Interchain Security Models Are Inadequate for MEV Mitigation

Bridges like Wormhole and LayerZero secure asset transfers but are blind to transaction ordering and content. Their validators can't detect, let alone prevent, predatory MEV strategies like cross-chain arbitrage sniping or sandwich attacks that drain user value.

• Security Guarantee: Asset safety, not execution fairness.
• Blind Spot: No visibility into the intent or economic outcome of bundled transactions.

Networks like UniswapX, CowSwap, and Across abstract execution to solvers. By having solvers compete to fulfill a user's declared outcome (the intent), they internalize and neutralize front-running and sandwich attacks before a transaction hits a vulnerable public mempool.

• Key Shift: Users specify what, not how.
• Result: MEV becomes a solver's cost of business, not a user's loss.

Cosmos IBC and Polkadot XCMP rely on a hub/relay chain for security. This creates a single point of MEV extraction. Validators on the hub can see and order transactions from all connected chains, enabling sophisticated cross-chain MEV strategies that are impossible to coordinate on isolated chains.

• Amplified Power: Hub validators have a panoramic, exploitable view.
• Consequence: MEV risk scales with connectivity, not decreases.

Projects like Succinct and Espresso Systems use cryptographic techniques (e.g., MPC, TEEs) to create a decentralized, neutral sequencing layer. This prevents any single entity from viewing or manipulating the full transaction flow, breaking the information asymmetry that enables MEV.

• Core Tech: Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), Multi-Party Computation (MPC).
• Outcome: Decentralized sequencing with enforced fairness.

Chains with instant finality (e.g., Solana, Avalanche) don't have a reorg-based MEV market. Instead, validators extract maximum value via local transaction ordering before finalization. When bridged to chains with slower finality (e.g., Ethereum), this creates asynchronous MEV opportunities where attackers can exploit time differentials.

• Mismatch: ~400ms finality vs. ~12 seconds creates arbitrage windows.
• New Vector: Cross-chain latency becomes a monetizable resource.

Astria, Radius, and Espresso are building shared sequencers that batch and order transactions for multiple rollups/chains. By creating a transparent, auction-based market for cross-chain block space, they turn opaque MEV into a transparent, redistributable revenue stream.

• Mechanism: Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) for multiple chains.
• Benefit: MEV is captured and can be redirected to users/protocols.

Attackers exploit the latency and trust assumptions in price oracles like Chainlink to drain lending protocols. The Wormhole and Nomad hacks demonstrated that a single compromised validator can forge cross-chain messages, enabling arbitrage-based theft.

• Vector: Spoofed price feeds or state proofs.
• Outcome: Instant, risk-free liquidation or minting of unbacked assets.

Rollup sequencers (e.g., Arbitrum, Optimism) and cross-chain relayers (e.g., LayerZero, Axelar) have centralized points of failure. A malicious operator can front-run, censor, or reorder transactions for maximal extractable value, breaking atomicity guarantees.

• Vector: Centralized transaction ordering power.
• Outcome: Stolen arbitrage opportunities and failed cross-chain settlements.

Bridges like Across and Stargate with on-chain liquidity pools are vulnerable to MEV bots. Attackers sandwich bridge transactions, manipulating pool prices before and after the settlement to extract value from users.

• Vector: MEV bots monitoring bridge mempools.
• Outcome: User slippage often exceeds 5-10%, making small transfers economically non-viable.

Models like Cosmos IBC or optimistic verification (e.g., Nomad) rely on a supermajority of honest validators. However, 33-66% collusion thresholds are insufficient against financially motivated MEV attacks, where validators profit more from stealing than securing.

• Vector: Economic incentive misalignment within validator sets.
• Outcome: Systemic risk where security is cheaper to break than maintain.

Protocols like UniswapX and CowSwap abstract execution to solvers, shifting risk. While they mitigate user-side MEV, they create a new attack vector: solver collusion. A dominant solver network can extract monopoly rents or censor transactions.

• Vector: Centralization of solver market share.
• Outcome: Hidden fees and reduced competition, negating user benefits.

Cross-chain security often depends on light client verification, which assumes honest majority of a foreign chain. For Ethereum PoS, this requires trusting ~$100B in stake. An L0 reorg or finality attack on a connected chain can invalidate all cross-chain state, a systemic risk ignored in siloed security models.

• Vector: Weak subjectivity or long-range attacks on source chains.
• Outcome: Total invalidation of bridged assets and messages.

Verifying block headers is insufficient for MEV security. Bridges like IBC and LayerZero provide data availability but cannot validate the fairness of the execution path within that state, leaving users exposed to sandwich attacks and transaction reordering.

• Blind Spot: Cannot detect if a validator extracted $100k in MEV before finalizing the header.
• Latency Penalty: Slow verification (~2-6s) creates exploitable time windows for generalized frontrunning.

Shift from transaction broadcasting to outcome declaration. Protocols like UniswapX, CowSwap, and Across use solvers who compete on fulfillment, baking MEV protection into the architecture.

• Counterparty Risk: Solvers post bonds and are slashed for malicious reordering.
• Economic Security: Competition drives fees toward the true cost of execution + fair profit, not extracted value.

Models used by Wormhole and most L2 bridges rely on a ~10/19 multisig. This creates a single point of failure for censorship and maximal extractable value (MEV), as the committee can collude to reorder or censor cross-chain messages for profit.

• Trust Minimization Failure: Security collapses to the honesty of a few entities.
• MEV Centralization: The committee becomes the ultimate MEV cartel, capable of extracting value across all bridged assets.

Replace social consensus with cryptographic verification. Succinct, Polygon zkEVM, and zkSync demonstrate that proving state transitions is possible. For interchain, this means proving a transaction was included and executed fairly according to public mempool rules.

• Verifiable Fairness: A ZK proof can attest that no prior transaction was frontrun.
• Universal Verification: One proof verifiable on any chain, breaking the security-liquidity trilemma.

MEV exists in silos per chain (Ethereum, Solana, etc.). This forces searchers to specialize, reducing competition and allowing local monopolies. Bridges become bottlenecks where value extraction is easiest due to fragmented security.

• Reduced Competition: Fewer searchers per chain means higher profit margins for extractors.
• Bridge-as-Target: The bridging transaction itself is a prime target for arbitrage and sandwich attacks.

A neutral, cross-chain sequencer layer that orders transactions for multiple rollups/chains. Projects like Astria and Espresso enable a global searcher market and can implement MEV auctions (PBS) to redistribute extracted value back to users.

• Global Competition: Searchers compete across all chains, driving down extractable margins.
• Value Recapture: Auction revenue can fund protocol development or be returned as user rebates.