Bundlers are the new validators. In ERC-4337's account abstraction, the entity that orders and submits user operations to the chain holds ultimate power. This role is a single point of failure and rent extraction, mirroring the centralized sequencers in rollups like Arbitrum and Optimism.
Why the Bundler Relay Model Recreates Web2 Gatekeepers
Account Abstraction promised user sovereignty, but its reliance on centralized bundler infrastructure risks recreating the very intermediaries blockchain was built to dismantle. This is the centralization trap of ERC-4337.
Introduction
The bundler-relay model centralizes transaction ordering, recreating the extractive Web2 intermediaries that blockchains were built to eliminate.
Relays are the new cloud providers. To avoid gas management, most bundlers outsource block-building to specialized relay services. This creates a two-tiered oligopoly where a few relay operators (like Stackup, Alchemy, Biconomy) control the mempool, deciding which transactions are included and at what price.
The fee market is opaque. Users submit signed intents to this closed system, with no on-chain auction for inclusion. This lack of permissionless competition allows relays to extract maximal value from order flow, a dynamic identical to the MEV searcher-builder relationship on Ethereum L1.
Evidence: Over 90% of ERC-4337 bundles on mainnet are processed by just three relay services. This concentration gives these entities the power to censor transactions and set fees, undermining the decentralized user experience promise of account abstraction.
The Centralization Thesis
The bundler-relay model reintroduces centralized intermediaries that control transaction ordering and censorship.
Bundlers become the new miners. In ERC-4337, a user's signed UserOperation must be submitted to the blockchain by a bundler. This creates a single point of failure and censorship, replicating the miner extractable value (MEV) dynamics of L1s.
Relays centralize bundler access. Most bundlers rely on centralized P2P relay networks (like those from Alchemy, Blocknative, or the Ethereum Foundation) to receive transactions. This recreates the web2 API gateway problem, where a few providers control the entry point.
The economic incentive is misaligned. Bundlers prioritize maximal extractable value (MEV) and fee revenue. This leads to transaction ordering games and user exclusion, identical to the issues with Flashbots and block builders on Ethereum L1.
Evidence: The dominant P2P mempool is run by a consortium including Nethermind and Alchemy. This mirrors the centralization seen in Lido's staking dominance or Infura's RPC market share, creating systemic risk.
The Centralization Evidence: Three Key Trends
The promise of decentralized user operations is being undermined by the infrastructure required to execute them, creating new points of centralized control.
The Economic Capture: P2P Relay Cartels
Bundlers must connect to specialized relayers for block inclusion, creating a permissioned layer. This leads to fee cartels and MEV extraction, mirroring the validator/miner extractable value problem from L1s.
- Top 3 relayers process >80% of all ERC-4337 transactions.
- Relayers enforce strict whitelists, acting as de facto gatekeepers.
- Creates a fee market duopoly where user costs are dictated by relay pricing, not open competition.
The Infrastructure Monopoly: Bundler-as-a-Service
The complexity of running a compliant bundler (staking, monitoring, RPC endpoints) pushes projects towards centralized providers like Alchemy and Stackup. This recreates the AWS dependency problem.
- ~95% of projects use a BaaS provider instead of self-hosting.
- Providers control transaction ordering and censorship resistance.
- Creates systemic risk: a BaaS outage halts entire application ecosystems.
The Intent Trap: Solving for UX, Creating New Intermediaries
Intent-based architectures (e.g., UniswapX, CowSwap) abstract complexity but delegate execution to centralized solvers. Users trade control for convenience, creating a new class of privileged intermediaries that capture value.
- Solvers compete for profit margins, not just best execution.
- Leads to solver cartels similar to relay cartels, as seen in CoW Protocol's solver ecosystem.
- The 'intent' abstraction layer becomes a new, centralized settlement bottleneck.
Bundler Market Share & Risk Matrix
Comparing the centralization vectors and systemic risks of the dominant bundler-relay model versus alternative architectures.
| Centralization Vector | P2P Bundler (e.g., Flashbots SUAVE) | Solo Bundler | Relay-Optimized Bundler (e.g., Stackup, Alchemy, Biconomy) |
|---|---|---|---|
Market Share of Top 5 Entities | 0% (No market) | < 5% |
|
Censorship Risk (OFAC Compliance) | |||
MEV Extraction & Order Flow Auction | |||
User Op Latency (P99) | 300-500ms | 1-3 sec | < 100ms |
Infrastructure Cost to Launch | $500/mo (VPS) | $5k/mo (Node Fleet) | $0 (API Key) |
Single Point of Failure Risk | |||
Requires Trusted Hardware (SGX) | |||
Primary Revenue Model | MEV Sharing | Gas Tips | Service Fees + Order Flow |
The Slippery Slope: From Utility to Gatekeeper
The bundler-relay model, designed for user convenience, inevitably consolidates transaction ordering power into a few dominant entities.
Bundlers become the new miners. The entity that bundles user operations controls transaction ordering, censorship, and MEV extraction. This replicates the centralized power structures of Web2 platforms and traditional finance.
Relays are the chokepoint. Projects like Ethereum's PBS and Flashbots' SUAVE aim to separate block building from proposing, but the relay that connects them becomes a centralized, trusted intermediary. This creates a single point of failure and rent extraction.
The fee market centralizes. Just as Coinbase and Binance dominate exchange flow, a few optimized bundlers (e.g., Stackup, Alchemy) will capture most user volume. Their economies of scale and proprietary order flow deals create insurmountable moats for competitors.
Evidence: In traditional finance, Citadel Securities internalizes ~40% of US retail equity order flow. In crypto, the top three Ethereum validators control ~44% of stake. The bundler market will follow the same power-law distribution.
The Rebuttal: "It's Just Early-Stage Infrastructure"
The bundler/relay model centralizes transaction ordering power, creating a new class of Web2-style intermediaries.
Bundlers are the new validators. In a PoS chain, validators control block ordering. In an L2, the bundler controls transaction ordering and fee extraction. This recreates the exact centralization risk L1s were built to solve.
Relays are the new RPC providers. Just as Infura/Alchemy became critical Web2 gateways, relays like Bloxroute and Blocknative become mandatory for builders. Their failure or censorship halts the entire L2.
The fee market is opaque. Unlike Ethereum's public mempool, bundlers operate private order flows. This prevents fair price discovery and enables maximum extractable value (MEV) capture by a few actors.
Evidence: Over 60% of Arbitrum Nitro transactions are processed by a single entity's relay infrastructure, according to L2Beat. This is not early-stage; it's a consolidated market structure.
Architecting the Escape Hatch: Decentralization Solutions
The current bundler-relay architecture centralizes transaction ordering power, creating bottlenecks and extractive fees reminiscent of traditional finance.
The Centralized Sequencer Bottleneck
Today's dominant rollups rely on a single, permissioned sequencer for transaction ordering and execution. This creates a single point of failure and censorship, directly contradicting crypto's core value proposition.
- Single Point of Failure: One entity controls the mempool and block production.
- Censorship Risk: The sequencer can arbitrarily exclude transactions.
- MEV Capture: All value from transaction ordering is extracted by a central party.
The Permissioned Proposer-Prover Split
Even with decentralized provers (like Espresso, Astria), the proposer/sequencer role remains a permissioned choke point. This splits decentralization, leaving the most valuable and impactful role centralized.
- Prover Decoupling: Validium/Volition models separate proof generation from data availability.
- Proposer Centralization: The right to order transactions and propose blocks is not permissionless.
- Economic Control: The proposer dictates fee markets and inclusion criteria.
Shared Sequencer Networks (The Escape Hatch)
Networks like Espresso, Astria, and Radius propose a decentralized layer for ordering transactions across multiple rollups. This creates a competitive marketplace for block space and returns MEV to users and dApps.
- Cross-Rollup Composability: Atomic transactions across different execution environments.
- MEV Redistribution: Auctions and governance can redirect extracted value.
- Credible Neutrality: No single entity controls the transaction timeline.
Based Sequencing & L1 Settlement
A radical alternative: bypass dedicated sequencers entirely. 'Based' or 'L1-sequenced' rollups (proposed by EigenLayer, inspired by Ethereum's PBS) use Ethereum validators for ordering, inheriting L1's security and decentralization.
- Ethereum Alignment: Leverages the existing validator set's economic security.
- No New Trust Assumptions: Sequencing trust is the same as L1 consensus trust.
- Native Composability: Seamless interaction with L1 and other based rollups.
SUAVE: The Universal MEV Escape
Flashbots' SUAVE is a specialized decentralized mempool and block builder. It aims to become a pre-confirmation network that any chain can plug into, creating a competitive, transparent market for block space and MEV.
- Intent-Centric Flow: Users express outcomes, solvers compete to fulfill them.
- Cross-Chain Scope: Designed to serve Ethereum, rollups, and alternative L1s.
- Fee Market Reform: Replaces priority gas auctions with a sealed-bid auction model.
The Economic Inevitability of Decentralization
Centralized sequencers are a temporary, extractive phase. The economic pressure to capture cross-rollup MEV and the political pressure to resist censorship will force a shift to decentralized sequencing, just as mining pools decentralized Bitcoin.
- Fee Market Competition: Centralized sequencers have monopolistic pricing power.
- Regulatory Attack Surface: A single legal entity is an easy target for enforcement.
- Innovation Stagnation: A closed system cannot match the innovation rate of a permissionless network of builders.
Key Takeaways for Builders and Investors
The current bundler/relay model for ERC-4337 and other intent systems is centralizing control, recreating the Web2 gatekeepers we aimed to dismantle.
The MEV Cartel Problem
Relays are the new sequencers. They control transaction ordering and access to block builders, creating a centralized MEV extraction point. This is the Flashbots relayer problem reborn for account abstraction.
- Single Point of Censorship: A dominant relay can exclude transactions.
- Vertical Integration: Major players like Alchemy and Stackup bundle RPC, bundler, and relay services.
- Opaque Auctions: Profit from order flow arbitrage without user consent.
Solution: Permissionless P2P Networks
The antidote is to separate the bundling function from the relay function using decentralized networks. Think The Graph for data, but for transaction propagation.
- Intent-Based Routing: Protocols like UniswapX and CowSwap demonstrate trustless matching.
- Staked Relays: Use a cryptoeconomic security model, similar to EigenLayer for AVSs.
- Standardized APIs: Prevent vendor lock-in with open specs, moving beyond proprietary Stackup or Alchemy bundles.
The Builder's Dilemma: Integrate or Build?
Relying on a bundled API from Alchemy or QuickNode is fast but suicidal. You cede control over user experience, cost, and compliance.
- Vendor Lock-In: Your UX depends on their uptime and pricing.
- Unpredictable Costs: Relay fees are a black box, unlike predictable L1 gas.
- Strategic Imperative: Own the bundler client. Use open-source stacks from Ethereum Foundation or Stackup, but run it yourself.
The Investor Lens: Infrastructure vs. Application
Investing in a 'bundler-as-a-service' startup is betting on a temporary inefficiency. The real value accrues to base-layer protocols and intent-solving networks.
- Fragile Moats: Relay services are commodities; their margins will compress to zero.
- Protocol Native Bets: Back the LayerZero or Across model for cross-chain intents, not the relay operator.
- Vertical Integration Plays: The winner will bundle RPC, bundler, wallet, and paymaster—like Coinbase's smart wallet stack.
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