PBS is the new consensus. The primary role of a base layer shifts from execution to ordering and settlement, making proposer-builder separation the fundamental protocol for coordinating value flow across rollups, appchains, and L2s.
The Future of Proposer-Builder Separation in a Multi-Layer World
PBS is no longer an L1-only problem. This analysis argues for cross-layer PBS as the critical infrastructure for managing MEV across rollups and the settlement layer, examining protocols, risks, and the future architecture.
Introduction: The L1 Illusion is Over
The monolithic L1 is dead; the future is a fragmented, specialized multi-layer ecosystem where PBS is the critical coordination mechanism.
Monolithic L1s are inefficient. A single chain cannot optimize for security, scalability, and sovereignty simultaneously. Specialized layers like Arbitrum for execution, Celestia for data availability, and EigenLayer for security prove modular architectures win.
Builders become cross-chain orchestrators. Entities like Flashbots and bloXroute will evolve from block builders to cross-domain sequencers, optimizing MEV extraction and transaction ordering across Ethereum, Arbitrum, and Optimism in a single bundle.
Evidence: Over 90% of Ethereum's value is now settled on L2s. Arbitrum and Optimism collectively process more transactions than Ethereum L1, proving demand has irreversibly shifted to the execution layer.
Core Thesis: PBS Must Become a Cross-Layer Coordination Layer
Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) must evolve from a single-chain auction into a cross-layer coordination protocol to prevent systemic fragmentation and extractive MEV.
Single-chain PBS is insufficient for a modular stack. Isolated PBS on Ethereum, Arbitrum, and Solana creates fragmented liquidity and cross-domain MEV leakage. Builders cannot coordinate execution across layers, forcing users into inefficient, high-slippage routes.
Cross-layer PBS is a coordination primitive. A unified PBS layer enables builders to atomically settle bundles across Ethereum, Optimism, and Polygon zkEVM. This turns interop protocols like Across and LayerZero into execution venues, not just message bridges.
The alternative is extractive fragmentation. Without it, vertical integration wins. Rollup sequencers like Arbitrum and zkSync will internalize cross-chain MEV, creating walled gardens of value capture that undermine the open, composable ecosystem.
Evidence: UniswapX and CowSwap already demonstrate intent-based, cross-domain settlement. A generalized PBS layer formalizes this, allowing builders to compete on sourcing liquidity from Celestia DA or EigenLayer AVS data, not just local mempools.
Key Trends Forcing the Shift to Cross-Domain PBS
Single-domain PBS is insufficient for a world where value and execution fragment across rollups, appchains, and L1s.
The Fragmented Liquidity Problem
Rollup-native PBS (e.g., Arbitrum Nova, Optimism's MEV-Boost) creates isolated auction markets. This fragments MEV revenue and builder capital, reducing efficiency and increasing latency for cross-domain arbitrage.\n- Problem: A $5M arb opportunity between Arbitrum and Base requires two separate, uncoordinated auctions.\n- Solution: A cross-domain PBS aggregates liquidity and ordering rights, enabling atomic cross-rollup bundles.
The User Experience Dead-End
Users expect seamless cross-chain interactions via intents (e.g., UniswapX, CowSwap). Single-domain PBS cannot fulfill these intents atomically, forcing risky bridging and settlement delays.\n- Problem: An intent to swap ETH on Ethereum for SOL on Solana fails if the two domain auctions are won by different, uncooperative builders.\n- Solution: Cross-domain PBS acts as a coordinated settlement layer, guaranteeing atomic execution for cross-domain intents powered by Across and LayerZero.
The Builder Cartel Risk
Dominant builders like Jito Labs and Flashbots can dominate individual domain auctions, leading to centralization and potential censorship. This risk multiplies across dozens of rollups.\n- Problem: A builder controlling >33% of Ethereum and >50% of a major L2 can censor transactions across the entire ecosystem.\n- Solution: Cross-domain PBS introduces competitive friction; a cartel must now win simultaneous auctions across multiple, potentially adversarial domains, raising the economic and coordination cost of attack.
The Economic Inefficiency of Isolated MEV
MEV extraction is suboptimal when sequencers/validators on different chains act independently. This leaves cross-domain MEV (e.g., DEX arb, oracle updates) on the table, reducing overall network security budget.\n- Problem: An oracle update on Ethereum creating a $2M arb on Avalanche cannot be captured by either chain's local PBS.\n- Solution: A unified auction surface allows builders to bid for global MEV opportunities, maximizing extractable value that can be redistributed as proposer rewards or protocol revenue.
Deep Dive: The Anatomy of a Cross-Domain Bundle
Cross-domain bundles are the atomic unit of execution that will unify the fragmented multi-chain ecosystem.
Cross-domain bundles are the new primitive. They are single, signed payloads containing instructions for multiple, heterogeneous chains, executed atomically by a unified sequencer network. This replaces the manual, error-prone process of managing separate transactions across Ethereum, Arbitrum, and Solana.
The bundle is the product, not the transaction. Builders compete to construct optimal bundles that satisfy complex user intents, like cross-DEX arbitrage or leveraged position management across Aave and dYdX. This shifts the economic center of gravity from simple block building to cross-domain state optimization.
PBS evolves into Cross-Domain PBS (CDPBS). A new role, the Cross-Domain Builder, emerges. They must source liquidity and compute across domains, using systems like EigenLayer for restaking security and Succinct for proof aggregation, to guarantee atomicity. The winning bundle is a single, verifiable claim of multi-chain state change.
Evidence: MEV already spans domains. Flashbots' SUAVE and protocols like Across demonstrate the demand for cross-chain intent fulfillment. The next evolution bundles these actions into a single, auctionable unit for Ethereum proposers and Alt-L1 validators to sell.
Protocol Landscape: Who's Building Cross-Domain PBS?
A technical comparison of leading cross-domain PBS architectures, focusing on their core mechanisms, interoperability, and economic models.
| Feature / Metric | SUAVE | Espresso Systems | Astria | Anoma (Namada) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Core Architecture | Decentralized Block Builder Network | Shared Sequencer + PBS | Decentralized Sequencer Network | Intent-Centric Coordination |
Primary Use Case | MEV extraction & cross-chain settlement | Rollup sequencing & shared security | Rollup sequencing & interoperability | Multi-chain atomic settlement |
Cross-Domain Atomicity | Via SUAVE chain & encrypted mempool | Via HotShot consensus & shared mempool | Via shared sequencer set | Via intent gossip & solving |
Native Interoperability Layer | SUAVE Chain (EVM) | Espresso Sequencer | Astria Shared Sequencer | Taiga (State Transition) & Typhon (IBC) |
Builder Decentralization Model | Permissionless builder entry | Permissioned validator set (initially) | Permissionless sequencer staking | Solver network for intent fulfillment |
Integration Status | Testnet (Ethereum, Arbitrum) | Testnet (integration with Rollkit, Caldera) | Devnet (with Rollkit rollups) | Research / Specification Phase |
Key Dependency | Ethereum for finality & data | Underlying L1 (e.g., Ethereum) for DA | Celestia for Data Availability (DA) | Target chains' bridging infrastructure |
Critical Risks: The Centralization Trilemma of Cross-Domain PBS
Cross-domain Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) must solve for three competing forces: censorship resistance, economic efficiency, and decentralization. Optimizing for two inevitably weakens the third.
The Problem: The Censorship-Resistant Vacuum
A decentralized builder network is slow and uncompetitive, creating a vacuum for centralized, high-performance actors like Flashbots to dominate. This centralizes censorship power.
- Risk: A single builder can blacklist OFAC-sanctioned transactions across multiple chains.
- Outcome: The network trades decentralization for liveness, failing the trilemma.
The Problem: The Economic Efficiency Trap
Maximizing MEV extraction and cross-domain arbitrage requires sophisticated, centralized infrastructure, marginalizing smaller builders.
- Risk: Only entities like Jito Labs or bloXroute can afford the ~500ms cross-chain latency requirements.
- Outcome: The network trades decentralization for economic efficiency, creating a builder oligopoly.
The Problem: The Decentralization Tax
Enforcing decentralization via distributed builder sets or MPC auctions inherently reduces block-building efficiency and profit.
- Risk: Protocols like SUAVE or Astria must sacrifice optimal execution to maintain a permissionless builder set.
- Outcome: The network trades economic efficiency for decentralization, leaking value to competing chains.
The Solution: Enshrined PBS as a Neutral Foundation
Bake PBS directly into the protocol layer (e.g., Ethereum's EIP-4844 path) to create a credibly neutral, decentralized marketplace.
- Benefit: Removes reliance on off-chain, centralized relay networks.
- Mechanism: Protocol-native auction house forces competition on a level playing field.
The Solution: Intent-Based Abstraction via SUAVE
Shift the competitive layer from block building to user intent fulfillment. Users express goals; a decentralized network competes to solve them.
- Benefit: Decouples decentralization from latency-critical execution.
- Analogy: Turns the MEV supply chain into a CowSwap or UniswapX model for all transactions.
The Solution: Economic Slashing & Reputation Bonds
Impose severe crypto-economic penalties for centralized behavior like censorship or exclusivity. EigenLayer restakers could act as enforcers.
- Benefit: Makes censorship more expensive than honest participation.
- Mechanism: $1B+ slashable bonds align builder incentives with network health.
Future Outlook: The Path to Credibly Neutral Cross-Domain PBS
Proposer-Builder Separation must evolve into a cross-domain coordination layer to prevent fragmentation and rent extraction in a multi-chain ecosystem.
Single-domain PBS is obsolete. Isolated PBS per chain (e.g., Ethereum, Solana) creates fragmented markets, allowing builders to extract monopoly rents on each domain. The future is a cross-domain PBS network that aggregates blockspace across rollups and L1s into a single auction.
Shared sequencing is the first step. Rollups like Arbitrum and Optimism outsourcing to a shared sequencer set (e.g., Espresso, Astria) create the atomic composability prerequisite for cross-domain PBS. This shared sequencing layer becomes the natural substrate for a unified builder market.
Intent-based primitives are the execution engine. Builders will not manually construct cross-chain bundles. They will fulfill user intents expressed through systems like UniswapX or Across, using solvers and bridges like Stargate to atomically execute across domains. The builder's role shifts from manual assembly to intent resolution.
Credible neutrality requires open protocols. A proprietary cross-domain PBS controlled by a single entity (e.g., a foundation or L2 team) recreates the centralization problem. The solution is a permissionless builder marketplace with standardized APIs, akin to how Flashbots' SUAVE envisions a decentralized block-building network.
Evidence: The economic incentive is undeniable. A builder capturing MEV across Ethereum and ten major rollups today must win ten separate auctions. A unified auction consolidates this power, increasing efficiency but demanding robust, neutral infrastructure to prevent a single-point cartel.
Key Takeaways for Builders and Architects
Proposer-Builder Separation is evolving from an L1 auction into a cross-chain coordination primitive. Here's how to architect for it.
The Problem: Cross-Chain MEV is a Fragmented Nightmare
Arbitrage and liquidations across L2s and alt-L1s create ~$100M+ in annual MEV but require separate builder setups per chain. This fragments capital and operational security.
- Fragmented Liquidity: Builders must post bonds and hold native gas tokens on dozens of chains.
- Operational Overhead: Managing validator relationships and software across heterogeneous environments.
- Missed Opportunities: Latency between chain finalities kills cross-domain arbitrage.
The Solution: Shared Sequencing as the Ultimate PBS Hub
A dedicated sequencing layer (e.g., Espresso, Astria) acts as a neutral, cross-rollup block space marketplace. Builders compete once for bundles spanning multiple L2s.
- Unified Auction: Single PBS auction for blocks across Optimism, Arbitrum, zkSync.
- Atomic Cross-Rollup Bundles: Enable sub-second arbitrage between L2s without inter-chain bridges.
- Capital Efficiency: One staking bond secures revenue across all connected rollups.
The Problem: Builder Centralization Begets Censorship
Top-tier builders like Flashbots and bloXroute dominate Ethereum PBS, creating >80% builder market share. This centralization risk enables transaction censorship and creates a single point of failure.
- Regulatory Attack Surface: Centralized builders are vulnerable to OFAC compliance demands.
- Trust Assumptions: Relayers must be trusted not to steal or reorder bundles.
- Barrier to Entry: High hardware and staking costs solidify oligopoly.
The Solution: Enshrined PBS with Permissionless Builders
Protocol-native PBS (e.g., Ethereum's EIP-4844 danksharding vision, Celestia) bakes the auction into consensus. Anyone can be a builder by simply submitting a valid block.
- Censorship Resistance: Validators are randomly assigned to builders, breaking stable relationships.
- Reduced Trust: Builders cannot equivocate; protocol slashes them.
- Democratized Access: Lowers hardware barriers, fostering a long-tail builder ecosystem.
The Problem: Intents Break the Traditional PBS Model
User-centric intent-based architectures (UniswapX, CowSwap, Across) shift agency from builders to solvers. The PBS auction now competes for solving, not just block building.
- Auction Inversion: Solvers bid for the right to fulfill a user's intent, not sell block space.
- Complex Settlement: Winning solver must often interact with LayerZero, Circle CCTP, or custom bridges.
- New Trust Model: Users must trust solver networks, not just block proposers.
The Solution: PBS as a Generalized Solving Marketplace
Future PBS infrastructure will auction intent fulfillment rights. Builders evolve into cross-domain solvers with specialized liquidity and routing (e.g., Across, Socket).
- Specialized Solvers: Some dominate DEX arb, others dominate bridge liquidity.
- Atomic Composability: Solver's bundle is the block, ensuring execution guarantee.
- User Pays for Outcome: Fees are for solved intent, not gas, improving UX.
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