Why Zero-Knowledge Proofs Are Overhyped and Under-Secured

Most ZK rollups rely on a single, centralized prover, creating a single point of failure and censorship. This contradicts the decentralized ethos of blockchains like Ethereum and Solana.\n- Single sequencer-prover models dominate networks like zkSync and Starknet.\n- Creates a trusted setup for every batch, not just the initial ceremony.\n- Failure or malice here invalidates the entire chain's security guarantees.

The verifier contract is a tiny, security-critical oracle on the parent chain. A bug here is catastrophic, as seen with the zkSync Era incident.\n- A single smart contract holds the keys to $1B+ in bridged assets.\n- Formal verification is rare; most rely on manual audits against complex circuits.\n- Upgradability introduces admin key risk, a recurring theme in exploits.

ZK circuits are black boxes of complexity, making meaningful security audits nearly impossible for all but a few experts.\n- Creates a knowledge gap where teams can hide flaws behind "proprietary tech."\n- Recursive proofs (e.g., Polygon zkEVM) stack abstraction layers, compounding risk.\n- The trusted setup ceremony for systems like Groth16 remains a persistent, often downplayed, vulnerability.

A privacy-focused zk-rollup that collapsed not from a cryptographic break, but from unsustainable economic and compliance pressures. Its failure highlights that code is law until regulators disagree.

• $100M+ TVL stranded during wind-down.
• Core issue: Compliance complexity with privacy tech.
• Lesson: Privacy is a product-market-fit problem, not just a tech one.

Projects like Scroll, Polygon zkEVM, and zkSync Era all depend on a trusted setup for their core circuits. This creates a persistent, off-chain trust assumption that undermines the 'complete trustlessness' marketing.

• Multi-party computation (MPC) ceremonies are complex and opaque.
• A single compromised participant can theoretically backdoor the system.
• Creates a liveness dependency on centralized sequencers for proof generation.

High-performance proving systems face a centralization trilemma: speed, cost, and decentralization. To achieve sub-second proofs, they rely on few, powerful provers, creating a new bottleneck.

• Proving markets are nascent; ~3 major prover services dominate.
• $0.10+ per proof cost creates economic barriers for decentralized provers.
• Results in validator-level centralization reminiscent of early PoW mining pools.

dYdX and other dApps on StarkEx faced a ~10-hour outage when the prover failed. This exposed the critical liveness dependency on a single prover entity (StarkWare). The network was technically secure but completely unusable.

• Highlights that decentralized verification ≠ decentralized proving.
• Single point of failure in the proving process halts the entire L2.
• Led to increased focus on prover decentralization as a security requirement.

The Circom library, used by Tornado Cash and hundreds of ZK projects, had a critical vulnerability in its circomlib circuits. A maliciously crafted proof could verify as true. This wasn't a ZK math flaw, but a tooling and implementation failure.

• Reveals the immature audit surface of ZK toolchains.
• Open-source library risk is systemic; one bug impacts all dependent projects.
• Underscores that circuit correctness is as vital as cryptographic soundness.

ZK proof systems like Plonk and Groth16 require periodic, coordinated trusted setup ceremonies or parameter updates. This introduces a protocol-level governance risk often overlooked. Who decides when to upgrade? A bug in a new SRS (Structured Reference String) is catastrophic.

• Contrasts with Ethereum's 'move fast and break things' upgrade culture.
• Creates validator coordination challenges for hard forks.
• Shows that ZK security is a continuous process, not a one-time setup.

Most ZK circuits require a one-time trusted ceremony, creating a permanent backdoor risk. A single compromised participant can forge proofs. Projects like zkSync Era and Polygon zkEVM rely on these ceremonies, making their security dependent on historical honesty.

• Key Risk: Single point of failure in the genesis.
• Key Mitigation: Look for perpetual or transparent setups like Halo2 or Nova.

ZK proofs verify computation, not data origin. A ZK-rollup's validity is meaningless if its input data (e.g., from an L1) is incorrect. This creates a critical dependency on the security of the data availability layer and bridge oracles like LayerZero or Axelar.

• Key Risk: Garbage in, gospel out.
• Key Action: Audit the data pipeline as rigorously as the proof system.

A bug in a ZK circuit is a catastrophic, silent failure. Unlike a smart contract bug, it can allow invalid state transitions that are cryptographically verified. Auditing these circuits requires specialized expertise beyond Solidity reviews. The $325M Wormhole exploit stemmed from a signature verification flaw, a parallel to circuit logic errors.

• Key Risk: Undetectable chain corruption.
• Key Action: Mandate multiple independent audits from firms like Trail of Bits and Zellic.

Many ZK-rollups rely on a single, centralized prover to generate proofs, creating a liveness and censorship risk. If the prover fails, the chain halts. While sequencer decentralization is discussed, prover decentralization (e.g., via proof markets like Espresso Systems) is a harder, unsolved problem.

• Key Risk: Chain halts and transaction censorship.
• Key Metric: Measure time-to-decentralize the prover network.