Gasless voting decouples cost from action. Users signal preferences without paying network fees, removing the natural economic friction that prevents spam and frivolous proposals in systems like Ethereum and Solana.
Why Gasless Voting Is a Double-Edged Sword for Security
An analysis of how meta-transaction infrastructure like Gelato, while solving for user onboarding, creates a critical new attack vector in DAO governance by introducing trusted relayers, compromising censorship-resistance and finality guarantees.
Introduction
Gasless voting abstracts transaction costs, creating a critical misalignment between voter action and protocol security.
This creates a subsidy attack surface. Protocols like Snapshot and Tally absorb meta-transaction costs, making governance participation a free public good vulnerable to Sybil and proposal spam, as seen in early DAO experiments.
The security model inverts. In fee-markets, stake-weighted voting aligns cost and influence. Gasless systems rely solely on token-weighted voting, which is cheaper to manipulate at scale without the gas fee barrier.
Evidence: The 2022 Optimism governance spam incident, where a single actor submitted hundreds of proposals, demonstrated the cost of abstracting gas. Mitigation required manual intervention and new proposal deposits.
The Core Contradiction
Gasless voting decouples participation cost from network security, creating a systemic vulnerability to low-cost governance attacks.
Gasless voting subsidizes apathy by removing the direct economic cost of submitting a governance transaction. This creates a principal-agent problem where voters bear zero financial stake in the consequences of their votes, unlike token holders who suffer from protocol degradation.
Delegation becomes a security liability. Systems like Snapshot and Tally enable effortless voting but concentrate power in a few delegates. This creates single points of failure where compromising a delegate's key or offering a small bribe can swing major proposals.
The cost of attack plummets. An attacker needs only to convince or compromise delegates controlling a voting quorum, a task far cheaper than acquiring and staking the underlying tokens. This exploits the incentive gap between voters and stakeholders.
Evidence: The 2022 Beanstalk governance attack demonstrated this flaw. An attacker borrowed funds, passed a malicious proposal via Snapshot, and drained $182M, all without ever owning the governance token. The protocol's gasless voting mechanism was the critical enabler.
The Relayer-Centric Stack
Delegating transaction sponsorship to relayers introduces critical trade-offs between user experience and protocol security.
The Censorship Vector
Relayers become centralized gatekeepers for governance. A malicious or compliant relayer can selectively exclude transactions, silently censoring votes.
- Key Risk: A single entity controlling a major relayer (e.g., Flashbots SUAVE) could blacklist proposals.
- Mitigation: Requires a robust, permissionless network of relayers, akin to Ethereum's PBS ideals.
The Subsidy Sustainability Problem
Gasless models rely on perpetual subsidies from treasuries or meta-transaction services like Biconomy or Gelato. This creates a hidden, uncapped cost center.
- Key Risk: Protocols face runaway OPEX if voter participation scales unexpectedly.
- Data Point: Major DAOs can incur $1M+ monthly in relay costs during heated governance seasons.
The Sybil-For-Hire Economy
Removing the gas cost barrier makes vote buying and Sybil attack coordination trivially cheap. Adversaries only pay for the vote signature, not the gas.
- Key Risk: Enables low-cost governance attacks where the cost to sway a vote plummets.
- Example: An attacker could fund thousands of Gitcoin Passport-verified identities for pennies per vote.
Solution: Staked Relayer Networks
Force relayers to post substantial economic bonds (e.g., via EigenLayer or Cosmos SDK modules) that can be slashed for censorship or malfeasance.
- Key Benefit: Aligns relayer incentives with protocol liveness and censorship resistance.
- Trade-off: Increases relayer operational cost, potentially reducing network size and increasing fees.
Solution: Hybrid Fee Markets
Implement a two-tier system where users pay a minimal priority fee, while the protocol subsidizes the base fee. This preserves a spam-resistance signal.
- Key Benefit: Maintains a cryptoeconomic cost for participation, deterring pure Sybil attacks.
- Implementation: Similar to EIP-4844 blob fee market, separating base and priority components.
Solution: Proof-of-Participation Attestations
Leverage zero-knowledge proofs (e.g., zkSNARKs via RISC Zero) to allow users to prove unique personhood or stake ownership without revealing identity, paid for by the relayer.
- Key Benefit: Decouples Sybil resistance from gas payment, moving it to an attestation layer like Worldcoin or BrightID.
- Complexity: Introduces reliance on external, often centralized, identity oracles.
Attack Vector Comparison: Native vs. Gasless Voting
A side-by-side analysis of the core security properties and attack surfaces for on-chain voting versus gasless, intent-based voting systems like Snapshot and Tally.
| Attack Vector / Property | Native On-Chain Voting | Gasless Off-Chain Voting | Hybrid (e.g., SafeSnap) |
|---|---|---|---|
Sybil Attack Resistance | Directly tied to token stake | Relies on off-chain sybil detection (e.g., Gitcoin Passport, BrightID) | Relies on off-chain sybil detection |
Transaction Cost Burden | Voter pays gas (e.g., $10-100) | Relayer pays gas, voter pays zero | Voter pays final execution gas only |
Vote Buying Visibility | On-chain, transparent, detectable | Off-chain, opaque, hard to detect | Off-chain aggregation, on-chain reveal |
Execution Finality Lag | Vote = Execution, 0 blocks | Multi-step process with 1-7 day delay | Time-locked execution after vote finalizes |
Censorship Resistance | High (if base L1 is uncensorable) | Low (relayer can censor signatures) | Medium (dependent on executor) |
Maximum Voter Participation | Capped by gas budget & wallet UX | Theoretically unlimited | Capped by final execution gas budget |
Smart Contract Attack Surface | Voting contract only | Voting contract + signature aggregator + relayer network | Voting contract + oracle (e.g., UMA) + executor |
The Slippery Slope of Trusted Finality
Gasless voting outsources consensus security to a trusted third party, creating a systemic vulnerability.
Gasless voting eliminates Sybil resistance. Paying gas is the primary cost for on-chain identity. Removing it requires a centralized validator to filter spam, shifting the security model from economic to social.
The trusted sequencer becomes the attack vector. Systems like Arbitrum's initial design and early Optimism rely on a single entity for transaction ordering. A compromised sequencer can censor or reorder votes, breaking governance.
This creates a liveness-security tradeoff. Projects like Polygon's PoS chain and BNB Chain prioritize low-cost voting but inherit the security assumptions of their small validator sets, which are easier to corrupt than a decentralized miner network.
Evidence: The 2022 Nomad Bridge hack exploited a trusted upgrade mechanism approved by a small, off-chain multisig, demonstrating how trusted finality fails.
Concrete Risks & Exploit Scenarios
Removing gas fees from governance lowers participation barriers but introduces novel attack vectors that can undermine the entire system.
The Sybil Manufacturing Plant
Gasless voting eliminates the primary economic cost of creating governance influence. Attackers can spin up thousands of pseudo-anonymous wallets at near-zero cost to execute a 51% attack on a proposal. This fundamentally breaks the 1-token-1-vote assumption, turning governance into a contest of wallet generation speed.
The Relayer Centralization Bottleneck
Users rely on a trusted relayer network (e.g., Gelato, Biconomy) to pay gas and submit votes. This creates a single point of censorship and failure. A malicious or compromised relayer can:
- Censor votes for or against specific proposals.
- Front-run or manipulate vote ordering.
- Go offline, halting governance during critical periods.
The MEV-Governance Feedback Loop
Gasless vote transactions are public in the mempool before being bundled. This creates a new MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) opportunity. Searchers can analyze voting patterns and:
- Front-run governance token buys/sells based on likely outcomes.
- Sandwich attack liquidity around proposal execution.
- Bribe voters in real-time to change votes, corrupting the process.
Solution: Proof-of-Personhood & Costly Signals
Mitigation requires reintroducing a non-monetary but costly barrier to entry. Effective models include:
- Proof-of-Personhood (World ID, BrightID) to limit one vote per human.
- Proof-of-Stake with Lockup requiring time-locked capital to vote.
- Futarchy & Prediction Markets to shift focus to skin-in-the-game forecasting rather than raw vote count.
The Rebuttal: "But It's Just Gas Sponsorship"
Gasless voting abstracts gas costs, creating systemic risks that outweigh the user experience benefits.
Gasless voting removes economic friction for users but introduces a critical principal-agent problem. The entity sponsoring the gas (e.g., a protocol treasury, a foundation) now controls the economic cost of governance participation, which is a core security mechanism.
This creates a subsidy attack vector. A malicious actor can spam governance with low-cost, high-volume proposals to drown out legitimate discourse or force a treasury drain, as the sponsor bears the financial brunt. This is a known attack mitigated by gas fees in systems like Ethereum mainnet.
Compare to gas sponsorship in DeFi. Protocols like UniswapX or Particle Network sponsor gas for intents, but the economic outcome (swap execution) is the user's liability. In governance, the sponsored action (a vote) directly impacts protocol ownership and treasury control, creating misaligned incentives.
Evidence: The 2022 Optimism Governance incident, where a flawed proposal triggered massive voting, demonstrated how gasless mechanics can enable governance spam. While not malicious, it highlighted the system's fragility when participation is artificially cheap.
Key Takeaways for Protocol Architects
Gasless voting boosts participation but introduces novel attack vectors that can undermine governance integrity.
The Sybil Attack Amplifier
Gasless voting removes the primary economic cost of creating governance power, making Sybil attacks trivial. This forces a dangerous reliance on centralized identity providers like Gitcoin Passport or Worldcoin.
- Key Risk: Delegates with 1M+ votes can be manufactured for pennies.
- Key Mitigation: Must layer proof-of-personhood with stake-weighted checks.
The Meta-Governance Liquidity Attack
Protocols like Aave and Compound that use tokenized votes (e.g., aTokens, cTokens) become vulnerable. Attackers can borrow vast voting power without economic skin in the game, execute a malicious proposal, and exit.
- Key Vector: Flash loan $100M+ in governance tokens, vote, repay.
- Key Defense: Implement vote latency or bonding periods to disincentivize short-term attacks.
Relayer Centralization & Censorship
Gasless transactions require a relayer network (e.g., Gelato, Biconomy). This creates a single point of failure. A malicious or coerced relayer can censor votes or front-run governance transactions.
- Key Dependency: Governance security inherits the ~5 major relayers' integrity.
- Key Solution: Design for relayer diversity and permissionless relay fallbacks.
Voter Apathy & The Lazy Delegation Problem
Zero-cost voting increases low-quality participation. Users delegate to the default option or influencers without diligence, creating voting cartels. This centralizes power with a few delegates like "stakefish" or "Figment".
- Key Metric: >60% of votes often follow top 3 delegates.
- Key Design: Implement delegate incentives and vote delegation expiry.
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