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account-abstraction-fixing-crypto-ux
Blog

The Future of Gas Markets Runs Through Bundlers

EIP-1559's user-pays model is being usurped. Bundlers, not end-users, are becoming the dominant bidders for block space, creating a new layer of gas risk management and MEV extraction that will define the next era of Ethereum.

introduction
THE NEW GATEKEEPERS

Introduction

Bundlers are becoming the dominant force in transaction ordering and fee extraction, reshaping the entire gas market.

The future of gas markets runs through bundlers. The transition from user-signed transactions to intent-based architectures shifts fee market control from block producers to specialized entities that aggregate and execute user preferences.

Bundlers are not just relayers; they are market makers. Unlike simple mempool relays, bundlers like EigenLayer's EigenDA and AltLayer compete on execution quality, creating a secondary auction for block space that decouples from base-layer congestion.

This creates a new MEV supply chain. Proposers sell block space to the highest-bidding bundler, who then extracts value by optimizing the bundled transactions, a model pioneered by Flashbots' SUAVE.

Evidence: The ERC-4337 standard has catalyzed this shift, with bundlers like Pimlico and Stackup already processing millions of UserOperations, proving the economic viability of this new layer.

thesis-statement
THE MECHANISM

The Core Argument: Bundlers as Block Space Wholesalers

Bundlers are the new primary market makers for block space, arbitraging the gap between user intents and L1 execution.

Bundlers are wholesalers, not retailers. They purchase L1 block space in bulk, repackage user intents from ERC-4337 accounts, and sell execution at a markup. This creates a secondary gas market where competition shifts from individual users to professional operators.

The future gas market runs on intents. Unlike today's transaction-first model, intent-based architectures (UniswapX, CowSwap) separate declaration from execution. Bundlers profit by finding the optimal path across chains and liquidity venues, making MEV extraction a core service.

This commoditizes L1 execution. For users, Ethereum becomes a settlement commodity, abstracted away by bundlers competing on price and reliability. Protocols like Across and Socket already operate as specialized intent solvers; bundlers generalize this model for all user operations.

Evidence: The Pimlico and Alchemy bundler networks already process millions of UserOperations, proving the wholesale model works. Their profitability depends entirely on gas arbitrage efficiency, not protocol fees.

THE FUTURE OF GAS MARKETS RUNS THROUGH BUNDLERS

Gas Market Evolution: User-Pays vs. Bundler-Pays

Comparison of gas fee abstraction models, contrasting traditional direct payment with emerging bundler-subsidized and intent-based architectures.

Feature / MetricUser-Pays (Legacy)Bundler-Pays (ERC-4337)Intent-Based (ERC-4337 + Solvers)

Primary Fee Payer

End User (EOA)

Bundler (Pays on L1)

Solver / DApp (Subsidizes via MEV)

User Gas Abstraction

Required User Pre-Funding

Native L1 Gas Token

ERC-20 (via Paymaster)

None (Sponsored)

Fee Market Complexity

L1 Auction Only

Dual (L1 Auction + Bundler Margin)

Multi-Dimensional (L1 + Bundler + Solver Profit)

Typical Latency for Inclusion

< 12 sec (L1 Block Time)

2-30 sec (Bundler Queue)

< 2 sec (Pre-confirmations)

Max Extractable Value (MEV) Capture

By Validators / Searchers

By Bundlers

By Solvers (e.g., UniswapX, CowSwap, Across)

Key Infrastructure Dependency

RPC Node

Bundler Node (e.g., Stackup, Alchemy)

Solver Network & Intent Standard

Dominant Cost for End User

L1 Gas Price Volatility

Bundler Surcharge (5-20 bps)

Slippage / Routing Fee (10-50 bps)

deep-dive
THE BUNDLER FRONTIER

Deep Dive: The New Gas Risk Stack

Bundlers are becoming the primary risk managers and capital allocators in the post-4844 gas market.

Bundlers are gas traders. Their core business is buying block space on L1s and selling it to users on L2s. Profit is the spread between the L1 settlement cost and the user-paid fee, minus any subsidies.

Post-EIP-4844 economics invert risk. Blobs decouple data availability cost from execution gas, creating a volatile two-dimensional market. Bundlers must now hedge exposure to both blob basefee and regular gas price fluctuations.

MEV is the new subsidy. Protocols like EigenLayer and Flashbots SUAVE enable bundlers to monetize cross-domain MEV. This revenue subsidizes user fees, creating a negative-fee equilibrium for priority users.

Evidence: The top five bundlers on Arbitrum and Optimism already control over 60% of transaction flow. Their capital efficiency dictates network throughput and finality speed for end-users.

protocol-spotlight
THE FUTURE OF GAS MARKETS

Protocol Spotlight: The Bundler Landscape

Bundlers are the new market makers for block space, abstracting gas complexity and creating a competitive layer for user operations.

01

The Problem: Paymasters Subsidize, But Don't Optimize

Current paymasters like Pimlico and Biconomy abstract gas fees for users but operate as simple relayers. They don't compete on execution quality, leaving MEV and optimal routing on the table.\n- Single-Client Reliance: Typically tied to one builder or public mempool.\n- Passive Pricing: Accepts prevailing gas prices instead of finding the best one.

~$0
MEV Captured
1x
Route Efficiency
02

The Solution: Intent-Based Order Flow Auctions

Bundlers like UniswapX and CowSwap treat user operations as intents and auction them to specialized solvers. This creates a competitive gas market beyond the public mempool.\n- Solver Competition: Solvers (e.g., Across, 1inch) bid for the right to fulfill, driving down costs.\n- MEV Redistribution: Frontrunning and sandwich profits are captured and can be shared back with users.

-90%
Slippage
+EV
User Value
03

The Architecture: Modular Bundler Stacks

Next-gen bundlers disaggregate into specialized modules: a Client (Rundler), a Searcher Network, and a Builder. This mirrors the PBS (Proposer-Builder Separation) evolution of validators.\n- Rundler Standard: ERC-4337's bundler RPC enables client interoperability.\n- Specialized Searchers: Compete on cross-domain liquidity and arbitrage opportunities.

6+
Client Teams
~100ms
Auction Latency
04

The Endgame: Vertical Integration with Builders

The highest-value bundlers will integrate directly with block builders like Flashbots, Titan, and rsync. This bypasses the public mempool entirely, creating a private order flow channel with guaranteed inclusion.\n- Guaranteed Execution: Direct integration eliminates failed transactions.\n- Maximal Extractable Value: Full MEV capture from user intent to block production.

99.9%
Success Rate
10-100x
Order Flow Value
05

The Risk: Centralization of Censorship

If a few bundled order flow channels dominate (e.g., Coinbase's Smart Wallet + Base sequencer), they become powerful censorship vectors. Regulatory pressure could filter transactions at the bundler level.\n- Protocol-Level Risk: Contradicts Ethereum's credibly neutral base layer.\n- OFAC Compliance: Bundlers may be forced to screen and block sanctioned addresses.

>60%
Market Share Risk
1
Chokepoint
06

The Metric: Cost-Per-Successful-User-Operation (CPSUO)

The true KPI for bundlers isn't cheap gas, but reliability-adjusted cost. This includes the cost of failed ops, latency, and cross-domain settlement. It's the L1 gas price for the intent economy.\n- Holistic Pricing: Accounts for reverts, slippage, and multi-chain fees.\n- User Experience as a Metric: Drives competition beyond simple fee undercutting.

Key KPI
For VCs
$0.01-$1.00
CPSUO Range
counter-argument
THE ARCHITECTURE

Counter-Argument: Is This Just Re-Centralization?

The economic logic of bundling inevitably concentrates power, but new primitives are emerging to enforce decentralization.

Bundlers are natural monopolies. The role demands capital efficiency, sophisticated MEV extraction, and low-latency infrastructure, creating immense economies of scale that favor a few dominant players like Jito Labs on Solana or Flashbots on Ethereum.

The control point is transaction ordering. Whoever bundles transactions controls the proposer-builder separation (PBS) flow for the entire rollup, dictating MEV capture and censorship resistance. This centralizes a core blockchain function.

Permissionless entry is the antidote. Protocols like SUAVE aim to decentralize this by creating a shared, neutral marketplace for block building, separating the roles of transaction sourcing, execution, and block proposal.

Evidence: The top five searchers on Flashbots' MEV-Boost control over 60% of Ethereum blocks, demonstrating the rapid centralization of a similar, previously permissionless function.

risk-analysis
THE BUNDLER DILEMMA

Risk Analysis: What Could Go Wrong?

Bundlers are the new miners. Their market power creates systemic risks for user experience, censorship resistance, and protocol security.

01

The MEV-Censorship Nexus

Bundlers can front-run, censor, or reorder transactions for profit, undermining the neutrality of the network. This creates a single point of failure for permissionless access.

  • PBS for ERC-4337 is not yet standardized, leaving the door open for centralized sequencer-like behavior.
  • Staked dominance by a few players (e.g., Pimlico, Stackup) could lead to >51% of user ops being controlled by a cartel.
  • Regulatory pressure could force compliant bundlers to blacklist addresses, breaking DeFi's core promise.
>51%
Cartel Risk
0
PBS Standard
02

Economic Capture by L2 Sequencers

Layer 2 sequencers (e.g., Arbitrum, Optimism, Base) are the natural, dominant bundlers. This vertically integrates the stack and risks extractive pricing.

  • They can impose rent-seeking surcharges on top of L1 gas costs, hidden from users.
  • Creates vendor lock-in where the L2's native bundler is the only economically viable option, stifling competition.
  • Threatens the shared security model by making the L2 a mandatory, trusted intermediary for account abstraction.
100%
Initial Control
+30%
Potential Surcharge
03

Staking Centralization & Slashing Risks

Future bundler staking mechanisms, intended for security, could replicate Proof-of-Stake centralization problems. Faulty slashing logic could cause catastrophic, cascading failures.

  • Capital efficiency demands will favor large, institutional staking pools (e.g., Lido, Coinbase).
  • A buggy slashing condition could wipe out a major portion of the network's bonding collateral in one event.
  • Creates a too-big-to-fail dynamic where the protocol is afraid to enforce its own rules.
66%+
Pool Concentration
$1B+
Slashing Exposure
04

The Liquidity Fragmentation Trap

Paymasters require upfront capital to sponsor gas. If liquidity is siloed across competing networks (Polygon, Scroll, zkSync), it creates inefficiency and raises barriers to entry.

  • Capital lock-up reduces yield and increases costs for paymaster operators.
  • Cross-chain intent systems like UniswapX and Across could be forced to manage dozens of fragmented paymaster balances.
  • Results in worse rates for users as paymasters bake their cost of capital into the exchange rate.
20+
L2 Networks
-15%
Capital Efficiency
05

Smart Account Wallet Lock-In

Wallet providers (Safe, ZeroDev) may bundle their own bundler/paymaster services, creating a closed ecosystem. This defeats the interoperable purpose of ERC-4337.

  • Users face high switching costs if their wallet's backend services are proprietary.
  • Vendor-specific extensions could fragment the standard, similar to the EIP-1559 base fee vs. priority fee market.
  • Leads to rent extraction through hidden fees, as seen in traditional fintech.
5-10x
Switching Cost
1
Proprietary Stack
06

Regulatory Attack Surface Expansion

Bundlers and Paymasters are clear, licensable Financial Intermediaries in the eyes of regulators (e.g., SEC, MiCA). This puts the entire AA stack in the crosshairs.

  • KYC/AML requirements could be forced on bundlers, breaking privacy for all downstream users.
  • OFAC compliance would turn bundlers into global transaction censors.
  • Risk of coordinated shutdown of major regulated bundlers could paralyze smart account functionality.
100%
Intermediary Risk
Global
Jurisdiction
future-outlook
THE NEW GAS MARKET

Future Outlook: The Bundler as a Primitive

Bundlers are evolving from simple transaction aggregators into the core execution layer for a new, intent-centric financial system.

Bundlers become intent solvers. The current model of ordering transactions is a commodity. The future value accrues to bundlers that act as generalized solvers for user intents, competing on execution quality across DEXs like Uniswap, bridges like Across, and liquidity sources.

MEV shifts to the application layer. With standardized intent formats (ERC-4337, SUAVE), the extractable value moves from block builders to the solvers fulfilling complex cross-domain intents. This creates a more transparent and competitive market for execution.

The bundler is the new RPC endpoint. Applications will programmatically interface with specialized bundler networks for guaranteed execution outcomes, not just transaction broadcasting. This turns bundlers into critical infrastructure akin to Alchemy or Infura, but with skin in the game.

Evidence: The solver market in CowSwap and UniswapX, which already competes on filling user intents, processes over $2B monthly volume. This is the prototype for all future bundler activity.

takeaways
THE BUNDLER ECONOMY

Key Takeaways for Builders and Investors

The abstraction of gas markets via bundlers is creating a new, high-stakes infrastructure layer. Here's what matters.

01

The Problem: User Abstraction Creates a New MEV Surface

ERC-4337 and Paymasters abstract gas, but the bundler that executes the transaction controls the final block inclusion. This creates a new, centralized MEV extraction point.

  • Bundlers can front-run, censor, or reorder userOps for profit.
  • Reliance on a few dominant bundlers (e.g., Pimlico, Stackup) risks network fragility.
  • The $100M+ annual MEV opportunity shifts from searchers to bundlers.
$100M+
MEV at Stake
>60%
Market Share Risk
02

The Solution: Permissionless Bundling & SUAVE-Like Auctions

To prevent centralization, the bundler role must be commoditized through open networks and competitive auctions.

  • Permissionless bundler pools (like EigenLayer AVSs) can decentralize execution.
  • Intra-block auctions for userOp ordering, inspired by SUAVE, maximize user refunds.
  • Builders should integrate with multiple bundler providers and oracle-delivered gas estimates.
~500ms
Auction Latency
10-15%
Refund Boost
03

The Vertical: Bundlers as the New RPC Endpoint

Bundlers are evolving into full-stack service providers, competing directly with RPC giants like Alchemy and Infura.

  • Bundler-as-a-Service (BaaS) offerings bundle userOps, sponsor gas via paymasters, and manage key infrastructure.
  • Revenue shifts from simple API calls to taking a spread on gas fees and paymaster services.
  • The winning model will be the fastest, cheapest, most reliable bundler network, not the smartest wallet.
10x
Revenue/User
<1s
TX Finality
04

The Investment: Own the Paymaster, Not the Pipe

While bundlers are a low-margin commodity, paymaster services are high-margin, sticky, and defensible.

  • Paymasters (like Biconomy, Pimlico) control the gas subsidy logic and token sponsorship.
  • They enable gasless transactions, fee abstraction in stablecoins, and subscription models.
  • The real moat is user acquisition and developer SDK integration, not raw transaction processing.
70-80%
Gross Margin
$10B+
Stablecoin Gas Market
05

The Architecture: Intents Will Eat Bundlers

Pure ERC-4337 bundling is a transitional step. The endgame is intent-based architectures where users declare outcomes, not transactions.

  • UniswapX, CowSwap, Across are intent-based for swaps and bridges.
  • Future bundlers become generalized intent solvers, competing on fulfillment efficiency across chains.
  • This shifts competition from latency to solver algorithms and liquidity access.
2-5x
Better Execution
Multi-Chain
Native Scope
06

The Risk: Regulatory Capture of the Gas Layer

Bundlers and paymasters are natural points for financial surveillance and control, attracting regulator attention.

  • OFAC-compliant bundlers could censor sanctioned addresses at the infrastructure level.
  • Paymaster KYC for gas sponsorship creates a permissioned on-ramp.
  • Builders must design for credible neutrality and bundler diversity to mitigate this systemic risk.
High
Compliance Risk
Critical
Systemic Importance
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Bundlers Will Dominate Gas Markets, Ending EIP-1559 | ChainScore Blog