection) and potentially better prices via MEV recapture.
- Key Benefit 2: Reduces the toxic, latency-sensitive MEV that drives centralization at the sequencer level.
The New Battleground: Shared Sequencer Economics
In a modular stack, the sequencer role is unbundled from execution. This creates a multi-billion dollar market for shared sequencers (e.g., Espresso, Astria, Radius) that auction block space to builders. Value accrues to the entity controlling transaction ordering across hundreds of rollups.
- Key Benefit 1: Revenue Diversification: Sequencer fees, MEV auction proceeds, and native token staking.
- Key Benefit 2: Protocol Sovereignty: Rollups can choose a sequencer for security/decentralization or outsource for liquidity and cross-chain composability.
Enshrined vs. Free-Market: The Privacy Dilemma
Modularity forces a choice: enshrined privacy (encrypted mempools like EigenLayer's MEVM, Shutter) at the protocol layer vs. free-market privacy via off-chain networks (e.g., Flashbots SUAVE). Enshrined offers stronger guarantees but limits innovation; free-market is flexible but risks fragmentation.
- Key Benefit 1: Enshrined privacy protects users from frontrunning by default, a critical feature for institutional adoption.
- Key Benefit 2: Free-market models allow for specialized searcher/builder ecosystems to evolve rapidly around new MEV opportunities.
Investor Thesis: Vertical Integration is Inevitable
The largest MEV profits will flow to vertically integrated stacks that control the full pipeline: sequencer -> builder -> solver -> cross-chain messaging. Look for projects building cohesive "MEV rails" rather than point solutions. This mirrors the consolidation seen in traditional HFT.
- Key Benefit 1: Captures Full Value Stack: From ordering rights to cross-domain arbitrage execution.
- Key Benefit 2: Network Effects: A dominant shared sequencer attracts rollups, which attracts liquidity and searchers, creating a powerful flywheel.
Builder Mandate: Own a Critical Choke Point
In a fragmented landscape, sustainable value accrues to protocols that become unavoidable intermediaries. This could be the shared sequencer, the canonical intent solver, or the trusted cross-domain bridge. Avoid building generic infrastructure that becomes a commodity.
- Key Benefit 1: Pricing Power: Control over a bottleneck allows for fee extraction and governance over the ecosystem.
- Key Benefit 2: Strategic Optionality: A critical choke point can expand into adjacent services (e.g., a sequencer launching its own rollup SDK).
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