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mev-the-hidden-tax-of-crypto
Blog

zk-SNARKs Are a More Potent MEV Solution Than PBS

Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) optimizes MEV extraction, treating it as inevitable. Zero-knowledge proofs offer a more radical cure: preventing MEV at the protocol level through cryptographic privacy. This is the architectural shift that matters.

introduction
THE WRONG FOCUS

Introduction: The MEV Management Fallacy

Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) merely redistributes MEV profits, while zk-SNARKs offer a path to eliminate the extractable value itself.

PBS is a governance tool, not a technical solution. It centralizes block building into professional searcher-builder cartels like Flashbots, creating a new political layer that controls transaction ordering.

zk-SNARKs enable private execution. Protocols like Aztec and Penumbra use zero-knowledge proofs to hide transaction details from the public mempool, preventing frontrunning and sandwich attacks at the source.

The fallacy is accepting extraction. PBS frameworks like MEV-Boost optimize for profit sharing, while zk-rollups like zkSync and StarkNet structurally reduce the attack surface by batching and proving transactions off-chain.

Evidence: Flashbots controls >90% of Ethereum blocks post-Merge, proving PBS entrenches, not dismantles, the extractive infrastructure. In contrast, private DEX volumes on Aztec demonstrate demand for MEV-free execution.

thesis-statement
THE ARCHITECTURAL IMPERATIVE

Thesis: Prevention Beats Management

zk-SNARKs structurally prevent MEV extraction at the consensus layer, making them a superior long-term solution to Proposer-Builder Separation's managerial approach.

Proactive prevention defeats reactive management. PBS systems like those on Ethereum and Flashbots' SUAVE attempt to manage MEV by creating a market for it. This adds complexity and fails to eliminate the underlying attack surface, merely shifting the rent-seeking actors. Prevention via cryptographic finality removes the attack vector entirely.

zk-SNARKs enforce transaction atomicity. In a zk-rollup like zkSync or StarkNet, the sequencer produces a validity proof for the entire state transition. This cryptographic proof makes the ordering of transactions inside the rollup block irrelevant to its validity, destroying the economic value of reordering for an external proposer.

PBS commoditizes trust, zk commoditizes verification. PBS assumes adversarial builders and uses auctions to reveal their value. zk-SNARKs assume nothing; the proof is the trust. This architectural shift moves the security boundary from social/economic games (auctions) to mathematical certainty, a more robust foundation.

Evidence: The PBS model still permits cross-domain MEV, as seen in bridges like Across and LayerZero. A zk-rollup's cryptographic batch finality prevents this, as no external entity can reorder or censor transactions after the proof is generated and verified on L1.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Architectural Comparison: PBS vs. zk-SNARKs on MEV

A first-principles comparison of the two dominant paradigms for managing MEV, evaluating their core architectural trade-offs for protocol designers.

Architectural FeatureProposer-Builder Separation (PBS)zk-SNARK-Based Sequencing

Core Mechanism

Market-based auction for block space

Cryptographic proof of fair ordering

Primary Goal

Democratize MEV extraction via specialization

Eliminate trust in centralized sequencers

MEV Redistribution

To builders/proposers via bids

To users/protocol via encrypted mempools (e.g., SUAVE, Fairblock)

Latency to Finality

~12 minutes (Ethereum slot + 2 epochs)

< 1 second (with recursive proofs)

Trust Assumptions

Honest majority of validators (1-of-N trust)

Cryptographic (trustless verification)

Censorship Resistance

Weak (relies on relay ethics)

Strong (enforced by protocol rules)

Implementation Complexity

High (requires network-wide consensus changes)

Extreme (novel cryptography & circuit design)

State of Deployment

Live on Ethereum (e.g., Flashbots, bloXroute)

Research/Testnet (e.g., Espresso, Astria)

deep-dive
THE ARCHITECTURE

Deep Dive: How zk-SNARKs Dissolve MEV

zk-SNARKs eliminate MEV by cryptographically proving transaction validity without revealing execution details to proposers.

Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) fails because builders still see the mempool. zk-SNARKs enforce execution integrity proofs, making the transaction's effect the only public data. This removes the information asymmetry that enables front-running and sandwich attacks.

The counter-intuitive power is that zk-SNARKs make MEV extraction a negative-sum game. Searchers cannot profitably analyze opaque proofs. This contrasts with PBS, which merely professionalizes extraction via entities like Flashbots and bloXroute.

Real-world evidence comes from Aztec and Penumbra. Aztec's private DeFi hides amounts and assets, while Penumbra's shielded swaps batch proofs to prevent DEX arbitrage. Their architectures prove MEV is a function of information leakage.

counter-argument
THE ARCHITECTURAL TRADEOFF

Counter-Argument: The PBS Defense (And Its Flaws)

Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) addresses MEV centralization but introduces new systemic risks that zk-SNARKs inherently avoid.

PBS centralizes trust in builders and relays. The separation creates a new oligopoly where a few professional builders like Flashbots and bloXroute control transaction ordering. This shifts power from validators to a new, less accountable layer.

zk-SNARKs eliminate ordering power. A system like Espresso or Aztec encrypts transactions before submission, rendering the builder's role moot. PBS manages a problem that cryptographic privacy directly solves.

Relays are a single point of failure. The PBS model depends on honest relays to pass blocks from builders to proposers. This creates a censorship vector and a new attack surface that zk-based systems do not require.

Evidence: Ethereum's PBS roadmap includes enshrined PBS to mitigate these risks, acknowledging the model's fragility. This is a complex, long-term fix for a problem zk-proofs prevent at the protocol layer.

protocol-spotlight
ZK-PROVABLE EXECUTION

Protocol Spotlight: Builders of the Post-MEV Future

Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) manages MEV; zk-SNARKs aim to eliminate its negative externalities by cryptographically proving correct execution.

01

The Problem: PBS is a Market, Not a Solution

PBS outsources block building to a competitive auction, but does not solve MEV's core issues: user exploitation and centralization risk.\n- Creates builder cartels controlling >80% of Ethereum blocks\n- Shifts, doesn't eliminate, value extraction from users\n- Relies on trust in the winning builder's execution

>80%
Cartel Control
Trust-Based
Security Model
02

The Solution: zk-SNARKs Enforce Honest Execution

A zk-rollup or co-processor generates a cryptographic proof that a state transition followed protocol rules, making malicious MEV extraction provably impossible.\n- Cryptographic guarantee of correct execution\n- Removes trust from builders/sequencers\n- Enables enforceable SLAs for maximum extractable value (MEV)

100%
Provable Correctness
Trustless
Verification
03

The Architecture: Private Mempools + ZK Proofs

Projects like Espresso Systems and Aztec combine encrypted transaction flow with succinct verification, preempting front-running.\n- Shielded mempools prevent information leakage\n- Proof of correct ordering prevents manipulation\n- Enables fair, efficient DEXs like a private CowSwap

~0ms
Front-Run Window
Encrypted
Flow
04

The Metric: Prover Cost vs. Extracted Value

The economic viability hinges on proving cost falling below the value of prevented MEV. With ~$1B+ annual MEV on Ethereum, the margin is wide.\n- Prover cost: Targets <$0.01 per transaction\n- Prevented MEV: Saves users >$100M+ annually\n- Hardware acceleration from Cysic, Ingonyama is key

1B+
$ Annual MEV
<$0.01
Target Cost/Tx
05

The Implementation: zkRollups as First Adopters

zkSync, Scroll, and Starknet have the infrastructure to integrate execution proofs, turning their sequencers into verifiable neutral parties.\n- Existing proving infrastructure can be repurposed\n- Native L2 MEV can be eliminated first\n- Bridges to L1 become more secure against MEV attacks

Native
Proving Stack
L2 -> L1
Attack Surface
06

The Future: Programmable Cryptography for MEV

Frameworks like Noir and Jolt enable custom zero-knowledge circuits to define and enforce fair execution policies, moving beyond simple correctness.\n- Circuit for 'fair ordering' can be codified\n- Custom MEV-resistance per application (e.g., UniswapX)\n- Endgame: MEV becomes a protocol feature, not a bug

Programmable
Fairness
App-Specific
Policies
risk-analysis
THE PROTOCOL'S DILEMMA

Risk Analysis: The zk-SNARK Path Isn't Easy

While zk-SNARKs promise a superior MEV-resistant future, the engineering and economic hurdles are monumental.

01

The Prover Monopoly Problem

High-performance zk-SNARK proving is a capital-intensive hardware race, risking centralization.\n- Dominant players like Ulvetanna and Ingonyama control specialized hardware (FPGAs/ASICs).\n- Creates a single point of failure and potential censorship, mirroring today's relay dominance in PBS.

>90%
Hardware Share
$1M+
Setup Cost
02

The Latency vs. Finality Trap

Generating a validity proof adds unavoidable latency, conflicting with high-frequency DeFi.\n- Proof generation time can be ~2-10 seconds even with optimized circuits.\n- This creates a new MEV surface in the pre-proof ordering window, which PBS (via SUAVE) explicitly optimizes for speed.

2-10s
Proof Time
~500ms
PBS Target
03

Economic Sustainability of Force-Inclusion

zk-SNARKs enable force-inclusion of censored transactions, but who pays?\n- The protocol must subsidize proofs for worthless transactions, creating a public goods funding crisis.\n- Contrast with PBS auctions, where searcbers internalize costs, creating a self-sustaining economic loop.

$0
Tx Value
$0.10+
Proof Cost
04

The Cross-Chain Fragmentation Risk

A zk-SNARK solution on one chain does nothing for MEV on connected chains.\n- MEV bridges like Across and LayerZero's OFT will extract value at the boundary.\n- A holistic solution requires a universal settlement layer (e.g., Ethereum via PBS) or a new interoperability standard.

50+
Active Chains
$100M+
Bridged MEV
05

Circuit Complexity & Auditability

Every new application (DEX, lending) requires a custom, audited zk-circuit.\n- A single bug is a total system failure, unlike PBS which operates on well-understood EVM semantics.\n- This creates a massive innovation drag compared to the compositional ease of intents-based systems like UniswapX.

6-12mo
Audit Timeline
$1M+
Security Cost
06

The Political Risk of Forced Privacy

zk-SNARKs enforce privacy by default, which regulators view as a red flag.\n- This invites aggressive scrutiny (see Tornado Cash), while PBS with encrypted mempools (e.g., Shutter Network) offers a more politically viable optional privacy model.\n- Adoption requires navigating a compliance minefield that PBS-based systems can sidestep.

OFAC
Compliance Hurdle
Optional
PBS Model
future-outlook
THE PROOF-DRIVEN PIPELINE

Future Outlook: The Inevitable Convergence

Proposer-Builder Separation is a market-based patch; zero-knowledge proofs are a cryptographic solution that will subsume it.

PBS is a market failure. It outsources censorship resistance to a competitive auction, creating a trusted relay layer vulnerable to regulatory capture, as seen with OFAC compliance on Flashbots. zk-SNARKs enforce correctness cryptographically, removing the need to trust builder or proposer incentives.

The end-state is a zk-rollup of the mempool. Projects like SUAVE envision this, but its current design relies on PBS economics. A pure zk-based system, using proof systems like Plonky2 or Nova, will prove the entire transaction ordering and execution path, making MEV extraction transparent and verifiable.

This convergence kills two birds. It solves the data availability problem for builders by committing to pre-states in proofs, and it solves the credible neutrality problem for proposers by making the chain's liveness independent of builder cartels. The architectural pressure from EigenLayer and AltLayer accelerates this shift.

Evidence: The cost to generate a ZK proof for a block of transactions on Ethereum today is under $0.01. When this cost drops below the profit margin of a typical MEV bundle, PBS becomes economically obsolete.

takeaways
ZK-PROOFED MEV

Key Takeaways

Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) manages MEV; zk-SNARKs can eliminate its negative externalities.

01

The Problem: PBS is a Market, Not a Solution

PBS (e.g., Ethereum's MEV-Boost) formalizes the MEV supply chain but doesn't reduce extraction. It's a governance tool that centralizes power in builders and relays, creating new trust assumptions and censorship vectors.

  • Centralizes Power: Top 3 builders control >80% of blocks.
  • Adds Latency: Introduces ~1-12 second relay delays.
  • Opaque Auctions: Bids and transaction ordering are hidden from the public mempool.
>80%
Builder Control
~12s
Added Latency
02

The Solution: Zero-Knowledge Proof of Execution

zk-SNARKs allow a prover (sequencer/validator) to generate a cryptographic proof that a block was constructed correctly according to a predefined, fair ordering rule (e.g., First-Come-First-Served). The network only needs to verify the proof, not re-execute the transactions.

  • Enforceable Fairness: Rules like FCFS or FIFO are cryptographically guaranteed.
  • No Trusted Builders: Anyone can generate a valid block; the best proof wins.
  • Reduced Latency: Finality is based on proof verification speed, not multi-party relay hops.
Cryptographic
Guarantee
~1s
Verification
03

The Result: MEV Becomes a Protocol Resource

With fair ordering enforced by zk proofs, arbitrage and liquidation value isn't extracted by third parties. This value can be captured by the protocol itself (e.g., via a network fee) or redistributed to users, aligning incentives.

  • Redistributable Value: Billions in annual MEV can fund protocol development or user rebates.
  • User Privacy: Front-running and sandwich attacks become computationally impossible.
  • Simplified Stack: Eliminates the need for complex PBS infrastructure, relays, and trusted builder sets.
$1B+
Annual Value
0
Sandwich Risk
04

The Hurdle: Proving Overhead & Adoption

Generating zk-SNARKs for full block execution is computationally intensive (~minutes). Widespread adoption requires specialized hardware (zk-ASICs/GPUs) and integration at the consensus layer, competing with entrenched PBS ecosystems.

  • Hardware Race: Proof generation time is the new bottleneck, favoring specialized provers.
  • Ecosystem Inertia: Existing MEV supply chain (builders, searchers, relays) has significant economic stake in the current model.
  • Rule Definition: Cryptographically defining "fair" ordering is a complex game-theoretic challenge.
Minutes
Proof Gen
High
Barrier to Entry
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zk-SNARKs vs PBS: The Superior MEV Solution | ChainScore Blog