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layer-2-wars-arbitrum-optimism-base-and-beyond
Blog

The Future of Builder-Block Proposer Separation on Layer 2

PBS on Ethereum solves validator centralization. On L2s, the problem shifts to sequencer-builder separation—a harder, more urgent challenge for Arbitrum, Optimism, and Base that redefines MEV capture and decentralization.

introduction
THE SEPARATION

Introduction

The decoupling of block building from block proposing is the next logical evolution for Layer 2 scaling, moving beyond simple transaction ordering.

Builder-Block Proposer Separation (BBPS) is the direct application of Ethereum's PBS to L2s. It creates a specialized market where builders compete on execution quality, not just transaction ordering, to maximize value for the sequencer and users.

Current L2 sequencers are monopolies that bundle ordering, building, and execution. This creates a single point of failure and censors transactions, unlike the competitive, permissionless builder markets seen on Ethereum with Flashbots' SUAVE or Titan Builder.

The core value is MEV redistribution. A competitive builder market on an L2 like Arbitrum or Optimism captures and efficiently redistributes cross-domain MEV, improving user execution and generating a new revenue stream for the protocol treasury.

Evidence: Ethereum's PBS post-EIP-1559 redirects ~90% of MEV to builders and proposers. L2s that implement BBPS will see a similar shift, transforming sequencer revenue from simple gas fees to a share of sophisticated cross-chain arbitrage.

thesis-statement
THE ARCHITECTURAL DIVIDE

The Core Argument: L2 PBS is a Different Beast

Proposer-Builder Separation on Layer 2 is architecturally distinct from Ethereum L1, demanding new models, not direct ports.

Sequencers are the natural builders. The L2 sequencer already performs the core builder function: ordering transactions and constructing execution payloads. This centralization is the problem PBS must solve, not an external market to create.

The economic model diverges. L1 PBS monetizes MEV. L2 PBS must prioritize sequencer decentralization and liveness. The primary value is censorship resistance and protocol security, not maximal extractable value auction revenue.

Shared sequencing layers like Espresso and Astria are the logical evolution. They separate block building from proposing by creating a neutral marketplace for execution, enabling cross-rollup atomic composability as a core feature.

Evidence: The failure of direct ports is visible. Proposals to auction L2 blocks via MEV-Boost clones ignore that sequencer revenue is already subsidized by L1 gas savings and user fees, creating a weak economic foundation for a pure MEV auction.

BUILDER-BLOCK PROPOSER SEPARATION

The L1 vs. L2 PBS Landscape

A comparison of Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) implementations across Ethereum L1 and major L2 rollups, focusing on architectural choices, economic models, and censorship resistance.

Feature / MetricEthereum L1 (Post-ePBS)Arbitrum (Timeboost)Optimism (MEV-Boost L2)Base (SUAVE-Share)

PBS Implementation

Enshrined PBS (ePBS)

Auction-based PBS (Timeboost)

Port of MEV-Boost (Permissioned)

SUAVE-based PBS (FCFS)

Block Builder Role

External Builders

Sequencer (Builder)

External Builders

SUAVE Executors

Proposer/Bidder Role

Consensus Validator

Sequencer (Bidder)

Sequencer (Bidder)

Sequencer (Bidder)

Auction Type

First-Price Sealed-Bid

First-Price Sealed-Bid

First-Price Sealed-Bid

Priority Gas Auction (PGA)

Censorship Resistance

crLists (Enshrined)

Delayed Inbox (Force-Inclusion)

None (Permissioned Builders)

FCFS w/ Private Mempool

MEV Revenue Distribution

Validator → Builder

Sequencer Treasury

Sequencer Treasury

Sequencer → SUAVE Executor

Time to Finality Impact

< 1 sec

Adds 1-2 sec

Adds ~1 sec

Adds < 1 sec

Primary Risk Vector

Validator Collusion

Sequencer Centralization

Builder Cartelization

SUAVE Adoption & Security

deep-dive
THE COMPLEXITY

The Architectural Quagmire: Why L2 PBS is Harder

Implementing Proposer-Builder Separation on Layer 2s introduces unique challenges absent from Ethereum L1.

Sequencer Centralization is the default. L2s like Arbitrum and Optimism launch with a single, trusted sequencer to guarantee liveness and transaction ordering. Introducing a competitive PBS market requires first decentralizing this core role, a multi-year governance and technical hurdle.

MEV is fundamentally different. On L1, PBS captures cross-domain MEV between DeFi pools. An L2's MEV is mostly internal, extracted from its own AMMs like Uniswap or GMX, creating a smaller, less competitive market for specialized builders.

Fast finality breaks the model. L2s offer near-instant confirmation. This eliminates the time auction essential to Ethereum's PBS, where builders have 12 seconds to construct optimal blocks. Real-time sequencing requires new, untested auction mechanisms.

Evidence: No major L2 has implemented live PBS. Optimism's initial design, OP Stack, still relies on a centralized sequencer, while Arbitrum's decentralized sequencer roadmap remains a long-term research project, highlighting the implementation gap.

protocol-spotlight
BUILDER-PROPOSER SEPARATION ON L2

Protocol Spotlight: Who's Building What

The MEV supply chain is being unbundled on Layer 2. Here's how leading protocols are implementing PBS to secure, decentralize, and optimize their sequencers.

01

Arbitrum BOLD: Decentralizing the Sequencer with On-Chain Fraud Proofs

Arbitrum's BOLD protocol enforces builder-proposer separation by moving fraud proofs on-chain, making the sequencer role permissionless and contestable.\n- Key Benefit: Sequencer decentralization via permissionless challenge protocol.\n- Key Benefit: Enables trust-minimized, multi-entity sequencing for Nitro chains.

7 Days
Challenge Window
Permissionless
Sequencer Set
02

Optimism's MEV-Aware PBS: Mitigating Negative Externalities

Optimism's design focuses on PBS to prevent value extraction that harms users, integrating with systems like MEV-Share and MEV-Boost.\n- Key Benefit: Proposer can enforce ethical rules on builder blocks (e.g., front-running protection).\n- Key Benefit: Revenue redistribution to users and the protocol treasury via MEV smoothing.

>80%
MEV Recycled
Censorship-Resistant
By Design
03

Espresso Systems: Shared, Auction-Based Sequencer Marketplace

Espresso provides a shared sequencer layer where rollups can outsource sequencing to a decentralized network, with PBS at its core via a timely auction.\n- Key Benefit: Cross-rollup atomic composability enabled by a shared sequencer.\n- Key Benefit: Economic security from staked proposers and competitive builder bidding.

~2s
Finality Time
Multi-Rollup
Throughput
04

The Problem: Centralized Sequencers Are a Single Point of Failure

Today, most L2s run a single, centralized sequencer. This creates censorship risk, creates a liveness bottleneck, and centralizes all MEV capture.\n- Consequence: Users have no guarantees against transaction reordering or exclusion.\n- Consequence: Creates a massive, opaque MEV pool controlled by one entity.

1
Active Sequencer
100%
MEV Capture
05

Shared Sequencer Networks: The Interoperability Play

Protocols like Astria and Radius are building dedicated PBS layers that multiple rollups can plug into, separating block building from proposing.\n- Key Benefit: Instant atomic cross-rollup arbitrage becomes native.\n- Key Benefit: Economies of scale in security and decentralization efforts.

10x+
More Builders
Sub-Second
Cross-Rollup TX
06

The Solution: Credibly Neutral Proposer Auctions

The endgame is a verifiable, on-chain auction where the highest bidder (builder) wins block space, and the proposer's only role is inclusion. This mirrors Ethereum's PBS trajectory.\n- Key Outcome: MEV is commoditized, pushing profits to the protocol and users.\n- Key Outcome: Censorship resistance is enforced at the protocol level.

>95%
Efficiency Gain
Protocol-Owned
Revenue Stream
risk-analysis
BUILDER-PROPOSER SEPARATION ON L2

Risk Analysis: What Could Go Wrong

Separating block building from proposing on L2s introduces new attack vectors and systemic risks that could undermine decentralization and finality.

01

The Centralizing Force of MEV Cartels

Top-tier builders like Flashbots SUAVE and BloXroute could dominate L2 block space, replicating Ethereum's PBS centralization. This creates a single point of failure and censorship risk.

  • Risk: Builder market share exceeding 50% for a single entity.
  • Consequence: Transaction censorship and extractive MEV becomes the norm, not the exception.
>50%
Market Share Risk
High
Censorship Risk
02

Cross-Domain MEV and Reorg Attacks

Builders with visibility across L1 and multiple L2s (e.g., EigenLayer, Across) can orchestrate sophisticated attacks. A malicious builder could force an L2 reorg to profit on a correlated L1 derivative.

  • Risk: Time-bandit attacks targeting L2's shorter finality windows (~12s vs. Ethereum's 12 min).
  • Consequence: User transactions are reverted, breaking atomic composability guarantees.
~12s
L2 Finality Window
Critical
Settlement Risk
03

Proposer Collusion and Enshrined Rent Extraction

L2 sequencers/proposers can collude with a preferred builder to capture all MEV, turning the protocol into a rent-seeking cartel. This defeats the purpose of separation.

  • Risk: Opaque, off-chain deal-making between proposers and builders.
  • Consequence: User fees remain high despite technological improvements, eroding L2 value proposition.
0%
User Savings
Opaque
Fee Market
04

Data Unavailability Cripples Fraud Proofs

If a malicious builder withholds transaction data after proposing a block, the L2's fraud proof or validity proof system cannot function. This is a fatal flaw for optimistic rollups.

  • Risk: Builder acts as a single point of failure for data availability.
  • Consequence: The L2 halts or requires a centralized operator intervention, breaking trustless assumptions.
Single Point
Of Failure
Chain Halt
Worst Case
05

Complexity Overload and Protocol Fragility

Adding a PBS-like layer introduces massive protocol complexity. Bugs in the builder market or relay infrastructure (see Ethereum's mev-boost bugs) could lead to network instability or stolen funds.

  • Risk: New attack surfaces in bidding logic, relay attestations, and block validation.
  • Consequence: Catastrophic failures that are harder to audit and recover from than a monolithic sequencer.
High
Attack Surface
Low
Auditability
06

The Regulatory Landmine of OFAC Compliance

Builders complying with OFAC sanctions will censor transactions, forcing L2s to choose between decentralization and legal compliance. This fractures the network and creates compliant vs. non-compliant chain splits.

  • Risk: Legal pressure forces builders like Flashbots to filter L2 blocks.
  • Consequence: A two-tiered system emerges, undermining credible neutrality and permissionless access.
High
Legal Pressure
Fractured
Network State
future-outlook
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

Future Outlook: The 18-Month Horizon

The decoupling of block building from proposing will define the next evolution of Layer 2 scaling and economic security.

Builder specialization drives efficiency. Dedicated builders like Espresso Systems and RiscZero will create optimized execution environments, commoditizing block production and lowering fees for end-users.

Proposers become validators of state. The L2 proposer's role shifts from computation to verification, relying on zero-knowledge proofs and fraud proofs from builders to secure the chain.

This creates a new MEV supply chain. Builders will compete for cross-domain MEV opportunities, integrating with solvers from CowSwap and UniswapX to capture value across Ethereum and its L2s.

Evidence: The proliferation of shared sequencer sets (e.g., Astria, Espresso) demonstrates the market demand for neutral, high-performance block building separate from proposer governance.

takeaways
THE PBS FRONTIER ON L2

Key Takeaways for Builders and Investors

The separation of block building and proposing is migrating from Ethereum L1 to the high-stakes, high-throughput world of Layer 2s, creating new vectors for MEV, security, and performance.

01

The MEV Redistribution

L2 PBS shifts MEV extraction from a sequencer's private domain to a competitive, open market. This commoditizes block space and forces a re-evaluation of value flows.

  • Key Benefit: Democratizes access to L2 MEV, creating new revenue streams for proposers.
  • Key Benefit: Increases economic security by aligning validator incentives with chain liveness.
$100M+
Annual MEV
>50%
To Proposers
02

The Censorship-Resistance Mandate

Centralized sequencers are a single point of censorship. PBS introduces a credibly neutral proposer layer that can enforce inclusion lists, a critical feature for L2s aiming for true decentralization.

  • Key Benefit: Enables compliance with Ethereum's roadmap (e.g., EIP-4844 blob inclusion).
  • Key Benefit: Mitigates regulatory risk by separating transaction ordering from execution.
0
Forced Exclusion
100%
L1 Alignment
03

The Specialized Builder Ecosystem

Generalized L1 builders (like Flashbots SUAVE) will be outcompeted by L2-native builders optimized for specific VM architectures (zkVM, OP Stack, Arbitrum Stylus).

  • Key Benefit: ~500ms latency optimizations for fast L2 finality.
  • Key Benefit: Custom preconfirmations and intent-solving for apps like UniswapX and CowSwap.
10x
Efficiency Gain
<1s
Preconfirmations
04

The Cross-Chain PBS Network

PBS infrastructure will not be siloed. Builders serving Optimism, Arbitrum, and zkSync will form a cross-L2 network, leveraging shared liquidity and MEV opportunities via bridges like Across and LayerZero.

  • Key Benefit: Unlocks cross-domain MEV arbitrage as a new asset class.
  • Key Benefit: Reduces capital fragmentation, increasing builder profitability.
5-10
L2s Served
$1B+
Cross-Domain Value
05

The Regulatory Attack Surface

Decentralizing the proposer role does not absolve builders from regulatory scrutiny. OFAC-compliant block building will become a service, creating a compliance premium and potential fragmentation.

  • Key Benefit: Clear separation allows compliant and non-compliant chains to coexist.
  • Key Benefit: Provides investors with a measurable 'decentralization score' for due diligence.
2x
Compliance Premium
High
Legal Clarity
06

The Endgame: Shared Sequencing

PBS is a stepping stone to shared sequencer sets (like Espresso or Astria), where a decentralized network of proposers orders transactions for multiple L2s simultaneously, achieving atomic cross-rollup composability.

  • Key Benefit: Eliminates bridging latency for native cross-L2 DeFi.
  • Key Benefit: Creates a unified security and liquidity layer, challenging monolithic L1s.
0s
Bridge Delay
L1 Grade
Security
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