The Future of Delegation: Private Preferences, Public Proxies

ZK-proofs and MPC have moved from R&D to mainnet. Projects like Aztec and Nocturne enable private on-chain actions, while FHE networks like Fhenix and Inco are emerging. This allows for confidential voting preferences and delegation strategies without exposing alpha.

• Key Benefit: Enforceable, verifiable privacy for voter intent.
• Key Benefit: Mitigates vote-buying and coercion by hiding signals pre-execution.

The success of UniswapX, CowSwap, and Across has validated intent-centric design. Users declare outcomes, and a solver network competes to fulfill them. This abstraction layer is perfect for delegation: specify a governance outcome, and a proxy network competes to execute it optimally.

• Key Benefit: User specifies what, not how, simplifying complex multi-chain governance.
• Key Benefit: Solver competition drives efficiency in proposal analysis and execution.

Incumbents like Lido and emerging players are building sophisticated delegation markets. The EigenLayer restaking primitive creates a new security layer for actively validated services (AVS), including governance. This creates a liquid market for delegation rights and proxy performance.

• Key Benefit: Economic security slashing aligns proxy incentives with delegators.
• Key Benefit: $15B+ TVL in restaking creates a massive capital base for proxy services.

Delegating transaction construction to a public proxy (e.g., UniswapX, CowSwap) outsources MEV strategy and security. The proxy's logic becomes the user's attack surface.

• Risk: Proxy operators can censor, front-run, or implement logic that fails to execute optimal routes.
• Vector: A malicious or buggy solver in a batch auction can steal value from the entire batch, impacting all users.

Private preferences (e.g., max slippage, preferred DEX) must be revealed for execution, creating a timing vulnerability between intent signing and on-chain settlement.

• Risk: Sophisticated searchers can sniff mempools or intercept off-chain messages to front-run the intended transaction.
• Vector: Systems like Flashbots SUAVE or EigenLayer operators could exploit this window if privacy is not cryptographically enforced.

Intent-based systems often rely on a small set of highly specialized solvers or relayers (e.g., Across, LayerZero Oracles) for economic viability, creating central points of failure.

• Risk: Collusion or regulatory capture of these core entities can halt the network or extract monopoly rents.
• Vector: A governance attack on the solver set or a critical bug in a dominant solver's software can cause systemic failure.

Proxies must choose between submitting transactions to high-latency private mempools (for MEV protection) or public mempools (for liveness). This trade-off is fundamental.

• Risk: Over-reliance on Flashbots Protect-style relays creates a single point of censorship, as seen with OFAC compliance.
• Vector: A state-level actor could pressure the dominant private relay to censor transactions, breaking the system's liveness guarantees.

Verifying that a proxy executed a complex, cross-chain intent correctly is computationally intensive, often requiring optimistic or zero-knowledge proofs.

• Risk: Users cannot practically verify execution, shifting trust to proof verifiers or fraud proof challengers.
• Vector: A bug in the verification contract (e.g., in Optimism's fraud proof system or a zkSNARK circuit) can lead to stolen funds with no recourse.

Proxy networks rely on intricate incentive models (solver bonds, tip auctions, revenue sharing) that are vulnerable to economic attacks and market manipulation.

• Risk: Staked capital in systems like EigenLayer or solver bonds can be slashed due to protocol bugs or malicious reporting.
• Vector: An attacker can perform a bribe attack to manipulate solver selection or corrupt the outcome of a batch auction for profit.

Delegating your stake publicly reveals your governance strategy, creating a target for bribery, coercion, and front-running. This forces large holders into passive, non-aligned voting.

• Exposes your entire position and strategy on-chain.
• Invites governance attacks and vote-buying schemes.
• Reduces participation from security-conscious entities (e.g., funds, foundations).

Protocols like Shutter Network and Aztec enable confidential voting by using threshold encryption. Voters submit encrypted votes, which are only revealed and tallied after the voting period ends.

• Enables private expression of preference, breaking bribery markets.
• Maintains final public verifiability of the aggregated result.
• Integrates with existing Snapshot/on-chain frameworks via relayer networks.

Separate the 'what' (private intent) from the 'who' (public proxy). Users sign off-chain messages defining delegation rules (e.g., 'vote with the majority of these 5 experts'), executed by a permissionless network of solvers.

• Decouples identity from execution, enhancing privacy and flexibility.
• Creates a solver market for optimal vote execution, similar to UniswapX or CowSwap for liquidity.
• Enables complex, conditional strategies without on-chain gas overhead.

Restaking transforms passive stake into active, programmatic security. Delegation becomes subscribing your stake to an Actively Validated Service (AVS) that automatically executes your encoded governance strategy across multiple chains.

• Monetizes delegation beyond native token rewards (AVS fees).
• Scales a single stake's influence across Ethereum, EigenDA, and other AVSs.
• Shifts risk model from 'trust a person' to 'trust cryptoeconomic security'.

The future KPI isn't just APR, but Delegation Yield—a composite of native rewards, AVS fees, and governance influence premium. Private preferences allow for optimizing across this vector without revealing strategy.

• Quantifies the total value of delegated capital, including non-monetary power.
• Drives competition among proxy services and AVS operators.
• Forces a re-evaluation of 'secure' vs. 'productive' stake.

Delegation evolves into a programmable asset class. Your stake's voting power can be automatically allocated via smart contracts to maximize DY, hedge governance risk, or align with dynamic, off-chain reputation scores.

• Turns governance rights into a composable, financial primitive.
• Enables derivatives markets on future voting influence.
• Finalizes the shift from human-led DAOs to algorithmically-steered protocol ecosystems.