Why MEV is a Symptom of Failed Information Aggregation

Block producers (L2 sequencers, validators) act as mandatory information gatekeepers. They see the full order flow and can front-run, back-run, or censor transactions before they are globally known. This creates a single point of failure for fairness and efficiency.

• Creates predictable arbitrage and sandwich attack patterns.
• Leads to centralization pressure on block production.
• Results in ~$1B+ in extracted value annually, paid by end-users.

Instead of broadcasting precise transactions, users submit declarative intents (e.g., "Swap X for Y at the best rate"). Solvers like those in UniswapX and CowSwap compete off-chain to find optimal execution paths, aggregating fragmented liquidity and information.

• Shifts competition from transaction ordering to execution quality.
• Enables batch processing and cross-domain coordination via protocols like Across and LayerZero.
• Can reduce user costs by 10-50% versus vanilla AMM swaps.

Decoupling transaction ordering from block building is critical. Networks like Espresso and Astria provide a neutral, shared sequencing layer. This allows for fast preconfirmations with economic security, giving users and dapps predictable outcomes before finalization.

• Reduces latency for cross-domain apps from minutes to ~500ms.
• Democratizes block building, enabling a competitive marketplace for execution.
• Mitigates censorship risk by separating the roles of orderer and executor.

The final stage treats state updates as a commodity. Projects like Flashbots SUAVE envision a decentralized block builder network where specialized actors compete to solve complex optimization problems across chains, paying for exclusive access to information flows.

• Monetizes information directly, not just its exploitation.
• Creates a verifiable delay between seeing and acting on data.
• Aims to make MEV neutral or positive-sum through efficient redistribution.

Eliminates MEV by matching orders off-chain before settlement, turning the traditional DEX model inside out.

• Batch Auctions aggregate liquidity and discover a single clearing price for all assets.
• Surplus Maximization redirects traditional MEV (like arbitrage) back to users as ~$200M+ in captured surplus.
• Solver Competition externalizes block-building complexity, creating a market for efficient execution.

Reframes the user's problem from 'swap on AMM' to 'get the best price'. It's an intent-based protocol.

• Fill or Kill Orders specify an outcome; competing fillers (solvers) compete to fulfill it, abstracting away liquidity sources.
• Gasless Swaps shift transaction cost and complexity to professional fillers, improving UX.
• Cross-Chain Native design treats layerzero and CCIP as commodities, making fragmentation irrelevant to the user.

Treats bridging as an information problem. Users post intents; competing relayers fulfill them using a unified liquidity pool.

• Optimistic Verification allows instant from-chain guarantees with ~12 min challenge period, reducing capital lock-up vs. canonical bridges.
• Single Pool Model aggregates liquidity for all chains, achieving ~$200M TVL with superior capital efficiency.
• Unified Auction lets relayers bid for the right to settle the intent, compressing MEV into better user pricing.

MEV exists because no single entity sees the complete market state. Block builders have a privileged, centralized view.

• Information Asymmetry between users, searchers, and builders creates arbitrageable gaps.
• Latency Arms Race leads to ~$1B+ annual extractable value and network centralization.
• Inefficient Pricing on isolated AMM pools and bridges is the low-hanging fruit for generalized frontrunners.

Shift from transaction-based (how) to outcome-based (what) systems. This rebuilds the information aggregation layer.

• User Declares Goal: 'Sell X for at least Y price on any chain.'
• Solvers Compete: A decentralized network (CowSwap solvers, UniswapX fillers) computes optimal execution path.
• Market for Truth: The winning solver's proof of optimal execution becomes the new consensus primitive.

The 'antidote' protocols are not eliminating value extraction but democratizing and productizing it.

• From Extractable to Capturable: Value that was seized by searchers is now competed for and returned to users.
• Protocols as MEV Markets: CowSwap, UniswapX, and Across operate as continuous batch auctions for block space and cross-chain state.
• New Stack Emerges: Intent propagation networks, solver networks, and shared sequencers become the new infrastructure layer.

Atomic composability is broken across chains and rollups. This creates latency arbitrage and forces users to broadcast public transactions, broadcasting their intent.

• Latency races for cross-domain arbitrage create ~$1B+ in annual MEV.
• Users must pre-fund wallets on multiple chains, fragmenting capital.
• Bridges like LayerZero and Axelar solve data transfer, not intent execution.

Shift from transaction-based (how) to intent-based (what) models. Users declare desired outcomes; a network of solvers competes to fulfill them optimally.

• UniswapX and CowSwap pioneered this for swaps, reducing frontrunning.
• Protocols like Across and Anoma generalize the model for cross-chain flows.
• Enables gasless UX, better price discovery, and MEV recapture for users.

A competitive solver network aggregates liquidity and information to fulfill user intents. This turns MEV from a parasitic extractor into a competitive service fee.

• Solvers perform off-chain optimization across DEXs, bridges, and private mempools.
• Chainscore and SUAVE aim to be decentralized solver blockchains.
• Creates a market for execution quality, not just block space.

The ultimate fix is a decentralized information layer where state is aggregated before settlement. MEV becomes the cost of compressing this information.

• Shared sequencers (e.g., Espresso, Astria) provide atomic cross-rollup blocks.
• Threshold Encryption (e.g., Shutter Network) hides intent until execution.
• This moves competition from latency to algorithmic efficiency.