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algorithmic-stablecoins-failures-and-future
Blog

Why Algorithmic Stablecoins Misunderstand Monetary Policy

Algorithmic stablecoins attempt to automate central banking but fail because they lack the core social and institutional pillars of monetary policy: a credible lender of last resort and enforceable trust.

introduction
THE FLAWED PREMISE

Introduction

Algorithmic stablecoins fail because they attempt to automate the political and behavioral functions of a central bank.

Algorithmic stablecoins misunderstand money. They treat currency stability as a purely technical problem solvable by code, ignoring that monetary policy is a social contract. A central bank's power stems from its legal authority to tax and its role as lender of last resort, which protocols like Terra/Luna or Frax cannot replicate.

The 'Reflexivity' problem is fatal. These systems rely on market incentives to maintain a peg, creating a positive feedback loop between price and demand. When confidence falls, the arbitrage mechanism designed to restore the peg instead triggers a death spiral, as seen in the UST collapse.

Evidence: The $60B Terra collapse demonstrates the model's fragility. In contrast, MakerDAO's DAI survives because it evolved beyond pure algorithms, incorporating real-world assets and centralized stablecoin collateral to back its value.

thesis-statement
THE MONETARY MISMATCH

The Core Thesis

Algorithmic stablecoins fail because they attempt to automate the impossible: the discretionary, political, and inherently human function of a central bank.

Algorithmic stablecoins lack a lender of last resort. A central bank's primary function is to backstop liquidity during a crisis, a discretionary power that cannot be encoded into a smart contract. This structural flaw guarantees a death spiral during a black swan event, as seen with Terra's UST.

The core error is conflating price with credibility. Projects like Frax and Ethena focus on maintaining a 1:1 peg through arbitrage or derivatives, but this ignores the monetary credibility that underpins fiat. The market's trust in the Federal Reserve's ability to manage the dollar is not replicable with on-chain collateral.

Stability requires a political actor, not just an algorithm. The 2008 financial crisis was resolved by the Fed's balance sheet expansion, not automated liquidation. An algorithmic system like MakerDAO's DAI, which relies on volatile crypto collateral, cannot perform this function without introducing centralized assets like USDC, which defeats its purpose.

Evidence: The $40B collapse of Terra's UST in May 2022 is the canonical case study. Its reflexive feedback loop between LUNA and UST created perfect conditions for a bank run, demonstrating that algorithmic mechanisms cannot instill the confidence required for a true monetary base.

WHY ALGORITHIC STABLECOINS MISUNDERSTAND MONETARY POLICY

Post-Mortem: A Comparative Autopsy

A first-principles comparison of failed algorithmic stablecoin designs against the core tenets of central bank monetary policy they attempted to replicate.

Monetary Policy FeatureTerraUSD (UST)Iron Finance (IRON)Frax (FRAX v1)Central Bank (Fed/ECB)

Primary Stabilization Mechanism

Seigniorage via LUNA arbitrage

Partial collateral (USDC) + seigniorage

Fractional-algorithmic hybrid

Interest rate targets & OMOs

Collateral Backing at Launch

0%

75% USDC

Variable, ~90% initially

100% (Treasuries, MBS)

Lender of Last Resort

No

No

No

Yes (Discount Window)

Yield Source for Peg Defense

Anchor Protocol (20% APY subsidy)

Farming rewards (unsustainable)

AMM LP fees & protocol revenue

Sovereign taxation authority

Time to Depeg Under Stress

< 72 hours (May 2022)

< 48 hours (June 2021)

Maintained (via hybrid model)

Persistent (2008, 2020 crises)

Critical Failure Mode

Reflexive death spiral (LUNA sell pressure)

Bank run on partial reserve

Managed risk via adjustable ratio

High inflation (policy error)

Monetary Sovereignty

False (dependent on exogenous crypto volatility)

False (dependent on USDC redemptions)

Partial (algorithm manages ratio)

True (currency issuer)

Can Print in a Crisis?

Yes (hyper-inflationary to LUNA)

No (limited to USDC reserves)

Yes (within collateral bounds)

Yes (unlimited, with consequences)

deep-dive
THE FLAWED PREMISE

The Lender of Last Resort: The Un-automatable Function

Algorithmic stablecoin designs fail because they attempt to automate the discretionary, trust-based role of a central bank.

Algorithmic stablecoins are monetary policy simulators. They codify rules like seigniorage and arbitrage incentives, attempting to replace a central bank's balance sheet with code. This ignores that a lender of last resort requires discretion to manage systemic risk, not just react to on-chain price feeds.

The 2008 crisis proved automation fails. The Federal Reserve's emergency lending to Bear Stearns and AIG was a political, discretionary act. An automated system like MakerDAO's PSM or Frax Finance's AMO would have liquidated these institutions, accelerating the collapse.

UST's collapse was a stress test. The Terra/Luna death spiral demonstrated that reflexive, algorithmic collateral cannot absorb a true liquidity crisis. The system lacked an entity with the mandate and capacity to backstop demand, a role filled by Circle's USDC reserves and regulatory compliance.

Evidence: $40B evaporated in days. UST's depeg erased its market cap in May 2022. In contrast, USDC's temporary depeg during the SVB crisis was resolved because Circle and regulators coordinated to make depositors whole—a real-world bailout no algorithm can execute.

counter-argument
THE HYBRID MODEL

Steelman: What About FRAX and Ethena?

Modern 'algorithmic' stablecoins are not purely algorithmic; they are hybrid systems that fail to solve the fundamental monetary policy trilemma.

FRAX and Ethena are hybrids, not pure algos. FRAX uses a fractional reserve of USDC, while Ethena uses staked ETH and short perpetual futures positions. This reliance on external collateral or derivatives introduces centralization and new systemic risks, moving the failure point rather than eliminating it.

The monetary policy trilemma remains unsolved. These protocols cannot simultaneously achieve decentralization, capital efficiency, and price stability. FRAX's peg depends on centralized USDC, and Ethena's 'delta-neutral' yield is a synthetic construct dependent on CEX liquidity and funding rates.

Collateral rehypothecation creates systemic fragility. Ethena's model of staking ETH and shorting perps on Binance/Bybit effectively rehypothecates the same collateral. This creates a complex web of counterparty risk with centralized exchanges, mirroring pre-2008 financial engineering.

Evidence: The 2022 de-peg of UST, a similar 'algorithmic' system backed by volatile LUNA, demonstrated the fatal flaw. While FRAX and Ethena use different mechanisms, their stability is contingent on the perpetual health of external systems like Circle, Binance, and the perpetual futures market.

takeaways
WHY ALGOSTABLES FAIL

Key Takeaways for Builders and Investors

Algorithmic stablecoins fail because they treat monetary policy as a purely technical problem, ignoring the political and psychological foundations of money.

01

The Reflexivity Trap: Demand is the Only Backing

Algostables like TerraUSD (UST) and Iron Finance collapse because their stability mechanism is the very thing that destroys it. The promise of arbitrage creates reflexive demand, but when confidence breaks, the death spiral is automated.

  • Key Flaw: Peg is maintained by a reflexive, circular asset (e.g., LUNA, IRON).
  • Result: $40B+ in value evaporated across major failures.
  • Lesson: Stability cannot be bootstrapped from pure market mechanics; it requires exogenous, non-reflexive value.
$40B+
Value Evaporated
~3 days
Death Spiral Time
02

The Central Bank Fallacy: Code is Not a Lender of Last Resort

Protocols like Frax Finance and MakerDAO succeed where others fail by incorporating real-world assets and discretionary governance, acting as a quasi-central bank.

  • Key Insight: Pure-algorithmic (e.g., Basis Cash) fails; hybrid/overcollateralized (DAI) survives.
  • Mechanism: $5B+ in RWA backing provides non-reflexive liquidity.
  • Lesson: Credible stability requires a backstop that code alone cannot provide—either excess collateral or sovereign power.
$5B+
RWA Backing
99%+
Time in Peg (DAI)
03

The Liquidity Mirage: TVL ≠ Stability

High Total Value Locked (TVL) in pools like Curve 3pool creates a false sense of security. It's exit liquidity for the informed, not a permanent anchor.

  • Key Risk: $10B+ TVL can flee in hours during a de-peg event, as seen with UST.
  • Dynamics: Liquidity is mercenary and amplifies volatility when needed most.
  • Lesson: Deep liquidity is a symptom of trust, not a cause of stability. Build for capital flight, not just capital inflow.
$10B+
Fugitive TVL
-20%
Hourly Drop (UST)
04

The Oracle Problem: Price is a Social Consensus

Stability mechanisms rely on price oracles (Chainlink, Pyth). During a crisis, oracles become the attack vector, as delays or manipulation break the redemption arbitrage loop.

  • Key Vulnerability: Oracle latency or staleness (~500ms) is an eternity in a bank run.
  • Example: Iron Finance's de-peg was exacerbated by oracle feed issues.
  • Lesson: A stablecoin is only as strong as its weakest data feed. Decentralized oracles are a bottleneck, not a panacea.
~500ms
Oracle Latency
1 Block
Attack Window
05

The Governance Shortcut: Tokens Are Not a Nation-State

Protocols like Empty Set Dollar (ESD) and Dynamic Set Dollar (DSD) attempted governance-mediated expansion/contraction. It failed because token holders lack the mandate and tools of a sovereign entity.

  • Key Failure: Governance votes are too slow and self-interested to manage real-time monetary policy.
  • Outcome: >99% de-pegs for pure rebase algostables.
  • Lesson: Monetary policy requires legitimacy and force majeure—attributes a DAO token cannot confer.
>99%
De-Peg Rate
Days
Gov Response Time
06

The Regulatory Blind Spot: Stability is a Legal Construct

True stability, like USDC or USDT, is ultimately backed by the legal system's guarantee of redeemability and the banking infrastructure. Algostables ignore this foundational layer.

  • Key Differentiator: Regulated entities can enforce redemption and hold off-chain assets.
  • Scale: $130B+ in combined market cap for top fiat-backed stables.
  • Lesson: For mainstream adoption, the ultimate backstop is not code, but law. Build accordingly or remain a speculative instrument.
$130B+
Fiat-Backed Cap
1:1
Legal Guarantee
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Why Algorithmic Stablecoins Misunderstand Monetary Policy | ChainScore Blog