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Blog

The Future of Gas Markets: Dynamic Pricing and MEV

The traditional gas market model is breaking. We analyze the shift from static priority fees to dynamic, MEV-aware auctions, exploring the protocols, economics, and risks defining the next era of blockchain transaction ordering.

introduction
THE INCENTIVE ENGINE

Introduction

Gas pricing and MEV are the core incentive mechanisms that will define the next generation of blockchain scalability and user experience.

Gas is mispriced. The current first-price auction model is a market failure that creates predictable inefficiencies and rent extraction. It fails to account for network state, transaction urgency, or external value.

Dynamic pricing models are inevitable. Protocols like EIP-1559 and PBS (Proposer-Builder Separation) are the first steps. The endgame is a real-time, intent-driven market where users express outcomes, not transactions.

MEV is the new block reward. The $1B+ annual MEV market funds infrastructure like Flashbots and Jito. This capital will subsidize cheaper transactions and enable new applications, but requires careful protocol design to prevent centralization.

Evidence: Ethereum's transition to PBS post-merge shifted over 90% of block production to specialized builders, fundamentally altering the validator's economic role and creating a new market layer.

market-context
THE INCENTIVE MISMATCH

The Broken Priority Fee Model

Static priority fees create predictable, inefficient markets that are exploited by MEV searchers at user expense.

Priority fees are a blunt instrument. They create a predictable, first-price auction where users overpay for inclusion, while sophisticated searchers exploit the information asymmetry to capture value.

The result is MEV leakage. Protocols like Flashbots Protect and MEV-Share attempt to mitigate this by enabling a more cooperative market, but they are patches on a broken core auction mechanism.

Dynamic pricing models are the fix. Systems like EIP-1559's base fee provide a foundation, but the future is real-time, intent-based pricing. This shifts the market from 'pay to include' to 'pay for outcome'.

Evidence: On Ethereum, over 90% of validator rewards now come from MEV, not standard block rewards, proving the priority fee model is economically obsolete.

THE GAS MARKET EVOLUTION

Old Model vs. New Model: A Transaction's Journey

Contrasting the traditional first-price auction with emerging intent-based and order flow auction models for transaction inclusion and execution.

Core MechanismTraditional Auction (e.g., Ethereum, 2021)Order Flow Auction (e.g., MEV-Boost, SUAVE)Intent-Based (e.g., UniswapX, CowSwap)

Pricing Model

First-price sealed-bid auction

Competitive block space auction

Solver competition for outcome

User's Role

Parameter tuner (gas, priority fee)

Fee payer

Declarer of desired end-state

Execution Guarantee

Inclusion only

Inclusion + potential MEV rebate

Settled outcome or reverted

Primary Latency Source

Mempool gossiping (~12s)

Builder bidding & relay attestation (~4s)

Solver competition window (~1-2 mins)

MEV Capture

By searchers & validators (proposer-builder separation optional)

By builders, with potential redistribution

By solvers, with surplus often returned to user

Typical Cost Premium

15-100%+ over base fee during congestion

5-50% over base, includes MEV tax

Often <5% over spot; can be negative (rebate)

Key Infrastructure Dependency

Public mempool, RPC nodes

MEV-Boost relays, builder network

Solver networks, intents mempool (e.g., Anoma, Flashbots SUAVE)

Failure Mode

Transaction stuck or overpaid

Block withheld by malicious relay/builder

No solver fills intent; fallback to traditional flow

deep-dive
THE NEW GAS MARKET

Anatomy of an MEV-Aware Auction

The future gas market is a dynamic, MEV-aware auction that prices execution priority based on its extractable value, not just computational cost.

MEV is the price driver. The traditional gas market prices computation and storage. In an MEV-aware auction, the dominant cost is the value of transaction ordering rights. A searcher bidding for a profitable arbitrage will outbid a simple token transfer, creating a dynamic pricing layer.

Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) is the enabler. PBS, as implemented by Flashbots' SUAVE or inherent in EigenLayer, separates block building from proposing. This creates a competitive builder market where searchers submit value-sharing bids to specialized builders like bloXroute or beaverbuild.

Time becomes a premium dimension. Auctions are not just for block space but for execution timing. Protocols like CowSwap and UniswapX use intent-based architectures to auction user transactions over time, finding the optimal price across venues like 1inch or Across.

Evidence: Ethereum's post-merge block building is a private auction. Over 90% of blocks are built by MEV-Boost relays, where builders pay proposers a premium that often exceeds standard block rewards, proving the market values ordering.

protocol-spotlight
THE FUTURE OF GAS MARKETS

Protocol Spotlight: The New Auctioneers

Static gas auctions are being replaced by dynamic, intent-based systems that internalize MEV and optimize for user outcomes.

01

The Problem: Opaque Priority Gas Auctions (PGAs)

First-price auctions on public mempools are inefficient and extractive. Users overpay, and searchers engage in wasteful, latency-sensitive bidding wars that generate negative externalities for the network.

  • Wasted Gas: ~$100M+ annually in failed PGA transactions.
  • User Obfuscation: Bots front-run predictable transactions.
  • Network Congestion: PGAs exacerbate block space volatility.
$100M+
Wasted Annually
~300ms
Latency Arms Race
02

The Solution: Private Orderflow & SUAVE

Protocols like Flashbots' SUAVE aim to decentralize the block building market. By creating a neutral, competitive marketplace for orderflow and block space, it separates transaction inclusion from execution.

  • MEV Democratization: Searchers compete on execution quality, not just speed.
  • Better Pricing: Users get expressiveness via intents, not just gas bids.
  • Chain-Agnostic: A single decentralized mempool for multiple blockchains.
90%+
OFAC-Compliant Blocks
Multi-Chain
Scope
03

The Solution: Intents & Solving (UniswapX, CowSwap)

Intent-based architectures shift the paradigm from 'how' to 'what'. Users submit desired outcomes, and a network of solvers competes to fulfill them optimally, abstracting away gas and MEV complexity.

  • Cost Efficiency: Solvers internalize MEV for better user prices.
  • Gasless UX: Users sign intents, not gas-paid transactions.
  • Cross-Chain Native: Systems like UniswapX and Across use intents for seamless bridging and swapping.
-50%
Avg. Swap Cost
$10B+
Processed Volume
04

The Problem: Centralized Builder Dominance

The PBS (Proposer-Builder Separation) model has led to builder centralization, with a few entities like Titan and Relayooor controlling >80% of Ethereum blocks. This creates systemic risk and potential censorship.

  • Censorship Risk: Centralized points of failure for transaction filtering.
  • Economic Centralization: MEV profits concentrate, reducing network resilience.
  • Opaque Markets: Lack of transparency in block construction.
>80%
Builder Market Share
Single Point
Of Failure
05

The Solution: Encrypted Mempools (Shutter, Anoma)

Encrypting transaction content until block inclusion neutralizes front-running and malicious MEV. Projects like Shutter Network use threshold encryption to enable fair, private transaction ordering.

  • Front-Running Proof: Transaction details are hidden from searchers.
  • Fair Ordering: Decryption occurs only after a block is proposed.
  • Protocol-Level: Can be integrated into chains like EigenLayer and Gnosis Chain.
~0s
Exposure Window
Threshold
Cryptography
06

The Future: Dynamic Fee Markets (EIP-1559 & Beyond)

EIP-1559's base fee is a first step. The endgame is fully dynamic, multidimensional fee markets that price compute, storage, and congestion separately, as envisioned by Vitalik Buterin. This enables sustainable scaling.

  • Predictable Fees: Smoother base fee reduces volatility.
  • Multi-Dimensional Pricing: Separately price EVM opcodes and state access.
  • Efficiency: Aligns network resource cost with user payment.
>3M ETH
Burned (Post-EIP-1559)
Multi-Dim
Pricing Model
counter-argument
THE REALITY

The Centralization Counter-Argument (And Why It's Inevitable)

Dynamic gas markets and sophisticated MEV extraction will consolidate block production into a few professional firms, creating a necessary and stable infrastructure layer.

Professionalization centralizes block production. Dynamic pricing and MEV capture require capital, low-latency infrastructure, and real-time data analysis. This creates a structural advantage for specialized firms like Flashbots and Jito Labs over casual validators.

This centralization is economically efficient. A fragmented network of amateur validators cannot compete with the capital efficiency and risk management of professional searchers and builders. The market rewards specialization.

The result is a two-tiered system. The base layer of validators provides security and decentralization, while a thin, centralized execution layer (e.g., builders in PBS) optimizes for performance and MEV extraction. This mirrors traditional finance's HFT/Exchange relationship.

Evidence: Over 90% of Ethereum blocks are now built by a handful of builders via proposer-builder separation (PBS), a trend that will accelerate with enshrined PBS and cross-domain MEV.

risk-analysis
THE FUTURE OF GAS MARKETS

Risk Analysis: What Could Go Wrong?

Dynamic pricing and MEV extraction are evolving from passive fees into active, programmable markets, creating new systemic risks.

01

The Centralization of MEV Supply Chains

The professionalization of MEV (e.g., Jito, Flashbots) creates a new, opaque layer of infrastructure dependency. Relayers, builders, and searchers can form cartels, leading to censorship risks and single points of failure that threaten chain liveness.

  • Risk: Builder dominance can exceed 80% market share, enabling transaction filtering.
  • Consequence: Protocol-level MEV (e.g., CowSwap, UniswapX) becomes a battleground, not a solution.
>80%
Builder Share
1-2
Critical Relayers
02

Dynamic Pricing as a DDoS Vector

EIP-1559's base fee and priority fee mechanisms are predictable. Truly dynamic, auction-based gas markets (e.g., TGas on Solana) are not. Malicious actors can spam low-value transactions to artificially inflate the clearing price, creating self-reinforcing fee spirals.

  • Attack Cost: As low as the cost to trigger one fee spike.
  • Impact: Paralyzes the network for all users, making cost prediction impossible for wallets like MetaMask.
Spike >1000%
Fee Volatility
~$0
Marginal Attack Cost
03

The L2 Fragmentation Trap

Each Optimistic Rollup and ZK-Rollup (e.g., Arbitrum, zkSync) operates its own mini-gas market. This fragments liquidity and MEV, creating arbitrage inefficiencies and cross-domain MEV risks. Bridges like Across and LayerZero become critical, but their oracles and relayers are new attack surfaces.

  • Risk: A gas auction war on one L2 can drain liquidity from bridges.
  • Consequence: Cross-chain intent systems fail, breaking composability.
10+
Isolated Gas Markets
$1B+
Bridge TVL at Risk
04

Regulatory Capture of Programmable Fees

When gas becomes a programmable, intent-based commodity (via ERC-4337 account abstraction or SUAVE), it enters regulatory gray areas. OFAC-sanctioned addresses could be blocked not by miners, but by the fee market logic itself, embedding compliance at the protocol layer.

  • Precedent: Tornado Cash sanctions targeted smart contract code.
  • Outcome: Developers face liability for the economic censorship their fee logic enables.
100%
Protocol-Level Censorship
Legal
New Attack Vector
future-outlook
THE GAS MARKET

Future Outlook: The Gasless Abstraction

The future of gas is a dynamic, auction-based market that abstracts payment away from users and integrates MEV capture as a core primitive.

Gas markets become auction-based. Users submit intents expressing desired outcomes, not transactions. Solvers like those in UniswapX and CowSwap compete in off-chain auctions to fulfill these intents, paying gas on the user's behalf. The winning solver is the one offering the best net outcome after gas and fees.

MEV is the subsidy, not a tax. In this model, extractable value (MEV) funds transaction costs. Solvers capture arbitrage and liquidation opportunities bundled within user intents, using that profit to cover network fees. This flips the current paradigm where MEV is a user loss into a system-wide efficiency gain.

Dynamic pricing replaces static gas. Gas fees will no longer be a simple function of network congestion. They become a dynamic price discovered through solver competition, influenced by intent complexity and the available MEV in the transaction bundle. Protocols like EigenLayer and Across are building this infrastructure now.

Evidence: Intent volume is scaling. UniswapX, which uses this intent-based, gasless model, already processes billions in volume. Its growth demonstrates user demand for abstraction and solver willingness to compete on execution quality, validating the economic model.

takeaways
THE FUTURE OF GAS MARKETS

TL;DR: Key Takeaways for Builders

Static gas auctions are obsolete. The future is dynamic pricing, intent abstraction, and MEV recapture.

01

The Problem: Static Auctions Waste Billions

First-price auctions on Ethereum waste ~$400M+ annually in overpayment and create a toxic UX. Users overbid to avoid delays, while validators capture the surplus. This model is fundamentally adversarial and inefficient.

  • Key Benefit 1: Eliminates >90% of gas overpayment through efficient clearing prices.
  • Key Benefit 2: Reduces failed transaction rates and front-running surface.
$400M+
Annual Waste
-90%
Overpayment
02

The Solution: Time-Based & EIP-1559-Like Mechanisms

Dynamic pricing via time-based fee markets (like Solana) or EIP-1559's base fee decouples fee urgency from bid wars. The base fee burns excess, while priority fees target inclusion speed. This creates predictable, stable pricing for users.

  • Key Benefit 1: ~50% lower fee volatility for standard transactions.
  • Key Benefit 2: Creates a deflationary pressure and predictable revenue for validators.
-50%
Volatility
Predictable
Pricing
03

The Problem: MEV Extracts Value from Users

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) from arbitrage, liquidations, and front-running is a $500M+ annual tax on users. It creates network congestion, increases costs for all, and centralizes block production in the hands of sophisticated searchers.

  • Key Benefit 1: Recaptures value for users and applications, not just validators.
  • Key Benefit 2: Improves chain fairness and decentralization.
$500M+
Annual Extract
User Tax
Impact
04

The Solution: Intents & SUAVE-Like Co-processors

Shift from transaction execution to intent declaration. Users specify a desired outcome (e.g., "swap X for Y at best price"), and a network of solvers competes to fulfill it efficiently. SUAVE, UniswapX, and CowSwap are pioneering this. MEV becomes a public good.

  • Key Benefit 1: Better prices via solver competition and batch execution.
  • Key Benefit 2: Enhanced privacy and resistance to front-running.
Better Price
Execution
Enhanced
Privacy
05

The Problem: Cross-Chain Gas is a UX Nightmare

Managing native gas tokens across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Polygon, etc. is a multi-step, high-friction process. It locks liquidity, creates security risks via bridging, and is a major barrier to chain abstraction. This fragments liquidity and user experience.

  • Key Benefit 1: Enables single-chain UX for multi-chain interactions.
  • Key Benefit 2: Unlocks billions in stranded liquidity across L2s.
Multi-Step
Friction
Billions
Liquidity Locked
06

The Solution: Abstracted Accounts & Paymasters

ERC-4337 Account Abstraction and Paymaster contracts allow users to pay fees in any token, or have fees sponsored by dApps. Combined with intents, this enables gasless transactions and seamless cross-chain actions via systems like LayerZero and Across.

  • Key Benefit 1: Zero-gas onboarding and sponsored transactions.
  • Key Benefit 2: Unifies asset management across the modular stack.
Zero-Gas
Onboarding
Unified
Assets
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