Compound-style quorum vs simple majority voting

Higher Security & Sybil Resistance: Requires a minimum threshold of total voting power (quorum) to pass a proposal. This prevents a small, active minority from controlling the protocol, as seen in Compound's requirement of 400,000 COMP (4% of supply) for quorum. This matters for high-value DeFi protocols where governance controls billions in TVL.

Voter Apathy & Gridlock Risk: If quorum is not met, proposals fail regardless of majority support. This can lead to governance paralysis, as evidenced by failed proposals in early Aave and MakerDAO votes. This matters for rapidly evolving protocols needing timely upgrades or parameter adjustments.

Guaranteed Decision-Making & Agility: A proposal passes if it receives >50% of the votes cast, with no minimum participation threshold. This ensures the DAO can always act, enabling fast iterations. This matters for NFT communities or new L2s like Optimism's early governance, where speed of execution is critical.

Vulnerable to Low-Turnout Attacks: A highly motivated minority can pass proposals if overall participation is low. For example, a group with 26% of circulating tokens could pass a proposal if only 51% of tokens vote. This matters for established protocols with distributed token holders where consistent high turnout is not guaranteed.

Dynamic quorum threshold adjusts based on voter turnout, preventing low-turnout proposals from passing. This matters for high-value DeFi protocols like Aave or MakerDAO, where a small group should not control treasury decisions. The quorum scales from a baseline (e.g., 4%) to a maximum (e.g., 20%) as more votes are cast.

Incentivizes broad consensus by requiring significant tokenholder alignment for controversial proposals. This matters for contentious upgrades or parameter changes, as seen in Compound's COMP distribution adjustments. It forces proposers to build wider support, reducing governance attacks.

Fixed quorum (e.g., 51%) provides clear, predictable pass/fail criteria. This matters for fast-iteration DAOs or grant committees like Uniswap Grants, where rapid decision-making on non-critical items (funding, integrations) is prioritized over exhaustive consensus.

Reduces participation burden by not penalizing low turnout on non-controversial proposals. This matters for community-focused DAOs with many small proposals, where requiring high quorums for routine operations (like Snapshot signaling votes) leads to apathy and stalled progress.

Easier for large tokenholders to pass self-serving proposals with minimal broader support. This matters for protocols with concentrated token distribution, where a simple majority can enable whale-dominated decisions on fee changes or treasury withdrawals without community alignment.

Enforces meaningful participation: Requires a minimum threshold of voting power (e.g., 4% of total supply) for a proposal to pass. This prevents a tiny, unrepresentative group from making major decisions, protecting against governance attacks like the 2020 MakerDAO 'Executive Vote' exploit.

Creates decision paralysis: High quorum requirements (e.g., Aave's 320k $AAVE) can stall critical upgrades during low-participation periods. This forces teams to rely on centralized 'temperature checks' off-chain, undermining the on-chain governance promise.

Guarantees execution speed: Decisions are made purely by the majority of votes cast, with no minimum turnout. This is critical for fast-moving DeFi protocols like Uniswap or SushiSwap that need to react quickly to market opportunities or security vulnerabilities.

Vulnerable to low-turnout attacks: A proposal can pass with support from a tiny fraction of total token holders. This was demonstrated in the 2022 Beanstalk Farms exploit, where an attacker acquired 67% of the votes cast (not total supply) to pass a malicious proposal, draining $182M.