Why Identity Aggregators Will Centralize Decentralized Voting

Sybil resistance centralizes power. The core function of an identity aggregator like Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS) or Gitcoin Passport is to consolidate credentials. This creates a centralized scoring oracle that protocols must trust to filter out bots, turning a distributed governance problem into a delegated trust problem.

Vote liquidity follows the score. Governance participants will optimize for the highest reputation score, not the best proposal. This creates incentive-driven centralization where aggregators like Worldcoin or BrightID become kingmakers, similar to how MEV searchers dominate block building on Ethereum.

The protocol becomes the client. DAOs that outsource identity to a third-party aggregator cede sovereignty. The aggregator's scoring algorithm and credential issuers hold de facto veto power, replicating the platform risk seen when dApps rely on a single oracle like Chainlink.

Evidence: Delegate concentration. Look at Compound or Uniswap governance. Even without formal aggregators, voting power concentrates in a few delegates. An identity score formalizes this, creating a permissioned layer atop permissionless voting. The data shows centralization is the equilibrium state.

Sybil resistance centralizes trust. Decentralized voting requires proving unique personhood, which pushes protocols to outsource verification to centralized aggregators like Worldcoin or Gitcoin Passport. This creates a single point of failure for the entire governance system.

Aggregators become the attack surface. A compromise of the aggregator's attestation keys or a regulatory takedown invalidates the identity layer for every integrated DAO. This risk is more concentrated than a protocol-specific Sybil attack.

The cost of verification creates oligopolies. The capital and legal overhead for running a compliant identity service is prohibitive, leading to a natural oligopoly of 2-3 major providers. This mirrors the centralization seen in oracle networks like Chainlink.

Evidence: Gitcoin Passport, used by over 500 projects, relies on centralized stamp providers like BrightID and Coinbase Verification. Worldcoin's Orb is a proprietary hardware device controlled by a single entity.

The 'Necessary Evil' Fallacy: Pragmatists argue that sybil resistance requires centralization. This concedes that decentralized identity is impossible, a premature surrender that ignores ongoing work on proof-of-personhood and ZK credentials.

Protocols Become Clients: Aggregators like Ethereum Attestation Service or Gitcoin Passport become the single point of failure. DAOs don't vote on-chain; they vote through the aggregator's API, which controls the identity graph.

Incentive Misalignment Emerges: The aggregator's business model depends on selling verified identity data. This creates a perverse incentive to gatekeep access and monetize participation, not maximize decentralization.

Evidence: Look at Snapshot's delegation system. While flexible, it already creates voting power hubs where a few large delegates sway outcomes. An identity layer formalizes this into a rent-extractable platform.

Aggregators centralize trust. Protocols like Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS) or Gitcoin Passport become the de facto identity oracles. Governance power concentrates in the aggregator's scoring algorithm, not the underlying community.

Voter coercion becomes trivial. A dominant aggregator like Worldcoin or Verite can manipulate sybil-resistance scores. This creates a governance attack vector more dangerous than a simple token vote.

The solution is competitive verification. The market needs multiple, competing attestation layers (e.g., EAS, Iden3, Sismo) with client-side aggregation. Voters must prove humanity across standards, not to a single provider.

Evidence: Look at Uniswap's failed 'aggressive' delegation. Centralized voter guides already distort outcomes. An identity oligopoly formalizes this distortion at the protocol level.