Why MEV Resistance Is a Core Censorship Issue

Censorship is economic exclusion. Validators and block builders exclude transactions not for political reasons, but because they are unprofitable to include. This creates a two-tiered transaction system where users who cannot pay for priority see indefinite delays.

MEV is the attack vector. Searchers and builders use arbitrage and liquidation bots to extract value, which directly dictates transaction ordering. Protocols like Flashbots' MEV-Boost formalize this, making censorship a predictable, profitable service.

Resistance is a property of design. A chain's resistance is determined by its consensus and block construction rules. Ethereum's proposer-builder separation (PBS) creates a censorship point; chains with threshold encryption or fair ordering like Shutter Network or Fuel, architect against it.

Evidence: Over 90% of Ethereum blocks are built via MEV-Boost relays, which have demonstrated the capability to censor OFAC-sanctioned addresses by excluding their transactions from blocks—a proof-of-concept for systemic failure.

MEV extraction requires privileged access. Validators and specialized searchers control the transaction ordering that defines MEV. This creates a permissioned relay layer where block builders like Flashbots and bloXroute act as gatekeepers.

Censorship is a feature, not a bug. The dominant PBS (Proposer-Builder Separation) model centralizes ordering power. Builders exclude sanctioned transactions to comply with OFAC, proving economic incentives override decentralization.

Resistance is a core protocol property. MEV-resistant designs like CowSwap and UniswapX with intents shift power from validators to users. This is not an optimization; it is a fundamental re-architecting of transaction fairness.

Evidence: Over 70% of Ethereum blocks post-Merge are OFAC-compliant, built by entities like Flashbots. This demonstrates that permissionless consensus is compromised by a permissioned execution layer.

Validators are rational economic actors who maximize revenue by ordering transactions. This is not a bug; it's the logical outcome of permissionless, proof-of-stake economics where block space is a commodity.

Censorship is a dominant MEV strategy. Excluding certain transactions (e.g., arbitrage opportunities for a rival searcher) or frontrunning user swaps on Uniswap is more profitable than fair inclusion. Tools like Flashbots Protect formalize this.

The 'neutral chain' is a myth. Protocols like Osmosis with threshold encryption or CoW Swap with batch auctions exist because base-layer Ethereum validators cannot be trusted for fair ordering. Their profit motive directly conflicts with user fairness.

Evidence: Over 90% of Ethereum blocks are built by MEV-Boost relays, creating centralized points for censorship. Validator pools like Lido and Coinbase follow the most profitable flow, not the most neutral one.

MEV is a censorship vector. The technical capability to reorder, insert, or censor transactions for profit is identical to the capability required for political or regulatory censorship. Builders on Flashbots MEV-Boost or operators using tools like Shutter Network's encrypted mempool control this power.

Private orderflow centralizes power. Protocols like UniswapX and CowSwap route intents to private solvers, creating a black-box financial system. This opaque orderflow is a single point of failure for regulators or malicious actors to pressure for exclusion.

The precedent is set. The 2022 OFAC sanctions on Tornado Cash demonstrated that validators will censor transactions when compelled. MEV infrastructure makes this censorship scalable, efficient, and profitable, moving from blunt blockspace denial to surgical extraction.

Evidence: Over 45% of Ethereum blocks post-Merge were OFAC-compliant at the sanction's peak, proving validators will censor. MEV-Boost relays now filter transactions, showing the slippery slope from profit to policy is real.

MEV creates censorship incentives. The most profitable block-building strategy for a validator is to reorder or exclude transactions based on extractable value, not network health. This directly conflicts with the principle of permissionless inclusion.

Free markets require neutral infrastructure. A validator's profit motive is not the problem; the problem is that the block production market is not neutral. It is a monopoly granted to the block proposer, who can abuse it.

This is a protocol-level failure. Comparing MEV to traditional HFT is flawed. In TradFi, the exchange infrastructure is neutral. In crypto, the infrastructure is the market maker, creating an inherent conflict of interest.

Evidence: Flashbots' dominance in Ethereum block building demonstrates centralization. When a single entity like Flashbots or bloXroute controls a majority of block space, they gain de facto power to censor transactions at the protocol layer.