Supermajority Voting vs Simple Majority Voting

Requires a higher threshold (e.g., 66% or 75%) for approval. This creates a strong defense against contentious or malicious proposals, making it ideal for high-stakes protocol upgrades (like Ethereum's Shanghai upgrade) or treasury management (e.g., Uniswap's $1B+ treasury). It prioritizes network safety over speed.

Decisions pass with >50% of the vote. This enables faster iteration and adaptation, which is critical for rapidly evolving DeFi protocols (like Aave's frequent parameter adjustments) or community-driven NFT projects. It reduces governance paralysis but increases the risk of a slim majority forcing through changes.

Forces broader alignment among stakeholders. This model is essential for Layer 1 blockchains (e.g., Cosmos Hub's 66.7% threshold for parameter changes) and DAO-to-DAO agreements where deep, cross-community buy-in is required. It can slow down progress but builds more durable consensus.

Easier to achieve quorum and pass proposals. This suits applications with high voter apathy or smaller, focused DAOs where aligning a supermajority is impractical. It's common for grant distributions (like Gitcoin Grants) and content moderation decisions, where frequent, low-risk votes are needed.

Requires broad consensus: Changes need 66-80% approval, making protocol upgrades or treasury spends highly resistant to capture by a transient majority. This is critical for high-value DeFi protocols like MakerDAO (GSM pause requires 80%) or layer-1 governance where changes are irreversible.

Higher coordination cost: Achieving a 2/3+ threshold often leads to prolonged deliberation and voter apathy, slowing critical upgrades or emergency responses. This is a significant trade-off for fast-moving DeFi ecosystems or protocols needing rapid parameter adjustments (e.g., adjusting lending rates in a volatile market).

Lower decision threshold: With only 50%+1 needed, proposals pass faster, enabling rapid iteration. This is optimal for experimental dApps, NFT project DAOs, or grant committees like Uniswap Grants, where failing fast and adapting quickly is a feature.

Risk of malicious proposals: A narrow majority (potentially acquired via token borrowing or short-term voting blocs) can pass harmful changes. This is a severe risk for protocols with large treasuries (e.g., >$100M) or critical infrastructure where a single bad upgrade could lead to fund loss or network fork.

Faster decision-making: Proposals pass with >50% approval, enabling rapid protocol upgrades and parameter changes. This is critical for fast-moving DeFi protocols like Uniswap or Aave, where market conditions demand swift responses to exploits or opportunities.

Lower coordination threshold: Easier to achieve consensus, preventing governance paralysis. This matters for large, decentralized communities (e.g., MakerDAO's early governance) where achieving supermajorities can be prohibitively difficult for routine operational decisions.

Vulnerable to 51% attacks: A malicious actor or cartel with just over half the voting power can force through harmful proposals. This is a critical concern for protocols with high TVL, as seen in theoretical attacks on Compound or Curve governance.

Promotes low-quality proposals: Lower passing threshold can lead to spam or poorly-vetted changes that benefit a transient majority at the expense of long-term health. This necessitates robust pre-proposal discussion forums like Commonwealth or Snapshot.

Higher bar for critical changes: Requiring 66% or 75% approval protects against rash decisions and hostile takeovers. This is essential for high-stakes upgrades like consensus changes on Ethereum (which uses a supermajority for client adoption) or treasury management in DAOs like Arbitrum.

Enforces broad consensus: Forces proposers to build wider coalitions, typically resulting in more thoroughly debated and sustainable decisions. This matters for foundational protocol layers (e.g., Cosmos Hub parameter changes) where stability is paramount.

Risk of deadlock: Can lead to paralysis where even popular, necessary upgrades fail to reach the high threshold. This is a common critique of systems like Tezos, where significant proposals can stall despite majority support.

Discourages participation: If voters believe reaching the threshold is unlikely, turnout drops, further entrenching power with large holders. This creates a vicious cycle observed in some older DAOs, reducing decentralization.